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Sustainable development is the concept of a relationship between 
economic growth and the environment. The term was first used in 
1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(also known as the Brundtland Commission for its chair, Gro Harlem 
Brundtland). In the commission’s report, “Our Common Future,” it de-
fined sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and De-
velopment 1987). Although the term has been around for almost two 
decades, differing interpretations have kept it from being a useful guide 
for development policy. However, there is now progress in moving the 
concept toward a more productive exploration of the relationship be-
tween economic development and environmental quality. For example, 
the International Summit on Sustainable Development that convened in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, in September 2002 provides some promise 
along this line (Hayward 2003).1
Sustainable development analysis differs from the standard eco-
nomics of growth and development by incorporating natural resources 
as a form of natural capital, defined as the value of the existing stock of 
natural resources such as forests, fisheries, water, mineral deposits, and 
the environment in general. Natural capital provides goods and services 
to people, just as do financial capital, manufactured capital, and human 
capital, the last created by investments in education and health. The 
depletion of natural capital can be compensated for, in part, by invest-
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ments in manufactured and human capital. Conceptually, sustainable 
development can be measured by taking a country’s Gross National 
Product (GNP) and subtracting Depreciation of Manufactured Capital 
(Dm) and Depreciation of Natural Capital (Dn) to find Sustainable Net 
National Product (SNNP): 
GNP − Dm − Dn = SNNP.2 
   
It follows that Sustainable Net National Product (SNNP) can be ex-
pressed as
SNNP = GNP − Dm − Dn = C + S − Dm − Dn,
 
where Consumption (C) plus Total Savings (S) minus Depreciation of 
Manufactured Capital (Dm) and Depreciation of Natural Capital (Dn) 
forms the equivalent of the previous equation. This yields the basic sus-
tainability criterion that Net Savings (NS) equals Total Savings (S) mi-
nus Depreciation of Manufactured Capital (Dm) minus Depreciation of 
Natural Capital (Dn), which must be positive:
NS = S − Dm - Dn > 0. 
Moreover, if Depreciation of Human Capital (Dh), whether in the 
form of brain drain or in the form of deterioration in the quality of 
education and health, is included, Sustainable Net National Product 
(SNNP) can be adjusted as follows: 
SNNP* = GNP − Dm − Dn − Dh = C + S − Dm − Dn − Dh,  
or
NS* = S − Dm − Dn − Dh,
 
where
SNNP* = SNNP − Dh
 
and
NS* = NS − Dh.
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The basic criterion of sustainability can now be restated as Net Sav-
ings (NS*) must be greater than zero after depreciation of manufac-
tured, natural, and human capital are accounted for, or 
NS* = S − Dm − Dn - Dh > 0. 
This implies that an economy becomes unsustainable if it fails to reverse 
the depreciation of the three forms of capital—manufactured, natural, 
and human—or, put another way, if natural resources are degraded and 
the quality of education and health deteriorates. The effect would be the 
same if capital flight—including the flight of human capital, or brain 
drain—occurs in a given country.
Natural and other forms of capital, such as manufactured and hu-
man, are both complements and substitutes. Improving either manufac-
tured or human capital can increase natural capital such as soils. 
Many of agriculture’s gains in land productivity are a direct result 
of investments in human capital and in farmers’ knowledge as much as 
they are in manufactured capital (investments in mechanical and bio-
logical technology such as machinery and improved seeds). So it stands 
to reason that there is marked deterioration of natural capital in the 
form of soil erosion, deforestation, and water depletion in economies 
where manufactured and human capital is lacking, such as in Africa. It 
is reasonable to assume that there is a finite or limited substitutability 
between natural and other forms of capital; therefore the preservation of 
various forms of capital for future generations is crucial, since it matters 
what type of capital assets future generations inherit from the current 
generation.
SOME HIGHLIGHTS OF THE CHAPTERS
The six chapters that follow explore various dimensions of sustain-
able development from an economic perspective. The chapters grew out 
of essays that were delivered at the fortieth annual Werner Sichel Eco-
nomics Lecture-Seminar Series, organized by the Department of Eco-
nomics at Western Michigan University. I directed the series, and the 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research cosponsored it with 
the university. The six authors in the volume cover a number of sus-
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tainable development issues: neglected aspects of sustainability (Mal-
colm Gillis); inequality, conflict, and war (E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha 
Auvinen); scientific constraints on sustainable agricultural production 
(Vernon W. Ruttan); economic perspective on population growth (Da-
vid Lam); the relationship between property rights and environmental 
sustainability (Daniel W. Bromley); and rural poverty and sustainable 
natural resource management (Scott M. Swinton). This introductory 
chapter will highlight some of the authors’ main arguments, preparing 
the reader for more detailed discussion and analysis by the individual 
authors. 
In the first chapter, Gillis notes that the concept of sustainable de-
velopment has become quite popular in recent years; there is now even 
a Dow Jones Sustainability Index, intended to guide managers to op-
portunities to secure “green growth” based on an improved natural en-
vironment—the need for clean air, clean water, and a healthy ecosystem 
on which human beings depend. An understanding of sustainable devel-
opment, he says, involves disciplines such as ecology, biology, ethics, 
economics, chemistry, physics, statistics, and engineering. Economics 
has a crucial role to play in this multidisciplinary endeavor. Thus, the 
focus of his chapter is on exploring from an economic perspective a 
sustainable development path that maximizes the long-term net benefits 
to humankind, taking into account the costs of environmental and natu-
ral resource degradation. Gillis points out that sustainable development 
is important for all societies but is especially critical for poor ones, 
which depend more heavily on natural resources such as soils, rivers, 
fisheries, and forests than do richer nations. Environmental problems 
in developing countries are primarily driven by poverty, while those of 
wealthier countries are driven by affluence and overconsumption (Per-
kins et al. 2001). 
Examples of affluence-driven environmental problems include the 
overuse of energy and fuel, highway congestion, and congestion of 
fragile watersheds and beaches with vacation homes. Poverty-driven 
environmental degradation includes deforestation and soil erosion. Gil-
lis points out that until a few years ago 20 percent of the land in Ghana 
(which was once covered with forests), still remained in forest. But 
the forests have now receded to less than 5 percent of the land. The 
problem is similar in many poor economies of Africa, Asia, and Central 
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America. It is estimated that 80 percent of the trees that are felled in 
developing countries are cut down for use in cooking.
Beyond the problems brought on by poverty and affluence, Gillis 
discusses two additional factors that undermine sustainable develop-
ment: market failure and government policy failure. Market failure 
comes from the underpricing of natural resources not traded in private 
markets; it can also be caused by monopolies, externalities, and high 
transaction costs. Policy failure arises from overlooking the environ-
mental consequences of economic policies such as those governing the 
tax code, the exchange rate, industrialization and agricultural and food 
prices. Policy failure often results from a lack of knowledge and under-
standing by policymakers of the role of markets and prices in resource 
conservation and ecological protection. 
Such policy failures include short-sighted subsidy programs that 
undervalue soils, forests, water, and energy resources. Gillis notes that 
energy policy failure has led to unsustainable development in oil pro-
ducing countries such as Nigeria, Indonesia, and Venezuela in at least 
three ways: 
1)  Subsidies lead to overconsumption of energy. 
2)  Excessive use of cars and the fuel they burn adds to congestion 
 and air pollution.
3)  Promotion of cheap energy results in capital-intensive industry  
 inappropriate for a country’s resource endowments. 
For example, Indonesia subsidized kerosene for 15 years with the 
aim of helping the poor by reducing the cutting of wood for fuel. But 
research showed that poor rural families used kerosene for lighting 
and not for cooking. Furthermore, over 80 percent of kerosene was 
consumed not by the poor but by relatively wealthy or higher income 
households. Thus, Indonesia protected some 50,000 acres of forestland 
each year at a cost of $200,000 per acre, for an annual program cost of 
$10 billion. 
Agricultural subsidy is another example of government policy fail-
ure, according to Gillis. This involves the underpricing of chemical fer-
tilizer and herbicides, resulting in overuse of fertilizer, which actually 
reduces the soil’s fertility in tropical agriculture. Agricultural subsidy 
also results in the overuse of chemicals such as herbicides and pesti-
cides, which actually increase infestation by agricultural pests because 
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of their greater effects on the natural predators of pests. Thus, sustain-
able use of resources is possible if governments work to correct both 
market and policy failure. 
The following chapter, by E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen, 
discusses the complex relationships that spring from conditions like 
economic development, inequality, conflict, and war. Nafziger and 
Auvinen explain how economic decline, income inequality, and weak-
ening or failing states with pervasive rent seeking by ruling elites and by 
rebels threaten the survival of people in developing societies. Nafziger 
and Auvinen maintain that competition for control of mineral exports 
leads to elite- and rebel-driven conflicts that contribute to wars and hu-
manitarian disasters for these societies. Their chapter takes a political 
economic approach, which includes not only economic analysis but 
also an examination of the interests of political leaders, rebels, and eco-
nomic policymakers, and the effects of their decisions on poor societies. 
Their data are based on a research project that began in 1996 between 
the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) of 
the United Nations University in Helsinki, Finland, and the University 
of Oxford in England. This project examined 17 case studies of war-af-
flicted developing countries for periods that ranged from the late 1960s 
to 2000, including Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Sudan, 
Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Haiti, El 
Salvador, Colombia, Bosnia, and the South Caucasus. 
Nafziger and Auvinen point out that there has been an increase in 
internecine conflict and humanitarian emergencies in Africa in the last 
two decades of the twentieth century, which is linked to negative per 
capita income growth. Indeed, the continent has the world’s highest 
death rates from wars and humanitarian emergencies such as famines. 
These maladies revolve around economic stagnation and are driven by 
misguided government policies. Per capita GDP in Africa was lower 
in the 1990s than it was in the 1960s, when most African countries 
were becoming independent from European colonialism. Writing in the 
1960s, the eminent economist Gunnar Myrdal of Sweden forecast great 
promise for Ghana and other African states, and a dismal one for Asia 
and for South Korea in particular. But over the next few decades, Afri-
can economies declined while East Asia and South Korea burgeoned as 
vibrant middle income economies. 
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Although several factors may contribute to the economic problems 
of African states, the single most important one is the problem of pred-
atory rule that results from monopoly. Political and economic power 
concentrate in the hands of authoritarian regimes that rule by coercion, 
rely on personality politics, and degrade the institutional foundations of 
the economy and the state, according to Nafziger and Auvinen. Such a 
predatory state is controlled by elites that extract rents rather than pro-
vide incentives for economic growth or the creation of wealth. Much 
of their revenue comes from transfer payments of bilateral or multilat-
eral international aid. In most of these states, the authors point out, rul-
ing elites and their clients use their monopoly on political positions to 
plunder the national economies through corruption, graft, and extortion. 
Instead of serving a public cause, the state in Africa tends to be priva-
tized, or appropriated to the service of private interests by the dominant 
faction of the elite, Nafziger and Auvinen write. This, combined with 
rulers who stay in power for unlimited periods, leads to violent resis-
tance by rebels. Resistance is fiercest in those states in the thrall of 
dictatorial rule and possessing rich mineral resources, such as the for-
mer Zaire (now the Congo) under former president Joseph Mobuto, and 
oil-rich Nigeria under former president Sani Abacha. What this implies 
is that natural resource wealth can be a curse in nondemocratic societ-
ies, where economies are subverted by elites with highly concentrated 
political and economic power.
Nafziger and Auvinen challenge the common view that ethnicity or 
tribalism is the primary cause of economic decline and state conflict in 
African societies. Rather, they assert, ruling political elites invent and 
impose ethnic tensions on society as a way of maintaining power. Thus, 
ethnic hostilities are merely a symptom of the real problems: poverty 
and lack of protection of individual rights and liberty. Furthermore, 
rebel organizations actively manufacture ethnic grievances, Nafziger 
and Auvinen say, as a necessary way of motivating their forces, which 
results in chaos for African societies and plunder of African economies. 
Consequently, where conflicts occur in ethnically diverse African soci-
eties, it will appear as though they are caused by ethnic or tribal hatreds. 
A good example of a state creating divisions where there were none 
occurred in Somalia. The state of Somalia in the Horn of Africa sub-
region is one of the most homogeneous ethnic states on the continent. 
The Somalis speak the same language—Somali—and have the same 
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religion—Islam. But clan-based conflicts between the ruling elite and 
rebels over scarce natural resources led to a collapse of the Somali state 
in 1991 and the ouster of dictator Said Barre. 
Thus, social scientists that study African societies and economies 
must rethink their claim that tribalism is the primary cause of conflict. 
The conflicts most often arise when authoritarian rule is challenged by 
rebels and rulers refuse to make credible economic and political re-
forms because of their selfishness, fear of losing power, and lack of a 
long-term vision. Decentralization and democratization are evolution-
ary processes that cannot be imposed from above by a dictator or from 
outside by foreigners. They require the emergence of enlightened lead-
ership that focuses on growing the economy and on carrying out cred-
ible political reforms that lead to democratization.
Nafziger and Auvinen’s conclusion asserts that the major changes 
that developing states need to make to achieve sustainable develop-
ment are economic and political ones. These include the development 
of a working legal system, financial institutions that increase earnings 
(and thus taxing capacity), a well-functioning factor and exchange rate 
market, targeted programs aimed at helping the poorest segment of the 
population, and the promotion of democratic institutions of governance 
that lead to representative government and accommodate various ethnic 
and religious groups and communities. 
The next chapter, by Vernon W. Ruttan, examines the sources and 
constraints of productivity growth in world agriculture. Ruttan traces the 
role of agriculture in economic development thought, beginning with 
the years after World War II, when agriculture was viewed as a sector 
from which resources could be extracted to fund the industrial sector. 
While this early literature recognized agriculture as a precondition for 
economic growth and development, he notes, the process by which agri-
cultural growth was generated eluded most development economists.
A new perspective, informed by advances in agricultural science 
and economics, began to emerge in the 1960s with the recognition that 
agricultural technology was location-specific and that technologies de-
veloped in industrial countries are not directly transferable to develop-
ing countries. In the midst of this new thinking, a small but important 
book by Theodore W. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, 
was published. Through empirical observation, Schultz (1964) induced 
that peasants in agrarian economies are rational persons who allocate 
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scarce resources efficiently, and that their poverty is a result of the lim-
ited technical and economic opportunities to which they can respond 
through enabling institutions. In other words, Schultz maintained that 
peasants are “poor but efficient” rational agents that respond to eco-
nomic incentives, not irrational beings as had been argued by some 
economists of an earlier generation.
The Schultz thesis implies three types of relatively high-payoff 
investment areas in agricultural development: 1) the capacity of agri-
cultural research institutions to generate new location-specific techni-
cal knowledge; 2) the capacity of the technology supply industries to 
develop, produce, and market new technical inputs; and 3) the school-
ing and the extension education of rural people to enable them to use 
new technology effectively. This high-payoff model contributed to the 
success of green revolution crop varieties at the time. The high-payoff 
input model, however, did not explain the conditions that induce the 
development of new institutions, such as public-sector agricultural ex-
periment stations, which supply location-specific knowledge and tech-
nology. This required another breakthrough in development thinking 
under a model of induced technology, in which the development and 
application of new technology is endogenous to the economic system. 
The new model, pioneered by Hayami and Ruttan (1985), suggest-
ed that technical change was driven by changes in relative resource en-
dowments and factor prices, in which new technologies are developed 
to substitute a relatively abundant or cheap factor for a more scarce or 
expensive factor. This calls for a choice between two kinds of technolo-
gies: mechanical and biological. Biological technology involves “land 
saving” technology designed to substitute labor-intensive production 
practices and inputs such as fertilizer and plant or animal protection 
chemicals for putting new land in production. Mechanical technology 
involves labor saving technology designed to substitute power and ma-
chinery for manual labor. These two types of induced technology in 
agriculture were historically demonstrated in the economic growth of 
Japan, which focused on biological and chemical technologies, and that 
of the United States, which adopted mechanical technologies (Hayami 
and Ruttan 1985; Ruttan 1988). 
The implication of Ruttan’s essay is that for most developing coun-
tries today with high population growth and density, the appropriate 
technology to pursue should include the advances and application 
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of biological technology that are most relevant to that country. Such 
technology comprises three elements, according to the author: 1) land 
and water development to provide a favorable environment for plant 
growth, 2) the addition of organic and inorganic sources of plant nu-
trition to stimulate plant growth and the use of biological agents and 
chemicals to protect plants from pests and pathogens, and 3) the selec-
tion and breeding of new, biologically efficient crop varieties specifi-
cally adapted to respond to those elements in the environment that are 
under management.
Ruttan maintains that in rural areas of developing countries, growth 
in land and labor productivity has led to a substantial reduction in pov-
erty, especially in East Asia and India. During the next 50 years, soil 
degradation may present serious constraints in some fragile resource ar-
eas such as the semiarid and arid regions of sub-Saharan Africa. Subre-
gions such as north China and northeast Africa will experience absolute 
or severe land and water shortages. Ruttan holds that the achievement 
of sustained growth in agricultural production over the next half cen-
tury represents at least as difficult a challenge to science and technology 
as the transition to a science-based system of agricultural production 
did in the twentieth century. He provides a rare optimistic perspective 
on the current bleak state of agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa by noting 
that for countries where land and labor productivity levels are furthest 
from pace-setting levels, such as in sub-Saharan Africa, opportunities 
exist to enhance productivity substantially. These countries would find 
it beneficial to acquire capacity for agricultural research and technology 
transfer. In his conclusion, Ruttan warns that if the world is to meet its 
food demands over the next 50 years, institutional innovation must play 
at least as great a role as technology.
Chapter 5, by David Lam, provides an economic perspective on 
how the world survived the so-called population bomb. The half cen-
tury from 1950 to 2000 experienced unprecedented population growth, 
yet mankind achieved a decline in poverty in the developing regions of 
the world, with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Lam notes that world population, which stood at 1 billion in 1900, 
reached 2 billion around 1930, then added another 4 billion by the 
year 2000. Given the current age distribution and trends in fertility and 
mortality, it is unlikely that world population will double in another 40 
years, which makes the 1960–2000 period unique in human history. 
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Before the population explosion began, the world had high birth rates, 
high death rates, and a relatively low population. But during the first 
half of the twentieth century, death rates fell rapidly and birth rates 
initially remained high, generating a gap that caused the rapid rise in 
population.
A large rise in births leads to an increase in the size of the childbear-
ing population 20 to 35 years later, which in turn creates a powerful 
mechanism for population momentum. This implies that even with the 
sharp fertility decline in the 1970s and 1980s, the number of births in 
many countries will continue to grow for several decades as a result of 
an increasing number of women of childbearing age. Thus, population 
will expand for some time to come, even if countries reach replacement 
fertility rate. 
The potential impact of population explosion was dramatized in 
such writings as Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (1968) and the 
Club of Rome’s The Limit to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972), both of 
which envisioned a doomsday scenario in terms of food production, 
depletion of nonrenewable resources, and rising commodity prices. But 
the opposite happened: food production increased faster than population 
between 1961 and 2003. Per capita food production grew by 0.7 per-
cent annually and total food production by 2.4 percent annually during 
this period. Per capita food production in 2003 was 31 percent higher 
than in 1961. Moreover, in spite of the warnings made in the 1970s and 
1980s that the green revolution would not last forever, the data show 
no indication that food production will not keep up with population 
growth, especially given the declining rate of population growth, Lam 
notes. For example, India, which suffered from famines in the 1960s 
in much the way Africa is currently suffering, has increased per capita 
food production to 23 percent above its 1961 level, even though its 
population has more than doubled since then.
One of the best indicators of whether the world is running out of re-
sources, Lam says, is whether commodity prices are increasing. Here he 
points out that there has been a decline in four broad real price indices 
from 1960 to 2000. Prices decreased 40 percent for metals and miner-
als, 54 percent for food, 60 percent for overall agricultural commodi-
ties, and 54 percent for all nonenergy commodities. The exception to 
falling commodities was petroleum, which, driven by the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Cartel, rose by the year 
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2000 to 3.6 times its price in 1960, the year OPEC was formed. But 
over a period in which world population doubled, real commodity pric-
es declined by more than 50 percent, excluding petroleum. Advances in 
agricultural production played a crucial role, as did economic global-
ization led by trade liberalization and advances in global transport and 
communication. 
Lam finds that most developing countries have experienced a 
marked decline in poverty over the past two decades. The percentage of 
the population mired in absolute poverty was measured as a ratio of the 
number of people who earned less than $1 per day to the total popula-
tion. This percentage declined from 40 percent in 1981 to 21 percent in 
2001, and the absolute number of people in poverty fell by 25 percent, 
from 1.48 billion to 1.10 billion. The largest decline over this period 
came in East Asia and the Pacific, where poverty fell by more than 40 
percent. In general, poverty fell rapidly in Asia and gradually in Latin 
America. But in Africa, the percentage of people in poverty increased 
from 40 to 50 percent, and the absolute number of people in poverty 
roughly doubled over the 20-year period.
Lam’s research shows that the total fertility rate (TFR) for major 
regions of the world declined over the last half century. Asia and Latin 
America experienced the fastest declines; Africa went through a more 
gradual decline. The tradeoff between the quantity and the quality of 
children is a central feature of economic theory of fertility as articu-
lated by Becker and Lewis (1973), who showed that rising incomes 
lead to replacement of quantity of children with quality of children. 
Child quality is enhanced by expenditures on children such as invest-
ments in schooling, health, and nutrition. Lam points out that Brazil 
constitutes one of the best examples of rapid decline in fertility without 
a major effort at family planning. Here, parental schooling, especially 
of the mother, is a key factor in women having fewer children and in 
decreases in infant mortality.
Lam concludes that the world’s ability to make gains in areas like 
food production and poverty reduction in the face of increased pres-
sures on resources bodes well for challenges of the twenty-first century 
such as ocean fishing, global warming, and the seeming intractability of 
problems in Africa with food production and poverty.
Chapter 6, by Daniel W. Bromley, explores the relationship between 
property rights and environmental sustainability. He first discusses the 
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concept of property rights, which means the limits of the law as it per-
tains to income appropriable from control of income-producing assets, 
including trademarks, copyrights, and patents. Bromley reviews John 
Locke’s notion that the key justification for the continued holding of 
land as property is the idea that such holdings form an essential assur-
ance of liberty. Landholders are assured of this liberty because the state 
forms an implicit pact to protect them from the predations of others, 
including the government itself. He notes that property rights in the 
Lockean sense allow for those who come after to buy land from those 
who have justly acquired it, and that once the initial acquisition is trans-
ferred to a new owner for a particular price, all future acquisitions must 
be mediated with due consideration for the holder of land or property, 
in perpetuity. But given this right, Bromley asks, what is to preclude 
holders of land from engaging in social extortion? Thus it is possible for 
land justly acquired to become unjustly held or imprudently used. 
Kant asserted that the community itself must determine whether 
land justly acquired continues to be justly held (Williams 1977). But 
how is this determination to be made? Bromley responds that property 
rights are created in the process of resolving disputes that originated in 
conflicting claims brought before a court of law. Thus, he holds, a gen-
eral theory of property rights is not as simple as it appears, but requires 
a major dose of philosophical pragmatism.
Bromley’s analysis leads him to assert that the central challenge for 
sustainable environmental policy is to understand the process whereby 
information from a community of scientists is regarded as definitive 
and pertinent to the problem under consideration. He notes that discus-
sions about sustainability cannot be understood as pronouncements on 
what must be saved for the future. Rather, coherence in such conversa-
tions will flow from a continual dialogue—a political process in which 
society figures out what works and is worth saving for the future, what 
is revered now, and what we hope our descendants will revere as well. 
The final chapter, by Scott M. Swinton, reviews the poverty-envi-
ronment debate with the aim of both promoting sustainability of natu-
ral resources and improving agricultural productivity. Swinton notes 
that the Malthusian fears that arose about population growth following 
World War II were challenged by Boserup (1981), who showed that 
rising population triggers an intensification of agriculture, leading to 
higher food production on the same land. As income and demand for 
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food rises, it creates incentives for farmers to increase productivity on 
land by adding inputs such as fertilizer and irrigation. This process, un-
der a flexible and secure land tenure system, can improve agricultural 
productivity and incomes and can reduce natural resource degradation. 
Swinton maintains that in this process it is important to understand the 
key factors that drive farmers’ behavior. For one thing, how farmers re-
spond to incentives and make choices is shaped by the resources at their 
command, following the “poor but efficient” idea of Schultz mentioned 
earlier in connection with Ruttan’s chapter. These resources include la-
bor or human resources as well as natural resources such as land, water, 
climate, and biodiversity. Other resources are physical capital, equip-
ment, and the financial capital needed to buy inputs such as feed, fertil-
izer, pesticides, and related inputs. The author also considers the role 
of social capital, which is a network of sociocultural institutions that 
enable communities to gain access to and manage resources at the local 
level, especially when formal government institutions fail. In addition, 
external factors such as infrastructure in the form of roads, banks, and 
institutions for the education and training of farmers are crucial, and 
these must be provided by the public sector.
Swinton asserts that farmers can respond to demand for increased 
food production with two alternative strategies: 1) extensification, in-
volving expansion into new lands, for which the opportunities are lim-
ited in most developing regions of the world, and 2) intensification, 
which has proven capable of increasing per capita food production 
through investment of capital in agriculture. He cites research in rural 
Kenya showing how three generations of soil erosion was reversed, as 
rising food and coffee prices led farmers to invest in land terracing and 
other soil conservation measures, thus enabling them to increase both 
food production per acre and environmental recovery (Tiffen and Mor-
timore 1994).
The distinction between labor-led and capital-led intensification of-
fers one explanation of how a decline and an increase in agricultural 
productivity can correlate, according to Swinton. The phenomenon 
occurs when an increase in population leads to declining productiv-
ity, which in turn triggers capital investment in land. The subsequent 
gradual increases in land productivity from a low point result in a U-
shaped population–land productivity relationship, which encompasses 
both labor-led (Malthusian) and capital-led (Boserupian) intensification 
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explanations. However, according to Swinton, the bargain subsistence 
farmers must make between survival for today and land stewardship 
for tomorrow directly undermines the goal of sustainable development, 
defined earlier as meeting present needs without harming the ability to 
meet future ones (World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment 1987). In spite of farmers’ manifest preference for the present over 
the future, Swinton cites case studies from Peru and northern Ethiopia 
that show that when farmers are confident of passing their land holdings 
on to their children—when they have security—they are more likely to 
invest in soil conservation practices such as building terraces than when 
they expect to control their fields for five years or less—i.e., when land 
tenure is insecure.
Swinton’s essay draws the following policy guidelines to enhance 
the sustainability of both agriculture and natural resources in rural de-
velopment: 
1)  Provide clear and durable property rights, since secured farm-
land tenure is crucial for increasing farm productivity and mak-
ing the long term investments needed to conserve and improve 
natural resources, 
2)  Develop local institutions that support natural resource steward-
ship, such as community systems that enforce crop rotation and 
maintain soil fertility at modest levels,
3)  Provide an efficient network of transportation, roads, and com-
munication to support markets for agricultural inputs and com-
modities, as well as provide a system of credit. Without these 
things in place, expected benefits from net investments in agri-
culture and natural resources will not happen, 
4) Enhance farmers’ capacity by providing quality education and 
training that include conservation of agriculture and natural re-
sources. This must be complemented by access to external sourc-
es of income or credit, either through investment in nonfarm en-
terprises or through provision of subsidized credit, 
5)  Develop policies tailored to the specific socioeconomic and bio-
geophysical settings in which agriculture and natural resources 
are managed in developing countries.
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BRIEF SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The six chapters address the various dimensions of sustainable de-
velopment under five recurring subthemes: 
1)  The challenge of promoting economic growth by maximizing 
the long-term net benefits to humankind and minimizing the 
net costs of environmental and natural resource degradation, 
including the challenge of correcting both market failure and 
policy failure to that effect, 
2)  The challenge of reducing scientific and technical constraints 
on sustainable growth of agricultural production,
3)  The progress made by societies in overcoming the fear of popu-
lation explosion in developing countries over the last half of the 
twentieth century,
4)  The challenge of reducing poverty and achieving sustainable 
management of natural resources in poor societies, including 
the challenge of establishing property rights aimed at ensuring 
environmental sustainability for specific communities,
5)  The challenge of reducing economic and political inequality 
and poverty, which in recent years have driven conflict and wars 
in many parts of the world, leading to humanitarian disasters. 
While the book deals with these challenges, it also sees the opportu-
nities available under proper policies aimed at sustainable development. 
In my view, the authors of the various chapters demonstrate that while 
societies and economies face stiff challenges, the promotion of policies 
that enhance human liberty by investing in human capital, democratic 
institutions, and improved market performance can lift millions out of 
poverty to sustainable development. 
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Notes
 1. The Johannesburg summit marked a major departure, in structure and outcome, 
from previous United Nations conferences. This could have a positive effect on 
the global community’s approach to sustainable development. The summit was 
marked by a new level of dialogue, energy, and commitment to foster collabora-
tion among key stakeholders, including governments, civil society groups, the 
private sector, and nongovernmental voluntary organizations (NGOs). In par-
ticular, the summit spurred commitments to expand access to water, sanitation, 
and energy, improve agriculture, manage toxic chemicals, protect biodiversity, 
and improve the management of ecosystems.
   Moreover, the World Bank, which is the leading international institution 
for development at the global level, laid out a path for the next half century in 
its World Development Report 2003: Sustainable Development in a Dynamic 
World:
 Without better policies and institutions, social and environmental 
strains may derail development progress, leading to higher poverty 
levels and a decline in the quality of life for everybody. Misguided 
policies and weak governance in past decades have contributed to 
environmental disasters, income inequality, and social upheaval in 
some countries, often resulting in deep deprivation, riots, or refu-
gees fleeing famine or civil wars. Today, many poor people depend 
on fragile natural resources to survive. Similarly, trust between 
individuals, which can be eroded or destroyed by civil unrest, is 
a social asset with important economic benefits, since it enables 
people to make agreements and undertake transactions that would 
otherwise not be possible. Development policies need to be sharply 
focused on protecting these natural and social assets. (World Bank 
2003)
  That report enlarges on the bank’s World Development Report 1992: Develop-
ment and the Environment, in which the bank first addressed the topic.  
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The concept of sustainable development, obscure just 15 years ago, 
now appears regularly in the mainstream media. There is now even a 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index to guide managers to opportunities for 
securing “green growth.”
Chairman Alan Greenspan and the Federal Reserve System have 
also given the concept pride of place: in its formal announcement on 
interest rate policy in January 2003, the Fed cited sustainable develop-
ment as a goal coequal with price stability. That same month, when 
President Bush announced in the 2003 State of the Union address new 
initiatives on fuel cells to convert chemical energy into electricity and 
heat, that too was couched in sustainable development terms. The presi-
dent even made a point of being photographed examining a hydrogen 
powered car that would vastly reduce pollution and sharply increase 
long-term energy availabilities.
Under other labels, sustainable development has long engaged 
the interests of physical and social scientists. At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, Rev. T. R. Malthus predicted an inexorable, inevi-
table collision between population and subsistence. Through a series of 
staggering revolutions in industry, science, and technology never envi-
sioned by Malthus, this apocalypse has been deferred time and again. 
Nevertheless, there is no assurance that humankind can continue to 
count upon technological innovation to keep the Malthusian wolf at 
bay. Increasingly, we will need to turn our attention to the possibilities 
for creating conditions for sustainable use of nature’s bounty. Sustain-
able development is all about trying to bring about green growth, which 
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benefits both the natural environment and the humans who depend upon 
it for clear air, clean water, healthy foodstuffs, and so much else. This 
chapter will address not the whole panorama of sustainable develop-
ment but some neglected aspects of good policies to promote sustain-
ability.
The search for paths of sustainable development necessarily in-
volves many disciplines: ecology, biology, geology, economics, sociol-
ogy, ethics, political science, mathematics, physics, chemistry, statis-
tics, and engineering. There is no universal agreement on what is meant 
by sustainable development. Nor are all definitions of sustainable de-
velopment sensible. But for the ecologists, economists, and biologists 
who understand the essence of resource scarcity, sustainable develop-
ment may be best defined as the path that maximizes the long-term, net 
benefits to humankind, taking into account the costs of environmental 
degradation. Net benefits include not merely income gains and reduc-
tion of unemployment and poverty but also healthier living conditions. 
Interpreted in this way, sustainable development stresses not the need to 
limit development but the need to develop sensibly, in order to be better 
able to conserve. Sustainable development seeks to make conservation 
the handmaiden of development while protecting the interests of future 
generations. In sensible sustainable development, preservation is val-
ued not for its own sake but for what it can do for the welfare of present 
and future generations. One vital condition for approaching sustainabil-
ity in development is that natural resources and environmental services 
not be undervalued or underpriced, a condition frequently violated in 
practice. This is the chapter’s prime focus. 
THE ROLE OF POVERTY
Sustainable development is an important concept for all societies. 
Nevertheless, poor people in developing countries are far more depen-
dent on their soils, rivers, fisheries, and forests than are citizens of rich 
countries. Therefore, degradation of resources and environment looms 
as a much larger threat to life and health in developing countries. Fortu-
nately for low-income nations, sustainable development does not nec-
essarily imply low rates of income growth. It does, however, require 
less wasteful, more efficient growth.
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For affluent countries such as the United States, Canada, Japan, and 
France, many of the most serious environmental problems are caused 
by affluence. Examples include too much pollution of the air from over-
use and waste of motor fuel, street and highway congestion caused by 
the addition in each country of several hundred thousand more auto-
mobiles every year, conversion of fragile watersheds and beaches into 
vacation homes on Cape Hatteras or Hilton Head Island, and housing 
developments on mountain slopes in Aspen or Jackson Hole.
But the situation is very different in almost all of Africa, in much 
of Latin America, and in south and Southeast Asia. In much of the rest 
of the world outside the United States and Europe, many of the most 
serious environmental problems are caused not by affluence but by pov-
erty. Poverty itself is the prime adversary of good ecological practices 
in poor nations. For example, there can be little doubt that poverty by 
itself, or in combination with other factors, is the main cause of defor-
estation in most tropical nations.
Consider Ghana. In 1900, one-third of Ghana’s land area was cov-
ered by natural tropical forest. When I first worked in Ghana for Har-
vard University in 1967–1971, the forest still covered about 20 percent 
of the land; there was still a lot of forest for me to study. That is no lon-
ger the case. By 1995, forest cover had shrunk to less than 5 percent. As 
elsewhere in West Africa, Southeast Asia, Brazil, and Central America, 
poverty has been killing the forest. Poor, landless Ghanaians, Ivorians, 
Indonesians, and Burmese practice destructive, slash-and-burn agricul-
ture, not because they are ignorant or venal, but because they have no 
other options. These are not the traditional shifting cultivators of Africa 
or Asia who for centuries past have moved from parcel to parcel. Rath-
er, they are landless, mostly urban people who have become “shifted 
cultivators,” driven to migrate to the forest by hunger and population 
pressures.
Slash-and-burn agriculture is only one manifestation of the effects 
of poverty on deforestation. In many poor nations, the role of poverty 
in deforestation has been magnified by the ever-more-desperate search 
for fuelwood by impoverished people. In Ghana in the mid eighties, 
for example, for every tree harvested for lumber, nine trees were cut 
down for firewood, leading to a pattern of deforestation that accelerated 
soil erosion, groundwater depletion, and loss of agricultural productiv-
ity. For developing nations generally, 80 percent of trees cut down are 
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felled for fuel for cooking or other domestic use, not for export as logs 
or wood products.
Most of the species on earth occur in the tropical forest. The tropi-
cal forest used to make up 12 percent of the earth’s land surface before 
extensive deforestation began. Now it covers less than 6 percent of the 
earth’s land. Worldwide, the tropical forest estate shrank by more than 
55,000 square miles per year in the early nineties, an area roughly 240 
miles square, or the size of Iowa. Of that amount, almost 60 percent fell 
to slash-and-burn agriculture. Another 3,900 square miles, an area 62 
miles square, was deforested by the search for fuelwood. Forest clear-
ing for cattle ranching, mostly in Brazil and Central America, took an-
other 5,850 square miles per year, or 76 miles square. 
It is important to note that the role of poverty-induced shifting cul-
tivation in deforestation has been steadily increasing, while the relative 
roles of logging and cattle ranching have been declining. Nearly 1.5 bil-
lion people in the world live in absolute poverty; at least a third of these 
are landless poor engaged in destructive forms of shifting cultivation. 
The number of these poor is growing, so we should expect growing 
damages from shifting cultivation.
The point: so-called solutions to tropical deforestation that do not 
take into account the needs of the poor and landless are no solutions at 
all; they worsen the conditions of the poor in almost every instance.
In forestry, fishing, agriculture, or natural resource extraction, pov-
erty is, of course, far from the only culprit in national resource degrada-
tion. Two other shortcomings have undercut sustainable development: 
market failure and policy failure. We have long known that market fail-
ure has been instrumental. Market failure arises when valuable services 
provided by an ecosystem are not traded in markets. For example, intact 
tropical forests provide a wide variety of vital but nontraded ecological 
services such as control of runoff, soil protection, microclimate control, 
and protection of animal habitat. Because there are no organized mar-
kets for such services, they are not priced and are therefore overused 
(wasted). However, some progress in valuing these vital services has 
been made over the past two decades (Repetto and Gillis 1988).
But market failures, whether due to monopoly, externalities, free 
riders, or transaction costs, now involve few mysteries. They have been 
studied for many decades by economists, at mind-numbing length. 
While it has long been recognized that market failure accounts for an 
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important part of the story, it is now much more widely appreciated that 
policy failures, or government failures, have also loomed quite large in 
environmental degradation.
THE ROLE OF POLICY FAILURES 
One of the prime causes of policy failure leading to needless eco-
logical and economic damage has been a widespread tendency of poli-
cymakers to overlook the environmental consequences of nonenviron-
mental policies. Even today it is still not widely recognized that poli-
cies intended primarily to attain nonenvironmental goals can have large 
impacts upon the environment. Nonenvironmental policies include tax 
policy, exchange rate policy, industrialization policies, credit, and agri-
culture and food price policies. In much of Africa, Latin America, and 
Asia, a by-product of the pursuit of agricultural, energy, urbanization, 
and industrial objectives has been significant corrosive effects upon 
soil endowments, watershed management, water quality, coastal fish-
ing, and survival of coastal reefs. From this experience, we should have 
learned that it is not enough that nations follow sensible environmental 
policies. Greater attention to the environmental impact of nonenviron-
mental policies and development projects is required as well, not only 
for more efficient resource use, but also for more equitably distributed 
growth. Ecological disasters are almost always economic disasters too; 
in low-income countries the reverse is often true as well, as illustrated 
by the experiences of Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania over the past five 
decades. Little imagination is required to see that measures that reduce 
the environmental damages of nonenvironmental policies are both good 
ecology and good economics, while policies that help to overcome pov-
erty are also both good economics and good ecology.
A second, not unrelated, reason for policy failures that damage eco-
logical and environmental values has been a persistent lack of under-
standing of the role of the market and the role of prices in both resource 
conservation and ecological protection. An unusually high proportion 
of such policy failures is traceable to short-sighted government sub-
sidy programs that deeply underprice water, soils, forest, and energy 
resources. A perfect example occurred on public lands out West, where 
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the United States government charges extremely low prices for grazing 
leases, leaving pastures cow-burnt from overgrazing.
Everywhere, societies persist in underestimating the role of mar-
ket prices in resource conservation or in resource allocation generally. 
Another recent example from the United States comes from outside of 
the environmental area: pricing of Internet access. A few years back, a 
major company adopted a pricing mechanism involving a flat fee for 
Internet service: this amounted to a zero price for overuse of scarce 
Internet access. Because the price of the service was not incremental, it 
was unrelated to intensity of use by the subscriber. And the managers 
were actually surprised when the scheme resulted in catastrophic col-
lapse from overuse. Although this example has nothing to do with natu-
ral resources, the same kinds of miscalculations are often responsible 
for unsustainable development. Virtually all of the policy failures I am 
about to depict have resulted primarily from deep underpricing of vital 
natural and environmental resources, leading to unsustainable, wasteful 
development.
Forestry Resource Policy
Quite apart from the effects of poverty, policy failures in forestry 
have been especially destructive to ecological and economic goals in 
dozens of tropical countries. Brazil’s government long provided heavy 
subsidies to ranching and other activities that encroached heavily on the 
Amazon rainforest. Three to four thousand square miles of the Amazon 
was deforested each year throughout the 1970s. When pastureland re-
placed the rainforest, it destroyed rainforest occupations, such as plant 
collection and harvest of forest meat, that provided more jobs than the 
subsidized ranching operations. Nevertheless, the government made 
deforestation as cheap as possible. Government policies provided new 
ranchers with 15-year tax holidays, investment tax credits, exemptions 
from export taxes and import duties, and loans with interest substan-
tially below market rates. Although a typical subsidized investment 
yielded a loss to the economy equivalent to 55 percent of the initial 
investment, heavy subsidies allowed private ranchers to earn a positive 
return of 250 percent, on average, of their investment, while the forest 
was relentlessly destroyed.
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Most tropical countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
many African nations, have charged very low fees for timber conces-
sions, and virtually all impose inadequate timber royalties too low to 
encourage conservation. Thailand’s forestry policies were so wanton 
that its rainforest has all but disappeared. The same can be said for the 
Ivory Coast, and Gabon and the Philippines are on the same path.
Water Resource Policy
Underpricing of water resources has long been common all over the 
world. It is safe to say that where one finds acute crisis in water avail-
ability, heavy subsidies for water use are usually the prime suspect, 
except for regions with extended drought.
Subsidies apply both to agricultural water and to potable water. By 
1990, public irrigation systems operated by government owned enter-
prises and by governmental departments in developing countries had 
already absorbed $300 billion in public funds. It has been estimated that 
over half of all investments in agriculture in less developed countries 
(LDCs) in the 1980s went into water resource development; in Mexico 
fully 80 percent of all public investment in agriculture from 1940 to 
1990 went into irrigation projects (Gillis 1991, pp. 248–256). There, 
charges for irrigation water average only 11 percent of total costs. And 
in a sample of World Bank irrigation projects in less developed coun-
tries, revenues covered only 7 percent of project costs, on average, 
while in most other countries revenue from farmers covers less than 20 
percent of capital and operating costs (Repetto 1986, p. 43). When a re-
source is underpriced, it will be overused and wasted. Cheap prices for 
irrigation water have, of course, resulted in high rates of water waste, 
whether from the Colorado River, the Indus River, or the Aral Sea of the 
former Soviet Union, straddling Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
Markets also have other roles to play in the sustainable use of drink-
ing water. In most of the world, provision of drinking water is domi-
nated by government departments or government-owned enterprises. 
But in dozens of those countries, infant mortality from unsafe water 
remains high. Three million children a year die from water related dis-
eases. What are the possible implications for health and for efficiency 
when reliance is placed on market mechanisms instead of on govern-
ment enterprises to provide water? Here is one example.
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In the 1990s Argentina embarked on one of the largest privatiza-
tion campaigns in the world, including the privatization of local water 
companies serving approximately 30 percent of the country’s munici-
palities. American and Argentinean researchers found child mortality 
fell 8 percent overall in areas that privatized their water services; the 
effect was largest (26 percent) in the poorest areas. Privatization there 
was associated with significant reductions in deaths from infectious and 
parasitic diseases.
Energy Resource Policy
Energy pricing provides an altogether frightful history of policy 
failure leading to unsustainable development. In such oil-rich countries 
as Nigeria, Indonesia, and Venezuela, domestic use of energy has been 
kept artificially cheap as a stimulus to industrialization and diversifica-
tion. This has had multiple adverse effects on ecology and on the econ-
omy. First, these subsidies encouraged wasteful domestic consumption, 
thereby reducing the country’s petroleum and gas reserves and its export 
earning potential. Second, underpricing of energy artificially promoted 
the use of auto transport, adding to urban congestion and air pollution. 
Third, artificially cheap energy promoted industry that was ill-suited to 
the country’s endowments: with cheap energy, industries (and consum-
ers) have little incentive to adopt energy-saving technologies. Thus, on 
several counts, underpricing contributed to environmental degradation 
as well as to sizable economic losses from needless waste of energy.
Indonesia’s kerosene policy furnishes another instructive example. 
For 15 years the government of Indonesia heavily subsidized the con-
sumption of kerosene and other fuels. The kerosene subsidy was jus-
tified as a way to reduce environmental degradation and to aid poor 
rural dwellers, who were thought to use kerosene for cooking. Heavily 
subsidized kerosene prices were seen as a disincentive to the cutting of 
fuelwood, which was denuding mountain slopes and causing major soil 
erosion on Java, Indonesia’s most densely populated island. But the sub-
sidy was totally misplaced. Research clearly showed that rural families 
used kerosene predominantly for lighting, not for cooking. In any case, 
the subsidy protected only 50,000 acres of forestland each year, at a cost 
of almost $200,000 a year per acre. Replanting programs, in contrast, 
cost only $1,000 per acre. Moreover, 80 percent of the kerosene turned 
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out to be consumed by the relatively wealthy, not the poor. And the low 
price of kerosene made it necessary to subsidize diesel fuel as well, be-
cause kerosene could be substituted for diesel in truck engines, causing 
greater environmental damage. The multiple costs of this policy finally 
led the government to sharply reduce its subsidy on kerosene. Indeed, 
Indonesia now tries to price most fuels at world market levels.
Some of my colleagues have studied commercial energy use per 
unit of GDP for almost 90 countries. The variance in utilization of com-
mercial energy, even among poor countries, is notable. Mistaken energy 
policies are principally, but not wholly, to blame for very high rates of 
domestic energy consumption in countries like Colombia, Bolivia, and 
Venezuela. Even recently, Venezuela has priced gasoline at less than 30 
cents a gallon. The environmental consequences of underpricing en-
ergy were particularly notable in countries formerly under the control of 
communism, such as Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and 
Romania, where markets played little role in resource allocation until 
the 1990s. Consequently, air and water pollution in these nations were 
among the worst in the world.
Agricultural Subsidy Policy
Another arena for environmental policy failure has been agricul-
tural subsidies. These have yielded notable economic and ecological 
damage everywhere, but especially in poor nations. Governments all 
around the globe have adopted policies that have resulted in severely 
underpriced chemicals, especially fertilizer made from natural gas. At-
tempts have  been made to justify heavy fertilizer subsidies not only on 
grounds of their effect on agricultural production, but also on grounds 
that the subsidies serve soil enrichment and conservation purposes. 
These arguments do not stand up to analysis, particularly in semiarid 
tropical countries where what is most needed are organic fertilizers 
(which are better adapted but rarely subsidized) and the use of mois-
ture-retaining methods. Indeed, there is evidence that sustained use of 
chemical fertilizers can actually reduce soil fertility over the long term. 
Furthermore, overuse of subsidized fertilizer and other chemicals such 
as pesticides and herbicides has often caused significant environmental 
damage rather than providing environmental protection, and high sub-
sidies on fertilizer have led to substantial waste. In Indonesia, for ex-
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ample, fertilizer use increased by 77 percent from 1980 to 1985 alone, 
to the point that rice cultivation in that nation used three times as much 
fertilizer per hectare as Thailand or the Philippines (World Commission 
on Environment and Development 1987, p. 102).
Finally, many agricultural subsidies have not only been expensive 
but strongly counterproductive. This was the case with heavy pesticide 
subsidies, also in Indonesia. Not only did the overused pesticides dam-
age the environment but they also proved ineffective: they actually in-
creased infestations of agricultural pests because they had a greater ef-
fect on the natural predators of pests than on the pests themselves.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
In the face of persistent market failures and ubiquitous policy fail-
ures, is sustainable development in poor nations even possible? The 
answer is, I believe, a qualified yes, at least for any one country, provid-
ed attention is strongly focused on rectifying both market failures and 
policy failures that corrode sustainability, and on measures to reduce 
rural poverty.
The Malaysian case is instructive. Malaysia contains plenty of con-
temporaneous examples of both sustainable and nonsustainable devel-
opment. West Malaysia is separated from East Malaysia in the South 
China Sea by nearly 400 miles of ocean. West Malaysia consists pri-
marily of the Malaysian Peninsula, whereas East Malaysia includes the 
two states of Sabah and Sarawak, on the island of Borneo.
After an inauspicious, largely wasteful start in the twentieth cen-
tury, West Malaysia has enjoyed mostly sustainable development for 
nearly three decades because it finally successfully capitalized upon its 
initial natural resource base. Real economic growth was in excess of 
3 percent from 1965 to 1990 and has been at nearly 5 percent since. 
This rapid growth has virtually banished rural poverty as a cause of 
deforestation and other environmental degradation. Moreover, the en-
vironment in Peninsular (West) Malaysia has suffered only lightly from 
policy failures.
Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia had, if anything, an even 
richer natural resource base than Peninsular Malaysia. But for Sarawak 
since the mid-1980s and Sabah since 1970, development has been un-
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sustainable. Efforts at sustainable development in Sarawak continue to 
be plagued by the scourge of rural poverty, while in both Sarawak and 
Sabah, natural forest endowments have been consumed by unsustain-
able practices, largely as a result of serious policy failure, particularly 
through grossly misguided forestry policy involving subsidies to timber 
firms.
In any case, the answer to the question, “Can economic develop-
ment be sustainable?” is yes for any given country that pays appropri-
ate attention to resource scarcity and avoids artificially cheap prices for 
natural resources and environmental services. But the answer becomes 
much less certain when we consider sustainability for the entire planet, 
or global sustainability.
The Malthusians are still with us, insisting that growth cannot be 
sustainable. Some argue that what sustainable growth means is that the 
rich have to sharply curtail their living standards to make room for more 
consumption by the poor. The implicit assumption is that the reason 
poor people are poor is that rich people are rich: that is, that they con-
sume more than their fair share of resources. But is this the cause? Jeff 
Sachs, director of Columbia University’s Earth Institute and special ad-
visor to United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan on poverty, says 
that rich people in rich countries are rich because they have developed 
technology to successfully deal with challenges, and because of geo-
graphical advantage.
CONCLUSION
Mainstream economics offers hope. In the short term we can make 
incremental progress in rectifying market failures leading to environ-
mental degradation. And in the short and long term we can do a great 
deal to reduce damages from policy failures. Given that this is so, one 
major feature of a strategy for global sustainability would be to move 
quickly toward more effective markets, so that real resource scarcities 
will be reflected in the prices people pay for all commodities and ser-
vices. An end to underpricing and heavy subsidies on fuels, fertilizers, 
pesticides, water, timber, land clearing, and other destructive uses of 
resources would be a major step towards sustainability. Most countries 
are far from this ideal market environment. They could easily reduce 
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resource wastage without jeopardizing economic growth, through bet-
ter policies, better pricing of scarce natural resources, in some cases 
judicious reliance on privatization, and above all, measures to reduce 
poverty, especially in rural areas.
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Recently the media have focused on the threat that insurgents in 
failed states with weapons of mass destruction pose to wealthy nations 
of the West—the United States, Canada, and the countries of Europe. 
Scholars predict that a clash between the West and Islam is inevitable. 
Amid this peril, we should not forget that war, state violence, and rebel 
resistance threaten the livelihood and the very lives of millions of the 
poor in Africa and Asia. About 20 percent of Africans live in countries 
seriously disrupted by war or state violence. The cost of conflict in-
cludes refugee flows, increased military spending, damage to transport 
and communication, reduction in trade and investment, and diversion 
of resources from development. The World Bank (2000, pp. 57–59) es-
timates that civil war in an African country lowers the gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita by 2.2 percent annually. Scholars must focus 
on reducing this danger to the survival income and human rights of the 
world’s poorest.
Economic stagnation, political decay, and deadly political vio-
lence interact mutually: economic and political factors contribute to 
war, while war has an adverse effect on economic growth and politi-
cal development. This paper analyzes how economic decline, income 
inequality, a weakening state, pervasive rent seeking by ruling elites, 
an extensive threat to survival income, and competition for control of 
mineral exports contribute to humanitarian emergencies. These emer-
gencies compose a human-made crisis in which large numbers of peo-
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ple die and suffer from war, state violence, and refugee displacement, 
and they are usually accompanied by widespread disease and hunger 
(Väyrynen 2000a). 
 What are the sources of humanitarian emergencies? Auvinen and 
Nafziger (1999) show that stagnation and decline in real (inflation-ad-
justed) GDP, slow growth in average food production, high income in-
equality, a high ratio of military expenditure to national income, and 
a tradition of violent conflict are sources of emergencies. The study 
also finds that countries that failed to adjust to chronic external deficits 
were more vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies. In addition, politi-
cal variables, such as predatory rule, authoritarianism, and state decay 
and collapse,1 interact with economic variables to affect vulnerability 
to humanitarian emergencies. The findings are by and large consistent 
for three measures of the dependent variable and for many different 
regression models.2
However, the focus of this chapter is much less on econometrics 
than on a discussion of how factors embedded in the political economy 
of developing countries contribute to humanitarian emergencies. “Po-
litical economy” includes not only economic analysis but also an ex-
amination of the interests of political leaders and policymakers who 
make economic decisions and of members of the population who are 
affected by these decisions. This politico-economic analysis is based 
on a research project begun in 1996 by the United Nations University’s 
World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Hel-
sinki, and Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford (QEH). It generalizes on 
the case studies of 17 war-affected less-developed countries (LDCs) 
and explains the reasons for econometric findings from the annual data 
of 124 LDCs from 1980 to 1995 (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999).3 The 
case studies include Nigeria and Pakistan from the late 1960s and early 
1970s and Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Haiti, El Salvador, Colombia, 
Bosnia, and the South Caucasus from 1980 to 2000.
STAGNATION AND DECLINE IN INCOMES
Contemporary emergencies are found in low- and middle-income 
(that is, developing) countries, suggesting a ceiling above which war 
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and massive state violence do not occur. A disproportional number of 
these states are also weak or failing (Holsti 2000, pp. 243–250), a trait 
that interacts as both cause and effect of their relative poverty. More-
over, emergencies are more likely to occur in countries experiencing 
stagnation in real GDP per capita and a breakdown in law and pub-
lic services. These phenomena affect relative deprivation, the actors’ 
perception of social injustice from a discrepancy between goods and 
conditions they expect and those they can get or keep. This deprivation 
often results from vertical (class) or horizontal (regional or communal) 
inequality (Stewart 2000, p. 16), where the actors’ income or conditions 
are related to those of others within society. Relative deprivation spurs 
social discontent, which provides motivation for collective violence 
(Gurr 1970). Among the components of emergencies, war and violence 
have major catalytic roles, adding to social disruption and political in-
stability, undermining economic activity, spreading hunger and disease, 
and fueling refugee flows. A marked deterioration of living conditions, 
especially during a period of high expectations, is likely to produce so-
cio-political discontent that may be mobilized into political violence.
During the twentieth century, some 200 million people were killed 
in war or state violence (Rummel 1994), but only a small proportion of 
these deaths came from insurgent action or fighting between belliger-
ents. Holsti (2000, pp. 250–267) demonstrates that the policies of gov-
erning elites are at the root of most humanitarian emergencies,4 a fact 
not recognized in most research on war (cf. Collier 2000a; Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998). Slow or negative per-capita growth puts pressure on 
ruling coalitions. Ruling elites can expand rent-seeking opportunities 
for existing political elites, contributing to further economic stagnation 
that can threaten the legitimacy of the regime and increase the probabil-
ity of regime turnover. To forestall threats to the regime, political elites 
may use repression to suppress discontent or capture a greater share of 
the majority’s shrinking surplus. These repressive policies may entail 
acts of direct violence against or withholding food and other supplies 
from politically disobedient groups, as in Sudan in the 1980s (Keen 
2000, pp. 292–294). Moreover, repression and economic discrimination 
may generate relative deprivation and trigger socio-political mobiliza-
tion on the part of the groups affected, leading to further violence and 
thus worsening the humanitarian crisis.
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Since economic deceleration or collapse can disrupt ruling coali-
tions and exacerbate mass discontent, we should not be surprised that 
since 1980 the globe, particularly Africa, has been more vulnerable to 
humanitarian emergencies. This increase in intrastate political conflict 
and humanitarian emergencies in Africa in the last two decades of the 
twentieth century is linked to the continent’s negative per-capita growth 
in the 1970s and 1980s and virtual stagnation in the 1990s. Indeed, in 
Africa, which had the highest death rate from wars in the 1990s of any 
continent, GDP per capita was lower in the late 1990s than it was at the 
end of the 1960s (World Bank 2000, p. 1).5
This stagnation and decline was often associated with, and exac-
erbated by, a predatory state, driven by ethnic and regional competi-
tion for the bounties of the state. Predatory rule involves a personalistic 
regime ruling through coercion, material inducement, and personality 
politics, tending to degrade the institutional foundations of the econo-
my and state. Elites extract immediate rents and transfers rather than 
providing incentives for economic growth. In some predatory states, the 
ruling elite and their clients “use their positions and access to resources 
to plunder the national economy through graft, corruption, and extor-
tion, and to participate in private business activities” (Holsti 2000, p. 
251). Ake (1996, p. 42) contends that “instead of being a public force, 
the state in Africa tends to be privatized, that is, appropriated to the ser-
vice of private interests by the dominant faction of the elite.” People use 
funds at the disposal of the state for systematic corruption, from petty 
survival venality at the lower echelons of government to kleptocracy at 
the top.
Humanitarian crises are more likely to occur in societies where 
the state is weak and venal, and thus subject to extensive rent-seek-
ing, “an omnipresent policy to obtain private benefit from public action 
and resources” (Väyrynen 2000b, p. 440). Cause and effect between 
state failure and rent seeking are not always clear. State failure does not 
necessarily result from the incapacity of public institutions but from 
the interests of rulers. While “state failure can harm a great number 
of people, it can also benefit others,” especially governing elites and 
their allies (Väyrynen 2000b, p. 442). These elites may not benefit from 
avoiding political decay through nurturing free entry and the rule of 
law and reducing corruption and exploitation. Instead political leaders 
may gain more from extensive unproductive, profit-seeking activities 
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in a political system they control than from long-term efforts to build 
a well-functioning state in which economic progress and democratic 
institutions flourish. These activities tend to be pervasive in countries 
that have abundant mineral exports (for example, diamonds and pe-
troleum), such as Sierra Leone, Angola, Congo-Kinshasa, and Liberia, 
while predatory economic behavior has a lower payoff in mineral-poor 
economies such as Tanzania and Togo.
The majority of countries with humanitarian emergencies have 
experienced several years (or even decades) of negative or stagnant 
growth, where growth refers to real growth in GNP or GDP per capita. 
Widespread negative growth among populations where a majority is 
close to levels of subsistence increases the vulnerability to humanitar-
ian disasters. From 1980 to 1991, 40 of 58 Afro-Asian countries, or 69 
percent, experienced negative growth, according to the World Bank’s 
World Development Report (1993, pp. 238–239). In contrast, from 
1960 to 1980, only 9 of 53 had negative economic growth, according 
to the earlier World Bank annual (1982, pp. 110–111). In addition, the 
positive growth of Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1960s 
and 1970s also reversed to negative growth in the 1980s, according to 
the same World Bank sources. The interrelationship between growth 
and emergencies suggests that the increased emergencies in the early 
1990s are connected to the developing world’s disastrous growth record 
of the 1980s. This disastrous growth was accompanied by state decay, 
as ruling elites, facing limitations in dispersing benefits to a wide-rang-
ing coalition of ethnic communities and economic groups, struggled 
for control, allied with other strongmen, and strengthened their military 
capability to repress potential rebels and dissidents. 
Econometric and country evidence indicates that, holding other 
variables constant, slow real GDP growth helps explain humanitarian 
emergencies. Humanitarian emergencies also contribute to reduced (of-
ten negative) growth (Stewart, Huang, and Wang 2001, pp. 11–41), al-
though according to econometric tests by Auvinen and Nafziger (1999) 
the direction of causation is weaker than from growth to emergencies. 
Contemporary humanitarian disaster is rarely episodic; rather, it is usu-
ally a culmination of longer-term politico-economic decay over a decade 
or more. Negative per-capita growth interacts with political predation 
in a downward spiral, a spiral seen in African countries such as Angola, 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Zaire (Congo). 
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Economic stagnation, frequently accompanied by chronic trade 
deficits and growing external debt, intensifies the need for economic 
adjustment and stabilization. A persistent external disequilibrium has 
costs whether countries adjust or not. But nonadjustment has the greater 
cost; the longer the disequilibrium, the greater is the social damage and 
the more painful the adjustment.6 Most LDCs face frequent internation-
al balance-of-payments problems, which reduce the ability of political 
leaders to maintain control. But abundant exports, such as minerals, 
together with a strong military, can provide the ruler or warlord with a 
modicum of security. 
More than a decade of slow growth, rising borrowing costs, reduced 
concessional aid, a mounting debt crisis, and the increased economic 
liberalism of donors and international financial institutions, compelled 
LDC (especially African) elites to change their strategies during the 
1980s and 1990s. Widespread economic liberalization and adjustment 
provided chances for challenging existing elites, threatening their posi-
tions, and contributing to increased opportunistic rent-seeking and overt 
repression. Cuts in spending reduced the funds available to distribute to 
clients and required greater military and police support for rulers to 
remain in power. 
INCOME INEQUALITY
Large income inequality exacerbates the vulnerability of popula-
tions to humanitarian emergencies. Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) cross-
section study of 71 developing countries, 1960–1985, finds that income 
inequality, by fueling social discontent, increases socio-political insta-
bility, as measured by deaths in intrastate disturbances and assassina-
tions (per million population) and coups (both successful and unsuc-
cessful). Moreover, the policies of predatory and authoritarian rulers 
increase income inequality.
To measure income inequality, Nafziger and Auvinen (2003, p. 
90) used Gini coefficients calculated from an expanded and qualita-
tively improved dataset from Deininger and Squire (1996, pp. 56–91), 
although we decided not to use data from studies they relied on that 
were based on incomparable research methodologies. We were able to 
find relationships between Gini and war, which World Bank researchers 
Economic Development, Inequality, and War   37
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and others, without this dataset, could not 
find. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 563) indicate “there is insufficient 
data to introduce distributional considerations into the empirical analy-
sis.” Our regressions indicate that high Gini or income concentration 
contributes to humanitarian emergencies.
Indeed, because of inadequate income inequality data, Collier 
(2000b, pp. 10–11, 13) concludes that “inequality does not seem to ef-
fect the risk of conflict. Rebellion does not seem to be the rage of the 
poor . . . Conflict is not caused by divisions, rather it actively needs to 
create them . . . However, it is the military needs of the rebel organiza-
tion which have created this political conflict rather than the objective 
grievances.”7 
WIDER researchers (Nafziger, Stewart, and Väyrynen 2000, both 
volumes), who include deaths from state violence as a part of humani-
tarian emergencies, examine deadly political violence more broadly 
than merely by focusing on rebellions, and they hold a contrasting view 
to that of Collier. Indeed, the WIDER approach is consistent with the 
finding that objective grievances of poverty and inequality contribute to 
war and humanitarian emergencies.
Severe social tensions leading to humanitarian emergencies may 
even arise under conditions of positive (even rapid) growth and ex-
panding resource availability. High inequality can contribute to the im-
miseration or absolute deprivation of portions of the population, even 
with growth. Absolute deprivation during substantial growth was ex-
perienced, for instance, by Igbo political elites, dominant in Nigeria’s 
Eastern Region, in the early 1960s. The East lost oil tax revenues from a 
change in allocation by the federal government, which ceased distribut-
ing mineral export revenues to regional governments. 
Moreover, through the demonstration effect of consumption levels 
of the relatively well off, high income concentration increases the per-
ception of relative deprivation among substantial sections of the popu-
lation, even when they do not experience absolute deprivation. The risk 
of political disintegration increases with a surge of income disparities 
by class, region, and community, especially when these disparities lack 
legitimacy among the population. Class and communal (regional, eth-
nic, and religious) economic differences often overlap, exacerbating 
perceived grievances and the potential for strife.
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This type of wide income inequality results from historical legacies 
of discrimination (colonialism, apartheid, failed policies), from govern-
ment policies in distributing land and other assets, taxation, and the 
benefits of public expenditure, from regional and ethnic economic com-
petition, and from predatory rule. Growing regional inequality and lim-
ited regional economic integration, associated with economic enclaves, 
can exacerbate ethnic and regional competition and conflict.
Regional factors contributing to conflict include educational and 
employment differences, revenue allocation, and language discrimina-
tion, which disadvantages minority language communities. There are 
many examples: 
• The struggle for petroleum tax revenues and employment in 
the civil service and modern sector in Nigeria in the early to 
mid-1960s
• The distribution of resources from East to West and employment 
discrimination against Bengalis in Pakistan in the 1950s and 
1960s 
• The conflict between Hutu and Tutsi for control of the state and 
access to employment in Burundi and Rwanda 
• The contention over the distribution of falling economic resourc-
es and rising debt obligations in Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 
early 1990s 
• State discrimination against Tamils in language, employment, 
and education in postindependent Sri Lanka
While high inequality is associated with emergencies, insurgency is 
more likely if the less advantaged can identify the perpetuators of their 
poverty and suffering. The examples of Nigeria in the 1960s, South 
Africa from the early 1970s through the early 1990s, and Chiapas, Mex-
ico, in the 1990s (Nafziger and Auvinen 2000, pp. 105–108) illustrate 
the diverse patterns of how discriminatory government policies cause 
economic inequality, fuel social discontent, and lead to political con-
flict and humanitarian emergencies. These dynamics may even occur 
either when the nation’s real per-capita GDP is growing, as in Nigeria 
in the 1960s, or when the disadvantaged group’s economic position is 
improving, as for nonwhite South Africans from the 1960s through the 
early 1980s.
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High income inequality can be a source of humanitarian emergen-
cies in both rapidly and slowly growing countries. But, once a popula-
tion is dissatisfied with income discrepancies and social discrimination, 
as the majority nonwhites were in white-ruled South Africa, the rising 
expectations associated with incremental reductions in poverty and in-
equality may actually spur the revolt, conflict, and hostile action from 
the state that increase the probability of a humanitarian emergency (Da-
vies 1962, pp. 5–19).8 
COMPETITION FOR NATURAL RESOURCES
Collier contends (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, pp. 568–569; Collier 
2000a, pp. 92–95) that the possession of primary commodities, espe-
cially exports, increases the occurrence and duration of civil war. Mwa-
nasali (2000, p. 145) indicates the reasons why. “Primary commodity 
exports present several advantages to the belligerents. Because they 
are generic products, rather than brand names, their origin can easily 
be concealed. They are usually the most heavily taxable, especially in 
kind, and their production or marketing does not require the compli-
cated processes, as is the case of manufactured goods.”
Primary goods include both agricultural (usually renewable) and 
mineral (largely non-renewable) commodities. According to de Soysa’s 
statistical tests (2000, pp. 123–24), “the incidence of civil war is com-
pletely unrelated to the per capita availability of natural resources, de-
fined as the stocks of both renewable resources . . . and nonrenewables.” 
But, once de Soysa refines her independent variable to include only 
mineral resources, her result is highly significant. She finds that “the 
higher the per capita availability of . . . mineral wealth, the greater the 
incidence of conflict” (ibid., p. 124). The following, based mainly on 
work by WIDER researchers (Nafziger, Stewart, and Väyrynen 2000, 
both volumes), explains why minerals contribute to conflict and state 
violence.
In the struggle for allies during the Cold War, the United States 
and the Soviet Union provided military and economic aid for develop-
ing countries. Sovereignty provided the opportunity for newly formed 
African states to extract resources from the major powers in exchange 
for diplomatic support. Yet aid could provide the basis for supporting a 
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patronage system for either the state or for insurgents. When the Cold 
War ended in the early 1990s, nation-states and rebels in the develop-
ing world required different strategies and new sources of funds. Many 
countries in Africa and Asia needed control of resources to provide 
military and police power but needed to provide only minimal services 
to control territory. Indeed, with the emphasis from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank on the market and private 
enterprise, predatory rulers often undermined their own bureaucracies 
to build personal power at the expense of their citizens’ health, educa-
tion, and agricultural development (Reno 2000, pp. 231–232; Väyrynen 
2000b, pp. 437–479).
The struggle for control over minerals and other natural resources 
is an important source of conflict. In Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
and Congo-Kinshasa, rulers and warlords used exclusive contracts with 
foreign firms for diamonds and other minerals to “regularize” sources 
of revenue in lieu of a government agency to collect taxes (Reno 1996, 
1998, 2000). In comparison, Tanzania and Togo lacked the tradable 
resources to become a predatory society (Väyrynen 2000b, pp. 444–
445).
After the decline of aid following the Cold War, Sierra Leone be-
came more susceptible to pressures for liberalization and adjustment 
from the IMF and World Bank. In 1991, the IMF, the bank, and bilateral 
creditors (national governments) offered loans and debt rescheduling 
worth $625 million—about 80 percent of GNP—if Sierra Leone re-
duced government expenditure and employment. Freetown heeded the 
World Bank’s advice (1994, pp. 22–51) to use private operators to run 
state services for a profit. But privatization did not eliminate the pres-
sures of clients demanding payoffs; it merely shifted the arena of client-
age to the private sector. Sierra Leone’s ruling elites, needing new ways 
of exercising power, used foreign firms to consolidate power and stave 
off threats from political rivals. In the 1990s, Sierra Leonean heads of 
state relied on exclusive contracts with foreign firms for diamond min-
ing to stabilize revenue, on foreign mercenaries and advisors to replace 
the national army in providing security, and on foreign contractors 
(sometimes the same mining or security firms) to provide other state 
services. In the process, rulers have found it advantageous to “destroy 
state agencies, to ‘cleanse’ them of politically threatening patrimonial 
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hangers-on and use violence to extract resources from people under 
their control” (Reno 1996, pp. 7–8, 12). 
In Liberia, Charles Taylor used external commercial networks (for-
eign firms), some a legacy of the Samuel Doe regime of the late 1980s, 
to amass power, at times extending his control to the eastern periphery 
of Sierra Leone. Taylor’s territory had its own currency and banking sys-
tem, telecommunications network, airfields, export trade (in diamonds, 
timber, gold, and farm products), and (until 1993) a deepwater port. All 
went to support arms imports. For Taylor, a warlord during most of the 
1990s before being elected Liberia’s president in 1997, controlling ter-
ritory by building a patronage network was easier than building a state 
and its bureaucracy (Reno 1995, p. 111). Indeed, from 1990 to 1996, 
Taylor had access to annual revenues exceeding $100 million, with an 
upper limit around $200 million (Reno 2000, pp. 243, 252).
Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko (1965–1997), like other hard-
pressed rulers in weak African states, mimicked the approach of war-
lords. But with the shrinking patronage base from foreign aid and invest-
ment, to prevent a coup by newly marginalized groups in the army or 
bureaucracy, Mobutu, as did rulers in other retrenching African states, 
needed to reconfigure his political authority. In this situation, foreign 
firms and contractors served as a new source of patronage networks. 
Indigenous commercial interests that profit from the new rules are not 
independent capitalists with interests distinct from the state’s, but rather 
clients of predatory rulers. As Reno (1996, p. 16) points out, “Those 
who do not take part in accumulation on the ruler’s terms are punished.” 
Mobutu weathered the collapse of the state bureaucracy but fell be-
cause his strategy of milking state assets had reached a limit, seriously 
weakening the patronage system. In 1997, his forces fell to the Alliance 
des Forces Democratique pour la Liberation (AFDI) of Laurent Kabila, 
who became president of the Democratic Republic of Congo but was 
assassinated in 2001 (Reno 1996, pp. 9–16; Reno 1998, pp. 147–81).
State failure, as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Zaire, increases vul-
nerability to war and humanitarian emergencies. Yet in a weak or failed 
state some rulers, warlords, and traders are more likely to profit from 
war and violence than from peacetime. Indeed, as Väyrynen (2000b, 
p. 442) argues, war, political violence, and state failure do not result 
from the incapacity of public institutions but from the fact that rulers, 
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warlords, and their clients benefit from the harm thereby befalling a 
substantial share of the population. 
Relative deprivation also helps explain the increased violence by 
belligerents and their clients. An abrupt rush of mineral wealth raises 
not only the expectations of prosperity by the allies of rulers and war-
lords that control the resource but also the lure of combat to potential 
rebels that want to control the resource. Indeed, as Gurr (1970, pp. 73, 
79) indicates, the intensity of deprivation felt increases with the dis-
crepancy between potential and actual conditions, and with the length 
of time the deprivation persists. In Angola, Congo-Kinshasa, and Sierra 
Leone, the length and intensity of perceived deprivation were consider-
able.
DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM
Legitimacy is not only materially defined. Political deprivation aris-
es from a lack of meaningful participation in making political decisions, 
whether this participation is prevented by law or through repression. In 
effect, a constant and frequent use of repression indicates lack of legiti-
macy and political capacity (Jackman 1993). Efficient repression may 
prolong authoritarian rule, as demonstrated for example by Augusto 
Pinochet’s Chile and Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s Malawi, but eventu-
ally the people are likely to challenge the regime from a “desperate 
bargainer” position. Democratic regimes do not guarantee the absence 
of conflict, but since they are likely to be more widely accepted, ex-
pressions of discontent are not aimed at challenging their basic tenets. 
Large-scale conflict and humanitarian emergencies are virtually nonex-
istent in democratic societies.
Authoritarianism and the Extent of Conflict
What are the empirical findings on the relationship between extent 
of political conflict and authoritarianism? On the one hand, openness in 
a political system encourages political actions of all kinds, and not all 
of them are likely to be voiced through formal institutions. Graham and 
Gurr show that democracies typically have more extensive “civil con-
flict” than autocracies. Gurr and Eckstein see chronic low-level conflict 
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as “a price democracies have to pay for freedom from regimentation, 
from the state or from authorities in other social units” (Eckstein 1980, 
p. 452). 
Democratic political regimes do not repress their citizens or inflict 
severe sanctions on protestors. Authoritarian regimes are prone to re-
press unrest (see Hibbs 1973), and the citizens are more likely to refrain 
from rebellious action when these regimes are in power. Turkey (1980–
1984) and Morocco (after 1984), for instance, imposed “long term and 
systematic repression—serious restrictions on civil and human rights, 
persistent arrests of suspected ‘activists,’ use of heavy prison sentenc-
ing and torture, banning of political movements and opposition trade 
unions—on protestors” and were spared serious unrest until the end of 
the 1980s (Seddon 1992, p. 49). The threshold of rebellious political 
action is higher, and therefore authoritarian regimes are likely to experi-
ence less political protest than democracies.
Nevertheless, authoritarian political structures are conducive to con-
flict because repression increases opposition group activity. By adopting 
coercive politics against dissidents, the regime loses legitimacy, and its 
actions thereby become the catalyst for the mobilization of previously 
neutral actors (Davis and Ward 1990, pp. 451–452). Repression may 
also harden the determination of members of the opposition and ignite 
a tougher response from rebellious groups. As a consequence, relatively 
innocent incidents of protest may escalate into large-scale rebellions 
with a large number of casualties.
Most research (see Auvinen 1996, p. 79) has detected an inverted 
U-curve relationship between type of regime and political conflict: mild 
repression incites conflict, and only intense repression deters it.9 The 
rationale behind the inverted U-curve is that, on one end of the curve, 
the severe costs of rebellion in an extremely repressive political system 
inhibit resource mobilization by dissident groups; on the other end, the 
availability of reasonably effective peaceful means of political action in 
a nonrepressive political system makes rebellion an undesirable strat-
egy of opposition for most people; but in the middle, rebellion is likely 
to be the preferred strategy of opposition for many dissident groups in a 
semirepressive political system in which resource mobilization is pos-
sible and peaceful opposition typically is ineffective (Muller and Weede 
1990, p. 627).
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A distinction is sometimes made between structural or institutional-
ized repression and behavioral repression. Structural repression refers 
to the repressive capability of the regime, while behavioral repression 
refers to actual acts of coercion by the government or parts thereof. The 
two are not necessarily the same because even the most democratic re-
gimes do not guarantee the absence of repression. This is demonstrated 
by the occasional use of repression by Western democracies (Henderson 
1973, p. 133). Nevertheless, Muller and Weede (1990) found that the 
inverted U-curve applies to both structural and behavioral repression.
Muller and Weede suggest that an inverted U-curve relationship 
supports a theory of belligerents as rational actors. An actor who cal-
culates utilities and, particularly, costs of action, takes into account the 
probability that when the level of repression is high, the expected ben-
efits of either rebellion or peaceful collective action will be relatively 
low because of high costs and a low expectancy of success. When re-
pression is low, the expected benefits of rebellion will be exceeded by 
the expected benefits of peaceful collective action. When repression is 
moderate, the expected benefits of rebellion will exceed those of peace-
ful collective action (Muller and Weede 1990, p. 628). This explanation 
of conflict as a function of rational actors calculating costs and benefits 
provides some support to Collier’s greed theory, even if only political 
and not economic benefits are evident. However, Muller and Weede 
admit that you may arrive at the same proposition from a relative de-
privation perspective (1990, p. 647), which corresponds to grievance 
theory.10 
Authoritarianism and the Form of Conflict
Authoritarian regimes are more susceptible to rebellion than to po-
litical protest. In Gurr and Lichbach’s study (1986, p. 69), autocratic 
governments faced proportionally three times as much revolutionary 
opposition as democratic governments, but were less likely to hear re-
formist demands. In Chile, the coup d’état of 1973 interrupted a long 
tradition of democratic rule. Legitimate opposition was disallowed and 
repressed, which led to the development of new and radical forms of 
political resistance.
The prevailing norms of political regimes, whether democratic or 
authoritarian, influence the tactics of dissidents and the responses of the 
Economic Development, Inequality, and War   45
elites to them. Democratic elites are disposed to make appreciable con-
cessions to protest, whereas authoritarian regimes, be they of the left or 
the right, are more likely to rely on repression. In democratic countries, 
this reinforces the utility of protest over rebellion, whereas in autocra-
cies it increases the relative usefulness of rebellion for challengers who 
are desperate enough to act at all (Gurr and Lichbach 1986, p. 12).
Democracies may not discourage political protest, but they are suc-
cessful in eliminating or strongly reducing the probability of rebellion. 
Gurr and Lichbach found that in democratic countries, dissidents rarely 
had revolutionary objectives; reformist demands were 10 times as com-
mon (1986, p. 69). Civil conflicts are also less deadly in democracies 
than in autocracies (Graham and Gurr 1969). Hibbs (1973) shows this by 
employing Cutright’s (1963) index of political development, although 
the relationship disappears if economic development is controlled for.11 
Hazlewood divides political systems into polyarchic, centrist, and per-
sonalist. He finds that in polyarchic systems the number of revolutions, 
guerrilla wars, and assassinations was smaller but the number of gov-
ernmental crises and riots was larger, compared to the sample mean. 
Personalist states were above the mean for all states on these five con-
flict indicators and above the mean for each of the other groups on all 
indicators except riots. Centrist systems had the lowest mean values on 
all indicators except revolutions (Hazelwood 1973, p. 184).12
Authoritarianism and Irregular Executive Transfer
The chances of peaceful regime change are limited under authori-
tarian rule. In the 1980s, before the end of the Cold War, political lib-
eralization was infrequent. The most common mechanism for changing 
an authoritarian regime was by force, sometimes through mass rebel-
lion or revolution but more commonly through a coup d’état by the 
elite. Authoritarianism was the most important determinant of political 
instability in Central America, save in Costa Rica, where peaceful and 
routine procedures for the transfer of power were established. In such 
coups, Lindenberg says, “The seeds of discontent for the next crisis 
cycle have been planted during the period of stable military rule with-
out concurrent mechanisms for channeling this discontent into peaceful 
regime change” (1990, pp. 416, 419). In autocratic regimes, coups are 
invariably the preferred mode of succession. More than 80 percent of 
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the countries in sub-Saharan Africa experienced at least one successful 
or unsuccessful coup from the 1950s to the early 1980s (Johnson, Slat-
er, and McGowan 1984). In most cases, authoritarian regimes followed 
one another. More than two-thirds of the executive transfers between 
1965 and 1987 were “irregular” (Hughes and May 1988). Adelman and 
Hihn conclude that “the possibility of political instability, or that of dis-
continuous political transitions, can be greatly reduced if governments 
make a conscious effort to pursue a development process that leads to 
greater social mobility and is combined with increased political partici-
pation” (Adelman and Hihn 1984, p. 20).
In closed political systems, elites are the main contestants for political 
power and enrichment. The main elite groups may unite to support the 
government if economic growth is sufficient to accrue benefits to all of 
them. On the other hand, economic hardship is likely to affect distribu-
tion and form cleavages within the elite, so that the threat of a coup d’état 
by relatively deprived groups increases. Democratic regimes imply more 
open decision-making. Political participation and competition should re-
duce the exclusiveness of opportunity for enrichment in political office. 
The elite is more likely to be divided into different pluralist power cen-
ters that compete for political power within democratically functioning 
institutions (Morrison and Stevenson 1971, p. 349). Of course, elites may 
use democracy’s liberties for personal enrichment and corruption. Nev-
ertheless, democratic regimes are likely to discourage coups, even while 
encouraging political protest as a favored mode of dissent. 
Although democratic political regimes may be less susceptible than 
authoritarian regimes to elite instability in general and to irregular execu-
tive transfer in particular, they too have been overthrown during periods 
of economic hardship. On the basis of Latin American developments in 
the 1960s and 1970s, the bureaucratic-authoritarian approach postulated 
a causal link between economic crises and political authoritarianism in 
countries at middle levels of economic development (O’Donnell 1973, 
1978): the military took political power when it perceived that democratic 
regimes were incapable of coping with the social consequences brought 
about by economic decline. This argument lost much credibility in the 
1980s when democratic regimes replaced authoritarian regimes in Latin 
America (see Frieden 1989, p. 123). O’Donnell explained this new devel-
opment by those countries’ citizens attaching an increased intrinsic value 
to democracy. The populace brought about this value change in two ways: 
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first, by discrediting groups that sought a violent and immediate route 
to socialism, and second, by reflecting on experiences with authoritarian 
regimes that, despite using unprecedented repression and violence, failed 
to bring about economic progress (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 
1986, pp. 15–17). Democracy became a preferable alternative to authori-
tarian rule.
In fact, Latin American democracies were more durable than autocra-
cies during the debt crises of both the 1930s and the 1980s. No democratic 
government was brought down in the 1980s as a result of continued debt 
outflow (Drake 1989, pp. 53–54). In Asia, the countries of Pakistan, South 
Korea, and the Philippines all moved toward more democratic rule. In 
some African countries the trend was slightly different. Ghana (1981), Ni-
geria (1983), and Sudan (1989) experienced a shift from fairly democratic 
to authoritarian regimes as a result of coups d’état. Notably, in Ghana a 
democratic paralysis had brought the economy to the brink of collapse 
before the coup. Overall, however, the recent empirical evidence runs 
contrary to the bureaucratic-authoritarian argument.
Authoritarian regimes have been able to cling to power during pe-
riods of relative prosperity, but they are more prone to collapse during 
economic crises than democracies. All of the breakdowns of authoritar-
ian regimes discussed in the collection by O’Donnell, Schmitter, and 
Whitehead (1986) were accompanied by economic crises (Bermeo 
1990, p. 372). Dictatorships have a narrow base of legitimacy and sup-
port, which makes them dependent on being able to keep an efficient 
economy and an orderly society (Drake 1989, pp. 53–54). But democ-
racies gain legitimacy from electoral, not merely effectual, means.13 
Compared to democracies, authoritarian regimes are also more depen-
dent on foreign lenders to stay in power. Neither Turkey nor Morocco 
experienced social unrest in the context of macroeconomic stabilization 
and structural adjustment policies; both were generously supported by 
IMF, the World Bank, and other lenders. This “made possible a degree 
of ‘cushioning’ in the economy which would otherwise have been im-
possible” (Seddon 1992, p. 49).14
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OTHER FACTORS
Military centrality, as indicated by the ratio of military expendi-
ture to GNP, contributes to humanitarian emergencies through several 
dynamics. On the one hand, military resources may be used to support 
predatory and authoritarian rulers, who generate desperate action and 
military response by the opposition. Under political deprivation and in 
the absence of political mechanisms to settle grievances, full-scale re-
bellion becomes more likely. Alternatively, a strong military may over-
throw either a democratic or an authoritarian regime, which may lead 
to political instability and humanitarian crisis. Powerful armed forces 
constitute a constant threat to civilian regimes in less-developed coun-
tries. Particularly during economic austerity, the regimes are afraid to 
cut back on military spending; they may even strengthen the military 
to stave off threats from the opposition. This, in turn, entails heavy so-
cioeconomic costs for the population, inducing further discontent and 
increasing the risk of rebellion. In very poor countries, an increasing 
budget allocation for the military may produce downright starvation 
and destitution.
Citizens adapt to a certain acceptable level of violence through the 
cultural experience of violence. A tradition of intensive political vio-
lence makes societies more susceptible to war and humanitarian emer-
gencies.15 Countries with a history of mass political mobilization for 
conflict, such as Rwanda, Burundi, and Colombia, are likely to be more 
susceptible to conflict in humanitarian emergencies than other, histori-
cally more peaceful countries. A tradition of conflict is an indicator of 
the legitimacy of political violence. 
In empirical studies, including conflict tradition in the model helps 
improve model specification. Auvinen (1997, p. 187) found that levels 
of previous political protests, rebellions, and irregular transfers were 
related to present levels. 
ETHNICITY
Ethnic identity is not a primordial given. Ethnicity, when implicated 
in humanitarian emergencies, is created, manifested, combined, and re-
constituted in struggles to share benefits from modernization and self-
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government but is not a source of these struggles (Nafziger, Stewart, and 
Väyrynen 2000, both volumes). As Widner says (1999, p. 406), “Ethnic 
identities are socially constructed, highly malleable, and situationally 
defined.” For example, the concept of the Yoruba people in Nigeria ex-
panded under British reorganization after the beginning of the twentieth 
century, when Yoruba referred only to the people of the Oyo kingdom. 
Elites use identification with ethnic and regional communities, and 
even accentuate them, to transfer potential hostility toward themselves, 
because of inequalities and power disparities within their communities, 
to the elites and subjects of other communities. Alexander, McGregor, 
and Ranger (2000, pp. 305–306) argue that “the salience of ethnic an-
tagonism in some recent wars cannot be explained as the inevitable 
resurgence of ancient tensions—rather, [such tensions] are the product 
of a reworking of historical memories in particular political contexts 
. . . Ethnicity is widely understood to be unnatural, to be historically 
‘invented,’ ‘constructed,’ or ‘imagined,’ and used ‘instrumentally’ by 
politicians.” In many instances, ethnic antagonism emerges during con-
flict rather than having been the cause of conflict. 
In 1980s South Africa, ethnic consciousness and cleavages were 
deliberately aroused as part of the government’s strategy of divide and 
rule implemented through the security apparatus. Chief Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi of the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party used cultural sym-
bolism to strengthen his and his party’s political power. During the most 
violent phase of conflict, 1991–1993, ethnic identities became further 
strengthened and reified, and their relevance as sources of political mo-
bilization increased (Auvinen and Kivimäki 1998, p. 42; 2001; Taylor 
and Shaw 1994). In a similar way, former Yugoslav President Slobodan 
Milosevic redeemed Serb nationalism by evoking the account of the 
Kosovo Polje battle of 1389–still painful to Serbian pride 600 years 
later. In Somalia, President Siad Barre succeeded in holding power for 
13 years after his failed military campaign in the Ogaden in 1977–78 
by manipulating clan identities and thus dividing the opposition into 
several different movements. This strategy, however, led to his ousting 
in 1991. By having fueled clan antagonisms, Barre made the instrumen-
tal use of clan affinities much easier for his opponents, who turned his 
work to their advantage (Auvinen and Kivimäki 2000, pp. 187–230).
According to Collier (2000b, pp. 12–13): “Ethnic grievance is ac-
tively manufactured by the rebel organization as a necessary way of 
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motivating its forces. As a result, where conflicts occur in ethnically di-
verse societies, they will look and sound as though they were caused by 
ethnic hatreds . . . Conflict is not caused by divisions, rather it actively 
needs to create them. When such conflicts are viewed during or after 
the event, the observer sees ethnic hatred. The parties to the conflict 
have used the discourse of group hatred in order to build fighting orga-
nizations. It is natural for observers to interpret such conflicts as being 
caused by ethnic hatred. Instead, the conflicts have caused the inter-
group hatred and may even, as in Somalia, have created the groups.”16
CONCLUSION
This paper examines the way various factors within the political 
economy lead to humanitarian emergencies, characterized by war, state 
violence, and refugee displacement. A major factor responsible for the 
increase in emergencies in the 1990s was the developing world’s stag-
nation and protracted decline in incomes during the 1980s, which con-
tributed to state decay and collapse. Economic decline and predatory 
rule that fail to provide state services lead to relative deprivation, or 
to a perception by influential social groups of injustice arising from a 
growing discrepancy between conditions they expect and those they 
can get. Relative deprivation spurs social dissatisfaction and political 
violence. Poor economic performance undermines the legitimacy of a 
regime, increasing the probability of regime turnover. Political elites 
use repression to forestall threats to the regime and capture a greater 
share of the population’s declining surplus. Repression and economic 
discrimination trigger further discontent and sociopolitical mobilization 
on the part of the groups affected, worsening the humanitarian crisis. 
Protracted economic stagnation increases the probability of population 
displacement, hunger, and disease. 
Slow or negative per-capita growth, which is often accompanied by 
a chronic external disequilibrium, necessitates stabilization and adjust-
ment; those countries whose adjustment policies fail, so that they do not 
qualify for the IMF “Good Housekeeping seal,” are more vulnerable to 
humanitarian disaster. 
Another factor, high inequality in income, contributes to regional, 
ethnic, and class discrepancies that engender crises. In addition, the 
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competition for mineral resources by warlords and traders in weak 
states increases vulnerability to war and state violence. Authoritarian-
ism is related to emergencies but not in a linear fashion; instead, emer-
gencies first increase with authoritarian repression, then decrease along 
an inverted U-curve. Another explanation for emergencies is military 
centrality, found more frequently in decaying states. Military centrality 
can spur conflicts as well as increase poverty. Furthermore, a tradition 
of violent conflict, in which violence becomes normatively justifiable 
in a society, increases the risk of a humanitarian emergency. Contrary 
to a commonly held view, ethnicity is not usually a source of conflict 
and state violence but often emerges during conflict, sometimes as an 
invention or construction of politicians. 
Since low average income, slow economic growth, high income 
inequality, and a decaying state are important contributors to emergen-
cies, Third World states, with the support of the international commu-
nity, must strengthen and restructure the political economy of their own 
poor, inegalitarian, and weak states. The major changes governments 
of less developed countries need to make are economic and political 
institutional changes—the development of a legal system, enhanced 
financial institutions, increased taxing capacity, greater investment in 
basic education and other forms of social capital, well-functioning re-
source and exchange markets, programs to help weaker segments of 
the population, and democratic institutions that accommodate and co-
opt the country’s various ethnic and regional communities. Institutional 
and infrastructural development increases the productivity of private 
investment and public spending and enhances the effectiveness of gov-
ernance.
Industrialized countries and international agencies bear a substantial 
responsibility to help developing nations by modifying the international 
economic order to enhance those nations’ economic growth and adjust-
ment. Developing regions, for their part, must demand greater consider-
ation of their economic interests within present international economic 
and political institutions. The interests of the Third World can generally 
be served by the following means: the enhancing of its flexibility and 
self-determination in designing paths toward adjustment and liberaliza-
tion; a shift in the goals and openness of the IMF and World Bank; the 
restructuring of the international economic system for trade and capital 
flows; the opening of rich countries’ markets; more technological trans-
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fer by foreign companies, bilateral donors, and international agencies; a 
greater coherence of aid programs; and increased international funding 
to reduce food crises, directly help the poor, ameliorate external shocks, 
and write down debt burdens.
A number of countries vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies are 
not amenable to political economy solutions. Policies of governing elites 
are indeed at the root of most emergencies, and usually some powerful 
faction of society benefits from them. Yet a large number of countries 
vulnerable to emergencies have the will to change. Thus there is a sub-
stantial scope for international, national, and nongovernmental econom-
ic and political actors to coordinate their long-term policies to reduce the 
developing world’s vulnerability to humanitarian emergencies.17 
Notes
 1. A weakening or decaying state is one experiencing a decline in the basic func-
tions of the state, such as possessing authority and legitimacy, making laws, 
preserving order, and providing basic social services. A complete breakdown in 
these functions indicates a failing or collapsing state (Holsti 2000, pp. 246–50; 
Zartman 1995, pp. 1–7). 
 2. Regression models include ordinary least squares (OLS), generalized least 
squares (GLS or Prais-Winsten), two-stage least squares, fixed and random ef-
fects, tobit, and probit models. See Tables 3A.1–3A.4 for the results of a few of 
these regressions. 
 3. Queen Elizabeth House is the University of Oxford’s center for development 
studies.
 4.  This study is more applicable to preventing terrorism by the state or by warlords, 
the most frequent contributor to deaths from humanitarian emergencies, than to 
preventing terrorism by those trying to undermine the state. Falk (2002, p. 11) in-
dicates that the word terrorism initially “describe[d] political violence derive[d] 
from the government excesses that spun out of control during the French Revolu-
tion.” He deplores “the regressive narrowing of the concept of terrorism to apply 
only to violence by nonstate movements and organizations, thereby exempting 
state violence against civilians from the prohibition on terrorism . . . Such a usage 
is ethically unacceptable, politically manipulative and decidedly unhistorical.”
 5. Nafziger and Auvinen (2003, p. 201) found, like Collier and Hoeffler (1999, 
2000), that the incidence of armed conflict in Africa exceeded the incidence in 
other developing regions in the 1990s. If Africa’s economic performance had 
been as high as that of non-African LDCs, Africa’s incidence of conflict would 
have been similar to that of other developing regions (ibid.). Collier and Hoef-
fler’s finding is similar to ours. Stewart, Huang, and Wang (2001) indicate that 
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Africa had by far the greatest number of deaths (direct and indirect) from conflict 
during 1960–1995 as a proportion of the 1995 population—1.5 percent, com-
pared to 0.5 percent in the Middle East, 0.3 percent in Asia, and 0.1 percent in 
Latin America.
 6. Auvinen and Nafziger (1999, p. 278) found that there was an inverse relation-
ship between IMF credits, as a percentage of GNP, and emergencies. Some of 
the explanation may stem from the IMF’s refraining from funding “basket cases” 
devastated by war and displacement. In that case, the negative coefficient would 
be picking up a reverse causal relationship. Indeed, our two-stage least squares 
results, using the IMF credits/GNP variable, confirmed this reverse causality. 
Moreover, when the IMF variable was used as a predictor for lagged values of 
dependent variables, its coefficients were larger than for the OLS regression, 
indicating that perhaps emergencies keep away the IMF rather than vice versa 
(Auvinen and Nafziger 1999, pp. 280–281). Thus, a potential emergency reduces 
the likelihood of receiving IMF and other international support for adjustment 
programs.
   A major contributor to nonadjustment is the distortion from an overvalued 
domestic currency. Nafziger (1988, pp. 150–160) argues that African govern-
ments resist adjustments to market prices and exchange rates that interfere with 
state leaders’ ability to build political support, especially in cities.
 7. Berdal and Malone (2000) ask whether greed or grievance drives contemporary 
civil wars. Our answer is that both greed and grievance (from deprivation and in-
equality) are consistent with most of their contributors. This view is at odds with 
that of the World Bank’s Collier, who holds that “the only result that supports the 
grievance approach to conflict is that a prior period of rapid economic decline 
increases the risk of conflict” (2000a, p. 97). But Collier, who apparently did not 
use Deininger and Squire’s dataset, finds that inequality “has no effect on the risk 
of conflict according to the data . . . The grievance theory of conflict thus finds 
surprisingly little empirical support” (Collier 2000a, pp. 97–98). Can we really 
argue that the East Timorans, the Kashmir mujahidin, Chechnyans, Palestinians, 
the Hutu, Nuba, and southern Sudanese, to name just a few, are motivated only 
by greed and not also by grievance?
 8. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (1994) 
indicates that 3,750 people were killed in internal repression and resistance in 
South Africa in 1993. Moreover, Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1996, 1997, 1998) 
classify South Africa from 1991 to 1993 as a war. 
 9.  This thesis was introduced by Buss (1961, p. 58) and was developed in Gurr’s rela-
tive deprivation model (1970), where “utilitarian and normative justifications”—
views on the utility and appropriateness of collective violence—affected the likeli-
hood of political violence. Utilitarian and normative justifications were secondary 
to relative deprivation, which was a necessary condition for political violence. A 
squared term has been used to capture the curvilinearity of the relationship (see, 
e.g., Boswell and Dixon (1990). 
 10.  Whereas in resource mobilization/rational actor theories the inverted U-curve re-
lationship relates to the opportunities for resource mobilization and to the calcula-
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tion of costs and benefits by rational individuals, in frustration-aggression/relative 
deprivation theories it is viewed as being analogous to the concept of punishment 
in psychological theories (see Markus and Nesvold 1972, p. 235). 
 11.  On difficulties related to Cutright’s index, see Bollen (1980).
 12.  The sample consisted of 83 developing and developed countries in 1958–1960; 
African countries are not included in the analyses.
 13.  “Their [the dictatorships’] legitimacy often rests largely on their purported abil-
ity to provide economic efficiency and social order. Depression and debt disaster 
severely undermine those capabilities . . . More significant . . . may be the advan-
tages of democracies. One virtue is that they have other sources of legitimacy. 
They can claim to be elected, representative, popular, and fair. They can convey a 
more equitable image of the distribution of sacrifices. In the absence of ‘economic 
goods,’ democracies can distribute ‘political goods,’ such as freedom of speech and 
assembly, which also provide safety valves for discontent” (Drake 1989, 53–54).
 14.  For more detail on how authoritarianism and democracy have affected emergen-
cies, especially in the 1990s, see Nafziger and Auvinen 2003, pp. 114–131.
15. Auvinen and Nafziger (1999, pp. 278–279, 286) find a direct association be-
tween the number of deaths from intrastate violence in the 1960s and 1970s and 
humanitarian emergencies in the 1980s and 1990s. 
16. This view marks a departure from Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 567), in which 
one variable explaining civil war and its duration is the extent of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization. 
17.  Nafziger and Väyrynen (2002) provide detail on policies to prevent humanitarian 
emergencies.
Appendix 3A
Results of Regression Analyses
Table 3A.1  Humanitarian Emergencies: OLS Regression Models
Explanatory 
variables LDEATREF LHUMEMER LCOHE
Constant 7.31*** (2.67) 4.27** (1.85) 15.07*** (2.51)
LGDPGRO[−1] −1.83*** (0.55) −1.16*** (0.38) −2.54*** (0.52)
LGINI[−1] 0.29** (0.12) 0.18** (0.08) 0.36*** (0.11)
LGNPCAP[−1] −0.15*** (0.03) −0.07*** (0.02) −0.19*** (0.03)
LIMFGNP[−1] −0.10*** (0.03) −0.05*** (0.02) −0.06** (0.03)
LCPIDIFF[−1] 0.26*** (0.06) 0.20*** (0.04) 0.27*** (0.05)
LMILCENT[−1] 0.18*** (0.03) 0.16*** (0.02) 0.15*** (0.03)
LDEATRAD 0.04*** (0.01) a 0.02* (0.01)
R square 0.18 0.16 0.19
N 663 663 663
DW 0.34 0.31 0.38
NOTE: The figures are parameter estimates and, in parentheses, standard errors. OLS 
stands for ordinary least squares. LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LGINI = ln 
Gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP per capita; LIMFGNP = ln use of IMF credit/
GNP; LCPIDIFF = ln consumer price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln mili-
tary expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = ln deaths from domestic violence 1963–77. 
Except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory variables are lagged one year [−1]. Coeffi-
cient significance: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 
0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test); a = not 
significant. DW = Durbin-Watson test statistic for serial correlation.
SOURCE: Nafziger and Auvinen (2003), p. 23.
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Table 3A.2  Humanitarian Emergencies: GLS (Prais-Winsten) 
 Regression Models
Explanatory 
variables LDEATREF LHUMEMER LCOHE
Constant −2.69*** (0.81) 1.18a(0.73) 2.82*** (0.58)
LGDPGRO[−1] b −0.29**(0.14) a
LFOODGRO [−1] −0.19* (0.12) a b
LGINI[−1] 0.97*** (0.16) 0.14* (0.08) 0.56*** (0.14)
LGNPCAP[−1] −0.14*** (0.04) −0.07*** (0.02) −0.21*** (0.03)
LIMFGNP[−1] a a a
LCPIDIFF[−1] 0.16*** (0.04) a 0.19*** (0.04)
LMILCENT[−1] 0.19*** (0.04) 0.10*** (0.02) 0.19*** (0.03)
LDEATRAD 0.05*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.007) 0.03*** (0.01)
Rho 0.86***(0.02) 0.88***(0.02) 0.83***(0.02)
N 600 753 732
DW 1.93 1.64 1.98
NOTE: The figures are parameter estimates and in parentheses, standard errors. GLS 
stands for generalized least squares.  LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LFOODGRO 
= ln growth of food production per capita; LGINI = ln Gini index; LGNPCAP = ln 
GNP per capita; LIMFGNP = ln use of IMF credit/GNP; LCPIDIFF = ln consumer 
price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEAT-
RAD = ln deaths from domestic violence, 1963–77. Except for LDEATRAD, all ex-
planatory variables are lagged one year [−1]. Rho = coefficient of autocorrelation. 
Coefficient significance: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant 
at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test); a 
= not significant; b = not included in the equation. DW = Durbin-Watson test statistic 
for serial correlation.
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Table 3A.3  Humanitarian Emergencies: Fixed (LSDV) and Random Effects (GLS) Models
LDEATREF LHUMEMER LCOHE
Explanatory 
variables Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random
Constant 3.52*** (0.85) 3.68** (1.46) 0.69** (0.32) 0.11a (0.27) 11.10*** (1.56) 8.61*** (1.19)
LGDPGRO[−1] a −0.45* (0.27) a a −0.72*** (0.26) −0.53** (0.25)
LGINI[−1] −0.90*** (0.23) −0.44** (0.19) a a −0.50** (0.23) a
LGNPCAP[−1] a a −0.11** (0.05) −0.07** (0.03) −0.19*** (0.05) −0.22*** (0.04)
LCPIDIFF[−1] a a a 0.07** (0.03) a a
LMILCENT[−1] 0.23*** (0.03) 0.20*** (0.03) 0.17*** (0.03) 0.17*** (0.03) 0.24*** (0.03) 0.23*** (0.03)
LDEATRAD a 0.05** (0.02) a a a a
No. of units 69 62 91 77 61 83
R square 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.18
N 885 775 1,102 933 752 996
NOTE: The figures are parameter estimates and, in parentheses, standard errors. LSDV stands for least square dummy variable. GLS 
stands for generalized least squares. LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LGINI = ln Gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP per capita; 
LCPIDIFF = ln consumer price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = ln deaths from do-
mestic violence, 1963–77. Except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory variables are lagged one year [−1]. Coefficient significance: * signifi-
cant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test); 
a = not significant. R square is for “within effects” in the fixed effects model and for “overall effects” in the random effects model. Num-
ber of units = number of cross-sectional units taken into account by the analysis.
SOURCE: Nafziger and Auvinen (2003), p. 25.
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Table 3A.4  Probabilities of Humanitarian Emergencies: Probit Models
Explanatory variables LDEATREF LHUMEMER
LGDPGRO[−1] −0.82* (0.45) −0.41** (0.20)
LGINI[−1] 0.25*** (0.10) 0.12** (0.05)
LGNPCAP[−1] −0.13*** (0.03) −0.03** (0.01)
LIMFGNP[−1] −0.07*** (0.03) −0.014 (0.011)
LCPIDIFF[−1]  0.05 (0.04) −0.01 (0.02)
LMILCENT[−1] 0.05* (0.028) 0.02* (0.01)
LDEATRAD 0.04*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.003)
Obs. P 0.33 0.08
Pred. P 0.30 0.05
Log likelihood −309.79 −136.60
Chi squared 95.40 35.42
N 562 562
NOTE: The figures are changes in probabilities and, in parentheses, standard errors.
LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LGINI = ln Gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP 
per capita; LIMFGNP = ln use of IMF credit/GNP; LCPIDIFF = ln consumer price 
index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = 
ln deaths from domestic violence, 1963–77. Except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory 
variables are lagged one year [−1]. Coefficient significance: * significant at the 0.10 
level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant 
at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). Obs. P = observed probability; Pred. P = predicted 
probability at the mean of the dependent variable. The statistical significance of the 
model is tested against the value of Chi squared with 7 degrees of freedom.
SOURCE: Nafziger and Auvinen (2003), p. 26.
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Before the twentieth century, almost all increases in crop and ani-
mal production occurred as a result of enlarging the area cultivated. By 
the end of that century, almost all increases were coming from increases 
in land productivity—in output per acre or per hectare. This was an 
exceedingly short period in which to make a transition from a natural 
resource–based to a science-based system of agricultural production. In 
the presently developed countries, this transition began in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century. In most developing countries, the transition 
did not begin until well into the second half of the twentieth century. 
For some of the poorest countries in the world, the transition has not 
yet begun.
During the second half of the twentieth century world population 
more than doubled—from approximately 2.5 billion in 1950 to 6.0 bil-
lion in 2000. The demands placed on global agricultural production 
arising out of population and income growth almost tripled. By 2050, 
world population is projected to grow to between 9 and 10 billion peo-
ple. Most of the growth is expected to occur in poor countries where 
the income elasticity of demand for food remains high. Even moder-
ately high income growth, combined with projected population growth, 
could result in nearly doubling the demands placed on the world’s farm-
ers by 2050 (Johnson 2000; United Nations 2001).
The most difficult challenges will occur during the next two or three 
decades as both population and income in many of the world’s poor-
est countries continue to grow rapidly. But rapid decline in the rate of 
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population growth in such populous countries as India and China lends 
credence to United Nations projections that by mid-century the global 
rate of population growth will slow substantially. The demand for food 
arising out of income growth is also expected to slow as incomes rise 
and the income elasticity of demand for food declines. In the interim, 
very substantial increases in scientific and technical effort will be re-
quired, particularly in the world’s poorest countries, if growth in food 
production is to keep pace with growth in demand.
AGRICULTURE IN DEVELOPMENT THOUGHT
Economic understanding of the process of agricultural development 
has made substantial advances over the last half century. In the early 
post–World War II literature, agriculture, along with other natural re-
source–based industries, was viewed as a sector from which resources 
could be extracted to fund development in the industrial sector (Lewis 
1954, p. 139; Ranis and Fei 1961; Rostow 1956). Growth in agricultural 
production was viewed as an essential condition, or even a precondi-
tion, for growth in the rest of the economy. But the process by which ag-
ricultural growth was generated remained outside the concern of most 
development economists.
By the early 1960s a new perspective, more fully informed by both 
agricultural science and economics, was beginning to emerge. It had 
become increasingly clear that much of agricultural technology was lo-
cation specific. Techniques developed in advanced countries were not 
generally directly transferable to less developed countries with differ-
ent climates and resource endowments. Evidence had also accumulated 
that only limited productivity gains were to be had by the reallocation 
of resources within traditional peasant agriculture. 
In his iconoclastic book Transforming Traditional Agriculture, 
Theodore W. Schultz (1964) insists that peasants in traditional agrar-
ian societies are rational allocators of available resources and that 
they have remained poor because most poor countries provide them 
with only limited technical and economic opportunities to which they 
can respond—that is, they are “poor but efficient.” If given the inputs 
and know-how of their modern counterparts, they too could succeed, 
Schultz maintains: 
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The principal sources of the high productivity of modern agricul-
ture are reproducible sources. They consist of particular material 
inputs and of skills and other capabilities required to use such in-
puts successfully . . . 
 But these modern material inputs are seldom ready-made . . . 
 In general, what is available is a body of useful knowledge 
which has made it possible for the advanced countries to produce 
for their own use factors that are technically superior to those em-
ployed elsewhere. This body of knowledge can be used to develop 
similar, and as a rule superior, new factors appropriate to the bio-
logical and other conditions that are specific to the agriculture of 
poor countries. (pp. 146–147)
This thesis implies three types of relatively high-payoff investments 
for agricultural development: 1) the capacity of agricultural research in-
stitutions to generate new location-specific technical knowledge; 2) the 
capacity of the technology supply industries to develop, produce, and 
market new technical inputs; and 3) the schooling and nonformal (ex-
tension) education of rural people to enable them to use the new knowl-
edge and technology effectively. The enthusiasm with which this high-
payoff input model was accepted and transformed into doctrine was 
due at least as much to the success of plant breeders and agronomists in 
developing fertilizer and management-responsive green revolution crop 
varieties for the tropics as to the power of Schultz’s ideas.1
The Schultz “high-payoff input model” remained incomplete, how-
ever, even as a model of technical change in agriculture. It did not at-
tempt to explain how economic conditions induce an efficient path of 
technical change for the agricultural sector of a particular society. Nor 
does the high-payoff input model attempt to explain how economic 
conditions induce the development of new institutions, such as public 
sector agricultural experiment stations, that become the suppliers of lo-
cation-specific new knowledge and technology. 
Beginning in the early 1970s, Hayami and Ruttan (1971, 1985) and 
Binswanger and Ruttan (1978) formulated a model of induced technical 
change in which the development and application of new technology is 
endogenous to the economic system. Building on the Hicksian model 
of factor-saving technical change and their own experience in south-
east Asia, they proposed a model in which the direction of technical 
change in agriculture was induced by changes (or differences) in rela-
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tive resource endowments and factor prices. In this model, alternative 
agricultural technologies are developed to facilitate the substitution of 
relatively abundant (hence cheap) factors for relatively scarce (hence 
expensive) factors. Two kinds of technology generally correspond to 
this taxonomy. Mechanical technology is labor saving, designed to sub-
stitute power and machinery for labor. Biological and chemical technol-
ogy is land saving, designed to substitute labor-intensive production 
practices and industrial inputs such as fertilizer and plant- and animal-
protection chemicals for land. Both the technical conditions of produc-
tion and historical experience suggest that changes in land productivity 
and labor productivity are relatively independent (Griliches 1968).
The process of induced technical change can be illustrated from 
the historical experience of Japan and the United States, illustrated in 
Figure 4.1. In Panel A of Figure 4.1, the horizontal axis is the price of 
fertilizer relative to the price of land and the vertical axis the amount of 
fertilizer per hectare of agricultural land. In Panel B of Figure 4.1, the 
horizontal axis is the price of draft power—both animal and mechani-
cal—relative to the price of labor and the vertical axis the amount of 
draft power per worker. Reading from right (1880) to left (1980), as 
the price of fertilizer declined relative to the price of land, fertilizer use 
per hectare rose in both countries (Panel A). Similarly, as the price of 
draft power declined relative to the price of labor, the use of power per 
worker rose in both countries (Panel B).
Throughout the period 1880–1980, Japanese farmers used more fer-
tilizer per hectare than U.S. farmers, and U.S. farmers used more power 
per worker than Japanese farmers. These differences in use of fertilizer 
per unit of land and of draft power per worker between the two coun-
tries, and the changes in each country between 1880 and 1980, were 
not the result of simple factor substitution in response to relative price 
changes. The large changes in factor ratios were made possible only by 
the very substantial advances in biological and mechanical technology 
that facilitated the substitution of fertilizer for land and draft power 
for labor. These technical changes were induced by the differences and 
changes in relative factor price ratios (Hayami and Ruttan 1985, pp. 
176–197).2 Over time, particularly since World War II, there has been 
some convergence in relative factor prices and in relative intensity of 
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a Relation between fertilizer input per hectare of arable land and the fertilizer–arable land price ratio: hectares of arable land that can be 
purchased by one ton of N + P2O5 + K2O, contained in commercial fertilizers. 
b Relation between farm draft power per male worker and power labor price ratio: hectares of work days that can be purchased by one 
horsepower (hp) of tractor or draft animal.
SOURCE: Hayami and Ruttan (1985, pp. 179–180).
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Figure 4.1  Induced Technical Change in Fertilizer and Draft Power, the United States and Japan (quinquennial  
observations for 1880–1980)
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Advances in mechanical technology in agriculture have been inti-
mately associated with the industrial revolution. But the mechanization 
of agriculture cannot be treated as simply the adaptation of industrial 
methods of production to agriculture. The spatial dimension of crop 
production requires that the machines suitable for agricultural mechani-
zation be mobile—they must move across or through materials that are 
immobile (Brewster 1950). The seasonal characteristic of agricultural 
production requires a series of specialized machines—for land prepara-
tion, planting, pest and pathogen control, and harvesting—designed for 
sequential operations, each of which is carried out for only a few days or 
weeks in each season. One result is that a fully mechanized agriculture 
is typically very capital intensive. Advances in biological technology in 
crop production involve one or more of the following three elements: 
1) land and water resource development to provide a more favorable 
environment for plant growth; 2) the addition of organic and inorganic 
sources of plant nutrition to the soil to stimulate plant growth and the 
use of biological and chemical means to protect plants from pests and 
pathogens; and 3) selection and breeding of new, biologically efficient 
crop varieties specifically adapted to respond to those elements in the 
environment that are subject to management.
Advances in mechanical technology are a primary source of growth 
in labor productivity; advances in biological technology are a primary 
source of growth in land productivity. There are, of course, exceptions 
to this analytical distinction. For example, in nineteenth-century Japan, 
horse plowing was developed as a technology to cultivate more deeply 
to enhance yield (Hayami and Ruttan 1985, p. 75).3 In the United States, 
the replacement of horses by tractors released land from animal feed to 
food production (Olmstead and Rhode 2001; White 2000). At the most 
sophisticated level, technical change often involves complementary ad-
vances in both mechanical and biological technology. For most coun-
tries, the research resource allocation issue is the relative emphasis that 
should be given to advancing biological and mechanical technology.
The model of induced technical change has important implications 
for resource allocation in agricultural research. In labor-abundant and 
land-constrained developing countries, like China and India, research 
resources are most productively directed to advancing yield-enhancing 
biological technology. In contrast, land-abundant Brazil has realized 
very high returns from research directed to releasing the productivity 
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constraints on its problem soils. Discovery of the yield-enhancing ef-
fects of heavy lime application on acidic aluminum-containing soils has 
opened its Campos Cerrados (great plains) region to extensive mecha-
nized production of maize and soybeans.
MEASURING THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
Comparative research on the rate and direction of productivity 
growth in agriculture has gone through three stages. Initially, efforts 
were directed to the measurement of partial productivity ratios and in-
dexes, such as output per worker and per hectare. Intercountry cross-
section and time-series comparisons of output per unit of land and labor 
were first assembled by Collin Clark in his pioneering study, The Con-
ditions of Economic Progress (1940/1957). In the late 1960s, Clark’s 
intercountry comparisons were revived and updated by Yujiro Hayami 
and associates (Hayami 1969; Hayami and Inagi 1969; Hayami, Miller, 
Wade, and Yamashita 1971). These early partial productivity studies 
identified exceedingly wide differences in land and labor productivity 
both among countries and among major world regions. Recent trends 
in land and labor productivity indicate that these wide differences have 
persisted. 
In Figure 4.2, labor productivity (output per worker) is measured on 
the horizontal axis. Land productivity (output per hectare) is measured 
on the vertical axis. The dashed diagonal lines, with the units appear-
ing across the top and down the right-hand side of the figure, trace the 
land-labor factor ratios (hectares of agricultural land per worker). The 
country and regional lines indicate land-labor trajectories for specific 
countries or regions. The partial productivity growth patterns of Figure 
4.2 are displayed in much greater detail in the work of Hayami and 
Ruttan (1985, pp. 117–129). The several country and regional growth 
paths fall broadly into three groups: 1) a land-constrained path in which 
output per hectare has risen faster than output per worker, 2) a land-
abundant path in which output per worker has risen more rapidly than 
output per hectare, and 3) an intermediate growth path in which output 
per worker and per hectare have grown at somewhat comparable rates. 
During the later stages of development, as the price of labor begins 
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Figure 4.2  International Comparison of Land and Labor Productivities  
 by Region: 1961–1990.










SOURCE: Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom (1997, p. 1066).
to rise relative to the price of land, the growth path tends to shift in a 
labor saving direction. If land and labor productivity grow at the same 
rate, as in west Asia and North Africa, historical productivity follows a 
diagonal path. Partial productivity ratios such as those plotted in Figure 
4.2 were employed by Hayami and Ruttan (1970, 1971, pp. 163–205) in 
their initial tests of the induced technical change hypothesis.
A second stage of the research on technical change in agriculture 
involved the estimation of cross-country production functions and the 
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construction of multifactor productivity estimates. In these studies, 
factor inputs—typically land, labor, livestock, capital equipment (ma-
chinery), and current inputs (fertilizer)—were aggregated using either 
factor shares or statistical estimates as the weights for factor aggrega-
tion in multifactor productivity estimates or as elasticity coefficients 
in Cobb-Douglas type production functions.4 Over time, improvements 
in data availability and estimation methods have contributed to greater 
reliability in the estimates. 
The Hayami and Ruttan (1970) and the Kawagoe, Hayami, and 
Ruttan (1985) cross-country metaproduction functions (Lau and Yoto-
poulos 1989) have been used in growth accounting exercises to parti-
tion the sources of differences in agricultural labor and land productiv-
ity between developed and developing countries and among individual 
countries. The results indicated that internal resource endowments (land 
and livestock), modern technical inputs (machinery and fertilizer), and 
human capital (general and technical education) each accounted for ap-
proximately one-fourth of the differences in labor productivity between 
developed countries and less developed countries as groups. Scale 
economies, present in developed countries but not in less developed 
countries, accounted for about 15 percent of the difference.5
The implications of these results for potential growth of labor pro-
ductivity in the agricultural production of less developed countries were 
encouraging. The pressure of population against land resources was not 
a binding constraint on agricultural production. Scale diseconomies 
were not an immediate constraint on labor productivity. Labor produc-
tivity could be increased by several multiples—to levels approximat-
ing the levels in Western Europe in the early 1960s—by investment in 
human capital and in agricultural research, and by more intensive use 
of technical inputs. The historical experience of Japan and the more 
recent experience of Korea and Taiwan did suggest, however, that as 
demand for labor, associated with rapid urban-industrial development, 
draws substantial labor from agriculture, small farm size could become 
a more serious constraint. As the agricultural labor force declines, farm 
consolidation results in a rise in the land/labor ratio and a rise in labor 
productivity.
A third stage in agricultural productivity analysis has involved ef-
forts to test for the convergence of growth rates and levels of multi-
factor productivity between and among developing and less developed 
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countries. Most of these studies have employed the Malmquist or fron-
tier productivity approach. The basic idea of the Malmquist approach 
is to construct the best-practice, or frontier, production function and to 
measure the distance of each country in the sample from the frontier 
by applying a linear programming method known as data envelopment 
analysis. The combination of inputs is allowed to vary along an efficient 
frontier, rather than the fixed coefficient production functions employed 
in the second-stage studies, to partition changes in multifactor produc-
tivity into technical change and efficiency change components.6 Techni-
cal change measures the shift in the best-practice or frontier production 
functions; efficiency change measures change in the difference between 
average practice and the best-practice productivity frontier. 
These studies generally indicate a widening of the agricultural pro-
ductivity gap between developed and developing countries between the 
early 1960s and the early 1990s. Within the group of developed coun-
tries, except for continuing divergence between northern and south-
ern Europe, productivity levels have converged modestly. Developing 
countries as a group experienced declining total factor productivity 
relative to the frontier countries. There is, however, some evidence of 
convergence toward the still relatively low frontier productivity levels 
within African agriculture (Arnade 1998; Ball et al. 2001; Chavas 2001; 
Fulginiti and Perrin 1997, 1998; Suhariyanto, Lusigi, and Thirtle 2001; 
Thirtle, Hadley, and Townsend 1995; Trueblood and Coggins 2001).
The partitioning of total factor productivity into technical efficiency 
and technical change in Asian agriculture is illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
During the period from 1965–66 to 1995–96 the gap between average 
practice, as measured by technical efficiency change, and best practice, 
as measured by technical change, widened. As a result, average total 
factor productivity change (TFP) advanced more slowly than the rate of 
technical change in the countries on the efficiency frontier. Another way 
of making the same point is to say that technical efficiency has lagged 
behind technical change associated with the rapid adoption of green 
revolution seed-fertilizer technology in the frontier countries (Roseg-
rant and Hazell 2000, pp. 123–60). The results are not inconsistent with 
a technical trajectory implied by the induced technical change hypoth-
esis. Technical change in Asia has been strongly biased in a land-sav-
ing direction, in response to the relatively severe constraints on land 
resources. This bias is reflected in both a land-saving shift in the pro-
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duction function and the substitution of technical inputs, particularly 
fertilizer and pest and pathogen control chemicals, for land (Murgai 
2001; Murgai, Ali, and Byerlee 2001). Similar trends have taken place 
in some of the more land-constrained, labor-intensive agricultural sys-
tems in Africa and Latin America.
TRANSITION TO SUSTAINABILITY
Growth in total factor productivity in agriculture, arising out of 
technical change and improvements in efficiency, has made an exceed-
ingly important contribution to economic growth. Within rural areas, 
growth of land and labor productivity has led to substantial poverty 
reduction. Productivity growth has also released substantial resources 
to the rest of the economy and contributed to reductions in the price 
of food in both rural and urban areas (Irz et al. 2001; Shane, Roe, and 
Gopinath 1998). The decline in the price of food, which in many parts 
of the world is the single most important factor determining the buying 
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Figure 4.3  Efficiency Change, Technical Change, and TFP Change in 
Asian Agriculture
SOURCE: Suhariyanto, Lusigi, and Thirtle (2001, p. 11).
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industrial development in a number of important emerging economies. 
These price declines have also meant that, in countries or regions that 
have not experienced such gains in agricultural productivity, farmers 
have lost competitive advantage in world markets and consumers have 
failed to share fully in the gains from economic growth. But what about 
the future? In the next two sections I will first address the environmen-
tal and resource constraints and then the scientific and the technical 
constraints that will confront the world’s farmers as they attempt to 
respond to the demands that will be placed on them.7
RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS
The leading resource and environmental constraints faced by the 
world’s farmers include soil loss and degradation; waterlogging and 
salinity of soil; the coevolution of pests, pathogens, and hosts; and the 
impact of climate change. Part of my concern is with the feedback of 
the environmental impacts of agricultural intensification on agricultural 
production itself (Tilman et al. 2001).
Soil. Soil degradation and erosion have been widely regarded as 
major threats to sustainable growth in agricultural production in both 
developed and developing countries. It has been suggested, for example, 
that by 2050 it may be necessary to feed “twice as many people with 
half as much topsoil” (Harris 1990, p. 115). However, attempts to assess 
the implications of soil erosion and degradation confront serious dif-
ficulties. Water and wind erosion estimates are measures of the amount 
of soil moved from one place to another rather than of soil actually lost. 
Relatively few studies provide the information necessary to estimate 
yield loss from erosion and degradation. Studies in the United States 
by the Natural Resources Conservation Service have been interpreted 
to indicate that if 1992 erosion rates continued for 100 years the yield 
loss at the end of the period would amount to only 2–3 percent (Cros-
son 1995a). An exceedingly careful review of the long term relationship 
between soil erosion, degradation, and crop productivity in China and 
Indonesia concludes that there has been little loss of organic matter or 
mineral nutrients and that use of fertilizer has been able to compensate 
for loss of nitrogen (Lindert 2000). A careful review of the international 
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literature suggests that yield losses at the global level might be roughly 
double the rates estimated for the United States (Crosson 1995b). 
At the global level, soil loss and degradation are not likely to rep-
resent a serious constraint on agricultural production over the next half 
century. But soil loss and degradation could become a serious constraint 
at the local or regional level in some fragile resource areas. For example, 
yield constraints due to soil erosion and degradation seem especially 
severe in the arid and semiarid regions of sub-Saharan Africa. A slow-
ing of agricultural productivity growth in robust resource areas could 
also lead to intensification or expansion of crop and animal production 
that would put pressure on soil in fragile resource areas—like tropi-
cal rain forests, arid and semiarid regions, and high mountain areas. In 
some such areas, the possibility of sustainable growth in production 
can be enhanced by irrigation, terracing, careful soil management, and 
changes in commodity mix and farming systems (Lal 1995; Niemeijer 
and Mazzucato 2002; Smil 2000).
Water. During the last half-century, water has become a resource 
of high and increasing value in many countries. In the arid and semiarid 
areas of the world, water scarcity is becoming an increasingly serious 
constraint on growth of agricultural production (Gleick 2000; Raskin et 
al. 1997; Seckler, Molden, and Barker 1999). During the last half centu-
ry, irrigated area in developing countries more than doubled, from less 
than 100 million hectares to more than 200 million hectares. About half 
of developing-country grain production is grown on irrigated land. The 
International Water Management Institute has projected that by 2025 
most regions or countries in a broad sweep from north China across 
East Asia to North Africa and northern sub-Saharan Africa will experi-
ence either absolute or severe water scarcity.8
Irrigation systems can be a double-edged answer to water scarcity, 
since they may have substantial externalities that affect agricultural 
production directly. Common problems of surface water irrigation sys-
tems include waterlogging and salinity resulting from excessive water 
use and poorly designed drainage systems (Murgai, Ali, and Byerlee 
2001). In the Aral Sea Basin in central Asia, the effects of excessive 
water withdrawal for cotton and rice production, combined with inad-
equate drainage facilities, have resulted in such extensive waterlogging 
and salinity, as well as contraction of the Aral Sea, that the economic 
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viability of the entire region is threatened (Glazovsky 1995). Another 
common externality results from the extraction of water from under-
ground aquifers in excess of the rate at which the aquifers are naturally 
recharged, resulting in a falling groundwater level and rising pump-
ing costs. In some countries, like Pakistan and India, these externalities 
have in some cases been sufficient to offset the contribution of expan-
sion of irrigated area to agricultural production.
However, the lack of water resources is unlikely to become a severe 
constraint on global agricultural production in the next half century. 
The scientific and technical efforts devoted to improvement in water 
productivity have been much more limited than efforts to enhance land 
productivity (Molden, Amarasinghe, and Hussain 2001), so significant 
productivity improvements in water use are surely possible. Institution-
al innovations will be required to create incentives to enhance water 
productivity (Saleth and Dinar 2000). But in 50 to 60 of the world’s 
most arid countries, plus major regions in several other countries, com-
petition from household, industrial, and environmental demands will 
reallocate water away from agricultural irrigation. In many of these 
countries, increases in water productivity and changes in farming sys-
tems will permit continued increases in agricultural production. In other 
countries, the reduction in irrigated area will cause a significant con-
straint on agricultural production. Since these countries are among the 
world’s poorest, some will have great difficulty in meeting food secu-
rity needs from either domestic production or food imports.
Pests. Pest control has become an increasingly serious constraint 
on agricultural production in spite of dramatic advances in pest control 
technology. In the United States, pesticides have been the most rap-
idly growing input in agricultural production over the last half century. 
Major pests include pathogens, insects, and weeds. For much of the 
post–World War II era, pest control has meant application of chemicals. 
Pesticidal activity of dichlorodiphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT) was dis-
covered by scientists in the late 1930s. It was used in World War II to 
protect American troops against typhus and malaria. Early tests found 
DDT to be effective against almost all insect species and relatively 
harmless to humans, animals, and plants. It was relatively inexpensive 
and effective at low application levels. Chemical companies rapidly 
introduced a series of other synthetic organic pesticides in the 1950s 
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(Ruttan 1982; Palladino 1996). The initial effectiveness of DDT and 
other synthetic organic chemicals for crop and animal pest control after 
World War II led to the neglect of other pest control strategies.
By the early 1960s, an increasing body of evidence suggested that 
the benefits of the synthetic organic chemical pesticides introduced in 
the 1940s and 1950s were obtained at substantial cost. One set of costs 
included the direct and indirect health effects on wildlife populations 
and on humans (Carson 1962; Pingali and Roger 1995). A second set of 
costs involved the destruction of beneficial insects and the emergence 
of pesticide resistance in target populations. A fundamental problem in 
efforts to develop methods of control for pests and pathogens is that the 
control results in evolutionary selection pressure for the emergence of 
organisms that are resistant to the control technology (Palumbi 2001). 
When DDT was introduced in California to control the cottony cushion 
scale, its predator the vedalia beetle turned out to be more susceptible 
to DDT than the scale. In 1947, just one year after the introduction of 
DDT, citrus growers were confronted with a resurgence of the scale 
population. In Peru, the cotton bollworm quickly built up resistance to 
DDT and to the even more effective—and more toxic to humans—or-
ganophosphate insecticides that were adopted to replace DDT (Palla-
dino 1996, pp. 36–41).
The solution to the pesticide crisis offered by the entomological 
community was integrated pest management (IPM). IPM involved the 
integrated use of an array of pest control strategies: making hosts more 
resistant to pests, finding biological controls for pests, cultivation prac-
tices, and also chemical control if needed. At the time integrated pest 
management began to be promoted in the 1960s, it represented little 
more than a rhetorical device. But by the 1970s, a number of important 
IPM programs had been designed and implemented. However, exag-
gerated expectations that dramatic reductions in chemical pesticide use 
could be achieved without significant decline in crop yields as a result 
of IPM have yet only been partially realized (Gianessi 1991; Lewis et 
al. 1997).
My own judgment is that the problem of pest and pathogen con-
trol will represent a more serious constraint on sustainable growth in 
agricultural production at a global level than either land or water con-
straints.9 In part, this is because the development of pest- and pathogen-
resistant crop varieties and chemical methods of control both tend to 
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induce the evolution of more resistant pests or pathogens. In addition, 
international travel and trade are spreading the newly resistant pests and 
pathogens to new environments. As a result, pest control technologies 
must constantly be replaced and updated. The coevolution of patho-
gens, insect pests, and weeds in response to control efforts will continue 
to represent a major factor in directing the allocation of agricultural 
research resources to assure that agricultural output can be maintained 
at present levels or continue to grow.10
Climate. Measurements taken in Hawaii in the late 1950s indicated 
that carbon dioxide (CO2) was increasing in the atmosphere. Begin-
ning in the late 1960s, computer model simulations indicated possible 
changes in temperature and precipitation that could occur because of 
human-induced emission of CO2 and other greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere. By the early 1980s a fairly broad consensus had emerged 
in the climate change research community that energy production and 
consumption from fossil fuels could, by 2050, result in a doubling of 
the atmospheric concentration of CO2, a rise in global average tempera-
ture by 2.5oC–4.5oC (2.7oF–8.0oF) and a complex pattern of worldwide 
climate change (Ruttan 2001, pp. 515–520). 
Since the mid-1980s, a succession of studies has attempted to as-
sess how an increase in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse 
gases could affect agricultural production through three channels: 
1) higher CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere may have a positive 
“fertilizer effect” on some crop plants (and weeds); 2) higher tempera-
tures could result in a rise in the sea level, resulting in inundation of 
coastal areas and intrusion of saltwater into groundwater aquifers; and 
3) changes in temperature, rainfall, and sunlight may also alter agricul-
tural production, although the effects will vary greatly across regions. 
Early assessments of the impact of climate change on global agriculture 
suggested a negative annual impact in the 2–4 percent range by the 
third decade of this century (Parry 1990). More recent projections are 
more optimistic (Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw 1994; Rosenzweig 
and Hillel 1998). The early models have been criticized for a “dumb 
farmer” assumption—they did not incorporate how farmers would re-
spond to climate change with different crops and growing methods. Ef-
forts to incorporate how public and private suppliers of knowledge and 
technology might adjust to climate change are just beginning (Evenson 
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1988). But even the more sophisticated models have been unable to 
incorporate the synergistic interactions among climate change, soil loss 
and degradation, ground and surface water storage, and the incidence 
of pests and pathogens. These interactive effects could combine into a 
significantly larger burden on growth in agricultural production than 
the effects of each constraint considered separately. One thing that is 
certain is that a country or region that has not acquired substantial ag-
ricultural research capacity will have great difficulty in responding to 
anticipated climate change impacts.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CONSTRAINTS
The achievement of sustained growth in agricultural production 
over the next half century represents at least as difficult a challenge 
to science and technology development as the transition to a science-
based system of agricultural production during the twentieth century 
did. In assessing the role of advances in science and technology in re-
leasing the several constraints on growth of agricultural production and 
productivity, the induced technical change hypothesis is useful. To the 
extent that technical change in agriculture is endogenous, scientific and 
technical resources will be directed to sustaining or enhancing the pro-
ductivity of those factors that are relatively scarce and expensive. Farm-
ers in those countries that have not yet acquired the capacity to invent 
or adapt technology specific to their resource endowments will continue 
to find it difficult to respond to the growth of domestic or international 
demand.
In the 1950s and 1960s, it was not difficult to anticipate the likely 
sources of increase in agricultural production over the next several de-
cades (Millikan and Hapgood 1967; Ruttan 1956; Schultz 1964). Ad-
vances in crop production would come from expansion in area irrigated, 
from more intensive application of improved fertilizer and crop protec-
tion chemicals, and from the development of crop varieties that would 
be more responsive to technical inputs and management. Advances in 
animal production would come from genetic improvements and ad-
vances in animal nutrition. At a more fundamental level, increases in 
crop yields would come from genetic advances that would change plant 
architecture to make possible higher plant populations per hectare and 
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would increase the ratio of grain to straw in individual plants. Increases 
in production of animals and animal products would come about by 
genetic and management changes that would decrease the proportion of 
feed devoted to animal maintenance and increase the proportion used to 
produce usable animal products.
I find it much more difficult to tell a convincing story about the 
likely sources of increase in crop and animal production over the next 
half century than I did a half century ago. The ratio of grain to straw is 
already high in many crops, and severe physiological constraints arise 
in trying to increase it further. There are also physiological limits to 
increasing the efficiency with which animal feed produces animal prod-
ucts. These constraints will impinge most severely in areas that have 
already achieved the highest levels of output per hectare or per animal 
unit—in Western Europe, North America and East Asia. Indeed, the 
constraints are already evident. The yield increases from incremental 
fertilizer application are falling. The reductions in labor input from the 
use of larger and more powerful mechanical equipment are declining as 
well. As average grain yields have risen from 1–2 metric tons per hect-
are to 6–8 metric tons per hectare over the last half century in the most 
favored areas, the share of research budgets devoted to maintenance 
research—the research needed to maintain existing crop and animal 
productivity levels—has risen relative to total research budgets (Pluck-
nett and Smith 1986). Cost per scientist year has been rising faster than 
the general price level (Huffman and Evenson 1993; Pardey, Craig, and 
Hallaway 1989). I find it difficult to escape a conclusion that both pub-
lic and private sector agricultural research, in those countries that have 
achieved the highest levels of agricultural productivity, have begun to 
experience diminishing returns.
Perhaps advances in molecular biology and genetic engineering will 
relieve the scientific and technical constraints on the growth of agricul-
tural production. In the past, advances in fundamental knowledge have 
often initiated new cycles of research productivity (Evenson and Kislev 
1975). Transgenetically modified crops, particularly maize, soybeans, 
and cotton, have diffused rapidly since they were first introduced in the 
mid-1990s. Four countries—the United States, Argentina, Canada, and 
China—accounted for 99 percent of the 109 million acres of transgenic 
crop area in 2000 (James 2000). The applications that are presently 
available in the field are primarily in the area of plant protection and 
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animal health. Among the more dramatic examples is the development 
of cotton varieties that incorporate resistance to the cotton bollworm. 
The effect has been to reduce the application of chemical control from 
8–10 to 1–2 spray applications per season (Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and 
Nelson 2000). These advances are enabling producers to push crop and 
animal yields closer to their genetically determined biological potential. 
But they have not yet raised biological yield ceilings above the levels 
that have been achieved by researchers employing the older methods 
based on Mendelian genetics (Ruttan 1999). 
Advances in agricultural applications of genetic engineering in de-
veloped countries will almost certainly be slowed by developed coun-
try concerns about the possible environmental and health impacts of 
transgenetically modified plants and foods. One effect of these concerns 
has been to shift the attention of biotechnology research away from 
agricultural applications in favor of industrial and pharmaceutical ap-
plications (Committee on Environmental Impacts 2002, pp. 221–229). 
This shift will delay the development of productivity-enhancing bio-
technology applications and agricultural development in less developed 
economies. 
I find it somewhat surprising that it is difficult for me to share the 
current optimism about the dramatic gains to be realized from the ap-
plication of molecular genetics and genetic engineering. One of my first 
professional papers was devoted to refuting the pessimistic projections 
for agricultural productivity and production that were common in the 
early 1950s (Ruttan 1956). Other students of this subject have presented 
more optimistic perspectives (Runge et al. 2003; Waggoner 1997). But I 
have not yet seen evidence that the new genetics technologies, although 
undoubtedly powerful, will or can overcome the long-term prospect of 
diminishing returns to research on agricultural productivity. 
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SYSTEMS
To this point, I have given major attention to the role of agricultural 
research as a source of technical change and productivity growth. In 
this section I sketch the evolution and structure of national and inter-
national agricultural research systems.11 The institutional arrangements 
for the support of agricultural research began in the middle of the nine-
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teenth century. In 1843 John Bennet Lawes (subsequently knighted) 
established, and later endowed, an agricultural experiment station on 
his family estate of Rothamsted, in Hertfordshire, England. In Germa-
ny, the introduction by Justus von Liebig of the laboratory method of 
training in organic chemistry at Giessen led directly to the establish-
ment of the first publicly supported agricultural experiment station at 
Mockern, Saxony, in 1852. The German method of public-sector ag-
ricultural research became the model for agricultural research in the 
United States. A number of American students who studied with Liebig 
were responsible for establishing the research program of the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture and the agricultural experiment stations at the 
new land-grant public universities in the late 1800s (Ruttan 1982). The 
basic structure of the U.S. agricultural research system has become in-
creasingly complex, with the federal government, individual states, and 
the private sector each playing an important role. The sources and flows 
of funding for 1998 are shown in Figure 4.4. 
a SAES stands for State Agricultural Experiment Station.
SOURCE: Adapted from Fuglie, Ballenger, Day, Klotz, Ollinger, Reilly, Vasavada, 
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Figure 4.4  Sources and Flows of Funding for Agricultural Research: 1998
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Substantial progress was made in the first several decades of the 
twentieth century in initiating public sector agricultural research capac-
ity in Latin America and in the colonial economies of Asia and Africa. 
Research efforts were focused primarily on tropical export crops such 
as sugar, rubber, cotton, bananas, coffee, and tea. The disruption of in-
ternational trade during the Great Depression of the 1930s and during 
World War II, followed by the breakup of colonial empires, aborted or 
severely weakened many of these efforts.
By the early 1960s, the U.S. development assistance agency and 
the assistance agencies of the former colonial powers were beginning 
to channel substantial resources into strengthening agricultural educa-
tion and research institutions, with a stronger focus on domestic food 
crops in developing countries. The Ford and Rockefeller foundations 
collaborated in the establishment of four international agricultural re-
search institutes: the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the 
Philippines, the International Center for the Improvement of Maize and 
Wheat (CIMMYT) in Mexico, the International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria, and the International Center for Tropical 
Agriculture (CIAT) in Colombia. In 1971, the two foundations, joined 
by the World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the Unit-
ed Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
and a number of bilateral donor agencies, formed the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). By the early 
1990s the CGIAR systems had expanded to 18 centers or institutes.
From the 1950s through the 1980s, the resources available to the 
new national and international research institutions from national and 
international sources expanded rapidly. Both the national and the inter-
national systems achieved dramatic success in the development of high-
er yielding, “green revolution” wheat, rice, and maize varieties (Alston 
et al. 2000; Ruttan 2001, pp. 203–223). Several developing countries—
India, China, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa—achieved world 
class agricultural research capacity. During the 1990s, however, growth 
of public sector support for both national and international agricultural 
research slowed substantially. Support for private sector agricultural re-
search, which remains concentrated primarily in developed countries, 
has continued to grow rapidly.12
An active and vibrant global agricultural research system will be 
needed to sustain growth in agricultural productivity into the twenty-
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first century. But the system itself is still incomplete. When it is com-
pleted, it will include strong public national research institutions, linked 
to higher education, that can work effectively with the international sys-
tem and other national systems. This network will be complemented by 
a scientifically sophisticated technology supply industry, composed of 
both national and multinational firms. The research systems in most de-
veloping countries have yet to establish sufficient capacity to make ef-
fective use of the existing advances in knowledge and technology. The 
private sector agricultural technology supply industry, although grow-
ing rapidly, still remains poorly represented in the poorest developing 
countries.
PERSPECTIVE
What are the implications of the resource and environmental con-
straints, the scientific and technical constraints, and the institutional 
constraints on agricultural productivity growth over the next half cen-
tury? In those countries and regions in which land and labor productiv-
ity are already at or approaching scientific and technical frontiers, it will 
be difficult to achieve growth in agricultural productivity comparable to 
the rates achieved over the last half century (Pingali and Heisey 2001; 
Pingali, Moya, and Velasco 1990; Reilly and Fuglie 1998). But in most 
of these countries at the technological frontier, the demand for food will 
rise only slowly. As a result, these countries, except perhaps those that 
are most land-constrained, will have little difficulty in achieving rates 
of growth in agricultural production that will keep up with the slowly 
rising demand for food. Several of the countries near the technologi-
cal frontier, particularly in east Asia, will find it economically advanta-
geous to continue to import substantial quantities of animal feed and 
food grains (Rosegrant and Hazell 2000). 
For those countries in which land and labor productivity levels are 
furthest from frontier levels, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, 
opportunities exist to enhance agricultural productivity substantially. 
Countries that are land-constrained, such as India, can be expected 
to follow a productivity growth path that places primary emphasis on 
biological technology. In contrast, Brazil, which is still involved in ex-
panding its agricultural land frontier while confronting crop yield con-
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straints in its older agricultural regions, can be expected to follow a 
more balanced productivity growth path. Most of the poor countries 
or regions that find it advantageous to follow a biological technology 
path will have to invest substantially more than in the past to acquire a 
capacity for agricultural research and technology transfer. These invest-
ments will include general and technical education, rural physical infra-
structure, and appropriate research and technology transfer institutions. 
Moreover, gains in labor productivity will depend on the rate of growth 
in demand for labor in the nonfarm sectors of the economy, which in 
turn will create the incentives for substituting mechanical technology 
for labor in agricultural production. If relatively land-abundant coun-
tries, in sub-Saharan Africa for example, fail to develop a strong inter-
sector labor market in which workers can move from rural agricultural 
jobs to urban manufacturing and service jobs, they will end up follow-
ing an East Asian land-saving biological technology path.
I find it more difficult to anticipate the productivity paths that will 
be followed by several other regions. The countries of the former Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) have in the past followed a trajec-
tory somewhat similar to North America (as shown in Figure 4.2). If 
they recover from recent stagnation, these countries may resume their 
historical trajectory.13 The trajectories that will be followed by west 
Asia, North Africa, and other arid regions are highly uncertain. Very 
substantial gains in water productivity will be required to realize gains 
in land productivity in these areas, and very substantial growth in non-
agricultural demand for labor will be required to realize the substantial 
gains in labor productivity that would enable them to continue along the 
intermediate technology trajectory that has characterized the countries 
of southern Europe. The major oil-producing countries will continue 
to expand their imports of food and feed grains. If the world should 
move toward more open trading arrangements, a number of tropical or 
semitropical developing countries would find it advantageous to expand 
their exports of commodities in which their climate and other resources 
give them a comparative advantage and import larger quantities of food 
and feed grains.
While many of the constraints on agricultural productivity discussed 
in this paper are unlikely to represent a threat to global food security 
over the next half century, they will, either individually or collectively, 
become a threat to growth of agricultural production at the regional 
88  Ruttan
and local level in a number of the world’s poorest countries. A prima-
ry defense against the uncertainty about resource and environmental 
constraints is agricultural research capacity. The erosion of capacity of 
the international research system will have to be reversed, capacity in 
the presently developed countries will have to be at least maintained, 
and capacity in the developing countries will have to be substantially 
strengthened. Smaller countries will need, at the very least, to strength-
en their capacity to borrow, adapt, and diffuse technology from coun-
tries in comparable agroclimatic regions. It also means that more secure 
bridges must be built between the research systems of what have been 
termed the “island empires” of the agricultural, environmental, and 
health sciences (Mayer and Mayer 1974).
If the world fails to meet its food demands over the next half cen-
tury, the failure will be at least as much in the area of institutional in-
novation as in the area of technical change. This conclusion is not an 
optimistic one. The design of institutions capable of achieving com-
patibility between individual, organizational, and social objectives re-
mains an art rather than a science. At our present stage of knowledge, 
institutional design is analogous to driving down a four-lane highway 
while looking only at the rear-view mirror. We are better at making 
course corrections when we start to run off the highway than at using 
foresight to navigate the transition to sustainable growth in agriculture 
output and productivity.
Notes
 I am indebted to Jay Coggins, Charles Muscoplat, Glenn Pederson, Munisamy Gopi-
nath, David Norse, Philip Pardey, Philip Raup, Timothy Taylor, Colin Thirtle, Michael 
Trueblood, and Michael Waldman for comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of 
this paper. I have also benefited from access to a draft manuscript of the book Ending 
Hunger in Our Lifetime: Food Security and Globalization, by Runge, Senauer, Pardey, 
and Rosegrant (2003).
 1.  The Schultz “poor but efficient” hypothesis was received skeptically by develop-
ment economists who had posited a “backward bending” labor supply curve in 
developing countries’ agriculture. See, for example, Lipton (1968). For a particu-
larly vicious review of Transforming Traditional Agriculture, see Balogh (1964). 
Schultz was the recipient of the 1979 Nobel Prize in Economics, along with W. 
Arthur Lewis, for his contribution to development economics.
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 2.  Hayami and Ruttan’s (1985) induced innovation interpretation of technical 
change has been criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds. See, for 
example, Olmstead and Rhode (1993) and Koppel (1995). For a response to 
these criticisms, see Ruttan and Hayami (1995).
 3.  Before that time, Japanese farmers prepared the soil by hand with shovels and 
hoes, or by using plows pulled by cattle, which were not as strong as horses and 
so could not plow as deep.
 4. Multifactor productivity estimates for agriculture in the United States were first 
constructed in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Barton and Cooper 1948; Schultz 
1953; Ruttan 1956). For a comparative review and analysis of the sources of 
differences in the several aggregate agricultural production functions that have 
been estimated for U.S. agriculture, see Trueblood and Ruttan (1995). Note that 
from the beginning agricultural economists were using what, in the recent lit-
erature, have been termed “augmented” neoclassical production functions rather 
than Solow-type, two-factor production functions. For a review of total factor 
productivity estimates in developing countries, see Pingali and Heisey (2001).
 5.  In cross-country growth accounting, it has not been possible to account directly 
for improvement in the quality of inputs. Attempts are made to capture improve-
ments in the quality of labor input by including education and for improvements 
in the quality of capital and intermediate inputs by including investment in tech-
nical education or research and development in the cross-country production 
functions. Jorgenson and Gollop (1995) have estimated that during 1947–85, 
when total factor productivity in U.S. agriculture grew at an annual rate of 1.58 
percent, input quality change accounted for about one-third of the total factor 
productivity growth. Using a somewhat different approach, Shane, Roe, and 
Gopinath (1998) estimated that private research and development embodied in 
factor input quality accounted for about 25 percent of total factor productivity 
between 1949 and 1991.
 6.  The advantages of the Malmquist or frontier productivity index, in addition to the 
decomposition of total factor productivity into efficiency change and technical 
change, are twofold: 1) it is nonparametric and does not require a specification 
of the functional form of the production technology, and 2) it does not require an 
economic behavior assumption such as cost minimization or revenue maximiza-
tion (Färe, Grosskopf, and Knox Lovell 1994; Färe et al. 1994). The contempora-
neous Malmquist approach employed by Trueblood and Coggins (2001) identi-
fies the best-practice countries in each period and measures the change in each 
country’s performance relative to the change in the frontier. A country that shows 
a positive growth in total factor productivity may show negative Malmquist pro-
ductivity change because it may lag relative to the best-practice frontier. The 
sequential Malmquist approach that has been employed by Suhariyanto, Lusigi, 
and Thirtle (2001) does not permit negative technology shifts.
 7.  The issues discussed in this section are addressed in greater detail in Ruttan 
(1999).
 8.  Countries characterized by “absolute water scarcity” do not have sufficient water 
resources to maintain 1990 levels of per capita food production from irrigated 
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agriculture, even at high levels of irrigation efficiency, and also meet reasonable 
water demands for domestic, environmental and industrial purposes. Countries 
characterized by “severe water scarcity” are in regions in which the potential 
water resources are sufficient to meet reasonable water needs by 2025, but only 
if they make very substantial improvements in water use efficiency and water 
development (Seckler, Molden, and Barker 1999).
 9.  Estimates of losses in crop and animal production due to pests vary greatly by 
commodity, location, and year. However, estimates by reputable investigators 
run upwards of 33 percent of global food crop production. Losses represent a 
higher percentage of output in less developed countries than in developed coun-
tries. Among major commodities, the highest losses are experienced by rice 
(Yudelman, Ratta, and Nygaard 1998).
 10.  I have not in this paper discussed the potential impacts of health constraints on 
agricultural production. The increase in use of insecticides and herbicides associ-
ated with agricultural intensification have had important negative health effects 
on agricultural workers. The health effects of the resurgence of older diseases 
such as malaria and tuberculosis, are greatest in rural communities in develop-
ing countries. It is not too difficult to visualize situations in particular villages 
in which the coincidence of several health factors, including AIDS, could result 
in serious constraints on agricultural production (Pingali and Roger 1995; Bell, 
Clark, and Ruttan 1994; Haddad and Gillespie 2001). 
 11.  For a more detailed discussion of the evolution and structure of national and 
international agricultural research, see Ruttan (1982) and Huffman and Evenson 
(1993).
 12.  In 1995 it was estimated that global agricultural research expenditures amount-
ed to $33 billion (in 1993 dollars). Of this amount public sector expenditures 
amounted to $12.2 billion in developed countries and $11.5 billion in develop-
ing countries. Private sector expenditures for agricultural research amounted to 
$10.8 billion in developed and $0.7 billion in developing countries. Support for 
the CGIAR system declined from $334 million in 1990 to $305 million (1993 
prices) in 2000 (Pardey and Beintema 2001).
 13.  Between 1962 and 1990, crop yields in the former Soviet Union experienced 
modest gains relative to the world’s leaders. From the early 1990s, however, 
yield growth rates became negative, and by 1997 the yield gap between the coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union and the world leaders exceeded the levels of 
1962 (Trueblood and Arnade 2001).
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How the World Survived 
the Population Bomb
An Economic Perspective 
David Lam
University of Michigan
The population of the world doubled between 1960 and 2000, grow-
ing from 3 billion to 6 billion people. This is by far the largest increase 
in world population over a period of two generations in human history, 
measured in either absolute numbers or percentage increase. In terms 
of the world’s ability to meet increasing demands on resources, the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century offered an experiment unlike anything 
seen before. As we think about issues of sustainable development fac-
ing the world today, it is instructive to look back on the lessons of this 
unique period of human history. 
It is entirely appropriate to think of the rapid growth of world pop-
ulation between 1950 and 2000 as a “population explosion.” Viewed 
from the perspective of the 1960s, when the rate of growth reached 
its peak, it is not surprising that there were concerns that this popula-
tion explosion would put enormous pressure on the world’s economic 
resources. Many predicted mass starvation, large increases in poverty, 
and depletion of key resources in the decades to follow. We now have 
accumulated more than three decades’ worth of data since many of 
these predictions were made, and more than four decades’ worth since 
the population growth rate reached its peak. This chapter will survey 
several key economic indicators related to some of the worst fears about 
the impact of population growth on humans. The data on economic 
variables, including food production, commodity prices, and poverty, 
suggest that the world not only survived the population explosion but 
was in better condition by most of these indicators in 2000 than it was 
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in 1960. The past four decades have been a period of rising per capita 
food consumption, with significant declines in both the percentage and 
the absolute number of people in poverty. While poverty rates remain 
unacceptably high in many countries, with especially disappointing 
progress having been made in Africa, the global picture of the latter 
half of the twentieth century presents the surprising combination of an 
unprecedented population explosion occurring at the same time as rapid 
declines in poverty. 
If we have the hindsight to say the world survived the population 
bomb, it follows that the population explosion is over. In addition to 
looking at trends in key economic indicators, this chapter examines 
the demography of the population explosion. As demographers have 
long pointed out, the population explosion resulted from rapid declines 
in mortality that produced a relatively short period of extremely high 
growth. While the world’s population continues to grow, fueled in part 
by the inertia of rapid growth during the peak of the population explo-
sion, rapidly declining birth rates imply that growth rates will contin-
ue to fall in coming decades, moving the world into a period of much 
slower growth. Growth has already dropped below the rate of 1950. 
With the growth rate in 2000 returning to roughly the level of 1950, 
it seems appropriate to consider 1950 and 2000 as convenient book-
ends for the population explosion in examining both its demography 
and its economics. An economic perspective helps us understand how 
the world avoided mass starvation; it also helps explain why birth rates 
have fallen so rapidly throughout the developing world. 
This chapter will take a broad look at the world, with examples 
from many different countries, but in addition, its last part will look in 
detail at fertility decline in Brazil. Brazil is an interesting case study be-
cause it had a rapid decline in birth rates in the absence of a significant 
national family planning effort. The fertility rate in Brazil is now about 
the same as the fertility rate in the United States. This chapter argues 
that the response of parents to falling infant mortality and the impact 
of rising parental education levels played an important role in Brazil’s 
incredible fertility decline. An economic model of optimizing behavior 
based on tradeoffs between the quality and quantity of children (the 
former term refers to the quality of their lives and the investments made 
in them) provides a framework for explaining these responses at the 
household level.  
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THE HISTORY OF WORLD POPULATION GROWTH
We begin with a historical overview of world population growth. 
Figure 5.1 shows estimates of the total population of the world from 
1500 to 2000, along with projections from 2000 to 2050.1 It demon-
strates that the population growth of the twentieth century, and especial-
ly of the second half of the twentieth century, skyrocketed. The world 
did not reach 1 billion population until 1800, reached 2 billion around 
1930, and then added another 4 billion people in the next 70 years. 
If we work backward from the 2000 population of 6 billion, an inter-
esting benchmark would be the time when the world population was 1/32 
(2-5) this size, or 187.5 million, meaning that the world has subsequently 
doubled in population five times. A common estimate for the popula-
tion of the world in 1 AD is 300 million, although estimates range from 
170 million to 400 million (U.S. Census Bureau 2003). The estimates 
reported by the Census Bureau suggest that a population of 187.5 mil-
lion might have existed around 300 BC. A population twice this large, 
375 million, may have been reached around 1200 AD, a doubling time 
Figure 5.1  Total World Population from 1500 to 2000 and U.N. High, 
Medium, and Low Variant Projections to 2050
SOURCE: Estimates for 1500–1950 are from U.S. Census Bureau (2003); estimates 
for 1950–2000 and high, medium, and low variant projections for 2000–2050 are 


































of 1,500 years. Continuing with subsequent doublings of population, 
the world reached 750 million around 1700, 1.5 billion around 1860, 
and 3 billion around 1960. In round numbers, then, the sequence of five 
doubling times since the world was 1/32 of its 2000 population is roughly 
1500 years, 500 years, 150 years, 100 years, and 40 years. 
Given this sequence of doubling times, it is natural to ask what the 
next doubling time will be—that is, when will world population reach 
12 billion? While the answer obviously requires conjecture, it is virtu-
ally impossible that the next doubling time would be less than 40 years, 
and very unlikely that it would be less than 100 years. Figure 5.1 shows 
three population projections from 2000 to 2050 made by the United 
Nations Populations Division. Even the high variant projection only 
reaches 10.6 billion by 2050, a rate of increase far short of the previ-
ous doubling (although it would be a larger absolute increase than took 
place between 1960 and 2000). The medium variant projection does not 
even reach 9 billion by 2050. In fact, many forecasts predict that world 
population will never again double. The United Nations Population Di-
vision (1999, p. 5) has projected that world population will reach about 
9.5 billion in 2100, 9.75 billion in 2150, and will stabilize sometime af-
ter 2200 at just above 10 billion. Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov (2001) 
use a model of probabilistic population projections in which their me-
dian forecast predicts that world population will peak in 2070 at 9 bil-
lion. They estimate that there is an 85 percent chance that the world will 
reach population stability by 2100. 
While it is obviously difficult to forecast world population, there is 
nonetheless quite a bit of information to use for such forecasts, given 
current age distribution, trends in fertility and mortality, and past expe-
rience (Bongaarts and Bulatao 2000). The picture of population growth 
becomes clearer if we look at growth rates rather than totals. Figure 
5.2 shows the annual rate of population growth from 1900 to 2000, 
with United Nations projections to 2050.2 The annual growth rate of 
0.6 percent at the beginning of the twentieth century was already quite 
high by historical standards. From there, we see that growth rates rise 
to a level of 1 percent a year around 1930. They then increase dramati-
cally in the 1950s, reaching about 1.4 percent in 1950 and rising to 1.9 
percent by 1958. The sharp short-term drop around 1960 and 1961 is 
due to the Great Famine in China, which killed more than 18 million 
Chinese, causing such a jump in death rates that it dropped the world 
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population growth rate by almost half a percentage point. The world 
reached its peak growth rate according to these estimates in 1964, at 
2.16 percent a year (implying a doubling time of about 32 years if the 
rate remained constant). The growth rate declined fairly rapidly in the 
1970s, remained fairly stable in the 1980s, and has been falling steadily 
since around 1990. The world’s growth rate in 2000 was about 1.3 per-
cent, lower than in 1950. Even the high variant U.N. projection shows 
steadily falling growth rates from 2000 to 2050. The medium variant 
projection has the growth rate dropping below 1 percent by 2015, drop-
ping below 0.5 percent by 2040, and continuing to fall after that.   
WHAT CAUSED THE POPULATION EXPLOSION?
These figures suggest that the world will almost surely never again 
see population growth of the magnitude experienced in the past half-
century. In order to understand how the world survived this population 
explosion and why it is unlikely to ever be repeated, it is necessary to 
Figure 5.2  Annual World Population Growth Rate, Actual and 
Projected, 1900 to 2050a
a Rates to 2000 are three-year moving averages; rates after 2000 are based on five-year 
projections (see Note 2). 
SOURCE: Estimates for 1900–1950 are from U.S. Census Bureau (2003); estimates 
for 1950–2000 and high, medium, and low variant projections for 2000–2050 are 




























understand what caused it in the first place. The demographic explana-
tions for the dramatic increase in the world population growth rate in the 
1950s and 1960s are well understood. The annual percentage increase 
in world population in a given year (the measure shown in Figure 5.2) 
is entirely determined by the difference between birth rates and death 
rates. Demographers define the crude birth rate (CBR) as the number 
of births in a year per 1000 population, and the crude death rate (CDR) 
as the number of deaths per 1000 population. The crude rate of natural 
increase (CRNI) is simply the difference between these. If the CRNI is 
10 per 1000, the population growth rate is 1 percent a year. Given these 
standard measures, we can analyze the extent to which either changes in 
the crude birth rate or changes in the crude death rate were responsible 
for producing the increase in the population growth rate in the 1950s 
and 1960s. 
The Demographic Transition
Figure 5.3 shows the crude birth rate, crude death rate, and crude 
rate of natural increase for the world between 1950 and 1999, based on 
United Nations Population Division estimates (2003). These are five-
year averages, in contrast to the single-year estimates shown in Figure 
5.2. The peak growth rate occurs at just above 2 percent a year in the 
1965–1969 period. (Since these data are averaged over five years, they 
do not show the sharp drop associated with China’s Great Famine that 
was seen in the annual estimates in Figure 5.2.) One of the striking fea-
tures of Figure 5.3 is that both the crude birth rate and the crude death 
rate fall over the entire period shown. The reason the population growth 
rate increased between the periods of 1950–1954 and 1965–1969 is that 
the death rate fell faster than the birth rate. Falling infant and child 
mortality played a major role in the falling death rate. Not only did 
the birth rate not increase during this period, it was already falling in 
the 1950s and continued falling throughout the period that population 
growth rates were increasing. 
Statistics are not available, but if we extended Figure 5.3 back sev-
eral decades, we would find that crude birth rates were probably in the 
range of 40–45 per 1000, not significantly higher than observed around 
1950. Crude death rates, on the other hand, would have been consider-
ably higher than the 20 per 1000 level observed in 1950. We know that 
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crude death rates must have been close to crude birth rates earlier in the 
twentieth century since the population growth rate was close to 0.5 per-
cent (5 per 1000). Death rates had already fallen substantially by 1950, 
producing the growth rates of over 1.5 percent shown in Figure 5.3. 
The pattern shown for the world as a whole would have been broad-
ly similar to the pattern observed in most developing countries. Begin-
ning from a regime with high birth rates, high death rates, and relatively 
low population growth, developing countries saw their death rates de-
cline during the first half of the twentieth century. Birth rates initially 
remained at their previous level, generating a gap between birth rates 
and death rates that caused increased population growth. The popula-
tion growth rate continued to increase until birth rates began to fall fast 
enough to offset falling death rates. This occurred in the 1965–1969 
period for the world (Figure 5.3), beginning a period of declining popu-
lation growth rates. About this time, death rates stabilized at a low level 
of around 10 per 1000, with further declines in birth rates leading to fur-
ther declines in the rate of population growth. This process, known as 
the demographic transition, has played out in similar fashion through-
out the developing world, with variations in the timing and pace of the 
transition. A century earlier, the demographic transition had occurred 
Figure 5.3  Crude Birth Rate, Crude Death Rate, and Rate of Natural 
Increase for the World, 1950–1999
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in similar fashion in most of the countries that currently have high in-
comes. The difference was that death rates fell much more gradually, 
with the result that peak growth rates during the transition were typical-
ly lower than those observed in developing countries 100 years later.
Population Momentum 
The other dynamic is population momentum. Since childbearing is 
concentrated in the 20–35 age range, a large increase in births in a given 
period will lead to a corresponding increase in the size of the childbear-
ing population 20–35 years later. This creates a powerful mechanism 
for population momentum, implying that even though there were sharp 
reductions in fertility in the 1970s and 1980s, the numbers of births in 
many countries will continue to grow for several decades, the result 
of increasing numbers of women of childbearing age. This holds true 
even for countries that have already reached replacement fertility. This 
dynamic also helps explain why we can predict the path of population 
growth with some precision. One reason we can be certain the world 
population growth rate will decline steadily between now and 2050 is 
that the current growth rate is only as high as it is because of popula-
tion momentum. The size of the childbearing population can be fairly 
easily projected for the next 20 years, since many of those women have 
already been born. While the number of women of childbearing age 
will continue to increase for several decades, the growth rate of that 
population is falling rapidly. This must translate into falling population 
growth rates, even if fertility rates were to stop falling.  
THE IMPACT OF THE POPULATION EXPLOSION
Given the unprecedented rates of population growth that appeared 
in the 1950s and 1960s, it is understandable that there were concerns 
about the potential social and economic consequences of this rapid 
growth. Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, which came out in 1968, 
was one of the best-known books expressing alarm over the high rates 
of population growth. Ehrlich focused particularly on the challenge of 
feeding the increasing numbers of people in developing countries. He 
wrote, “The world, especially the developing world, is rapidly running 
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out of food . . . In fact, the battle to feed humanity is already lost, in the 
sense that we will not be able to prevent large-scale famines in the next 
decade or so” (1968, p. 36). Lester Brown struck a similar note when 
he wrote in a 1967 article in Science that “conventional agriculture now 
provides an adequate and assured supply of food for one-third of the 
human race. But assuring an adequate supply of food for the remain-
ing two-thirds, in parts of the world where population is increasing at 
the rate of 1 million weekly, poses one of the most nearly insoluble 
problems confronting man” (1967, p. 604). The computer simulations 
of the Club of Rome’s well-known The Limits to Growth (Meadows et 
al. 1972) focused attention on depletion of nonrenewable resources and 
resulting increases in commodity prices.
Trends in Economic Indicators
There have been extensive debates about trends in economic, so-
cial, and environmental indicators in recent decades. It is far beyond the 
scope of this chapter to provide an exhaustive review of those debates, 
or to propose resolutions to the complex issues involved. Some of these 
debates have been closely tied to discussions about the impact of rapid 
population growth, with many going back to the predictions made by 
Ehrlich and others who gave early warnings. In this section, I provide 
a broad description of trends in several key economic indicators during 
recent decades. These include food production, commodity prices, and 
poverty. 
These variables go to the heart of many of the worst fears about the 
potential impact of rapid population growth. Mass starvation, exhaus-
tion of nonrenewable resources, and increased poverty were certainly 
some of the major concerns among a wide variety of observers who 
considered the impact of rapid population growth during the 1960s. It 
is hard to imagine a more challenging test of the world’s capacity to 
absorb population than for it to double its population in 40 years, es-
pecially when this doubling means the addition of 3 billion people. As 
Lester Brown wrote in his 1967 Science article, in which he (accurately) 
predicted the addition of at least 1 billion people by 1980, “The world 
has never before added 1 billion people in 15 years.” 
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Trends in Food Production
In the 1960s, there was probably no more daunting challenge as-
sociated with rapid population growth than that of feeding the growing 
population. The prologue to The Population Bomb began, “The battle 
to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970s the world will undergo 
famines—hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death in 
spite of any crash programs embarked upon now” (Ehrlich 1968).
Data on agricultural production are provided by the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and are readily avail-
able on that organization’s Web site (FAO 2004). Figure 5.4 presents 
indices of total food production, per capita food production, and total 
population for the world from 1961 to 2003, setting the 1961 levels to 
100 as a baseline for all three indices. As the figure indicates, the world 
has experienced steady and dramatic increases in food production since 
1961. Total food production in the world roughly doubled between 1961 
and 1990, and by 2003 it had reached a level 2.7 times the amount in 
1961. The average rate of growth of food production between 1961 and 
2003 was 2.4 percent a year. Significantly, Figure 5.4 shows that the line 
for total food production is always above the line for total population, 
Figure 5.4  Indices of World Food Production and Population, 1961–2003 
(1961=100)
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even during the period of the most rapid population growth, the 1960s. 
Thus, at any point between 1961 and 2003, food production increased 
faster than world population relative to the 1961 baseline. The average 
growth rate of world population from 1961 to 2003 was 1.7 percent a 
year, yet per capita food production grew at an average annual rate of 
0.7 percent. Per capita food production in 2003 was 31 percent higher 
than it was in 1961.
One reason for the world’s remarkable increase in agricultural out-
put since the 1960s has been the green revolution’s technological ad-
vances in developing new high yield crops. While we cannot assume 
that the growth rates of the past 40 years in food production can be 
maintained, it is interesting to look at forecasts of food production made 
at various points between the 1960s and today. Lester Brown concluded 
in a 1975 article in Science that “the scarcity of basic resources required 
to expand food output, the negative ecological trends that are gaining 
momentum year by year in the poor countries, and the diminishing re-
turns on the use of energy and fertilizer in agriculture . . . lead me to 
conclude that a world of cheap, abundant food with surplus stocks and 
a large reserve of idled cropland may now be history. In the future, 
scarcity may be more or less persistent, relieved only by sporadic sur-
pluses, of a local and short-lived nature” (1975, p. 1059). In addition 
to his dire prediction about overall food production, Brown expressed 
concern that the world was becoming increasingly dependent on North 
America as its food producer. In fact, however, FAO data indicate that 
between 1965 and 1975, food production increased at an annual rate of 
2.9 percent in developing countries, compared to a rate of 2.4 percent 
in North America. 
Although impressive growth in food production continued through 
the late 1970s, Brown (1981) again expressed concern in another Sci-
ence article: “As the 1980s begin, the growth in world production is 
losing momentum and its excess over population growth is narrowing” 
(p. 1001). But in fact the annual growth rate of world food production 
in the 1980s turned out to be 2.5 percent, slightly higher than the growth 
rate between 1965 and 1980 and a full percentage point greater than the 
growth rate of world population. Additional concerns were raised at the 
end of the 1980s. Paul and Anne Ehrlich (1990) wrote in The Popula-
tion Explosion, a follow-up to The Population Bomb, that “world grain 
production peaked in 1986 and then—for the first time in forty years—
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dropped for two consecutive years . . . Global food production peaked 
in 1984 and has slid downward since then” (p. 15). 
 A couple of years after the Ehlichs’ book, Robert McNamara (1992) 
wrote that “The early gains of the Green Revolution have nearly run 
their course. Since the mid-1980s, increases in worldwide food produc-
tion have lagged behind population growth.” It is not clear exactly what 
data the Ehrlichs and McNamara were referring to, although it is pos-
sible that their comments were consistent with the data available at the 
time they wrote. The FAO data shown in Figure 5.4 clearly tell a much 
different story. Figure 5.4 shows that both total and per capita food pro-
duction for the world increased throughout the 1980s, although there 
are occasional years when per capita food production declined, such 
as a 1 percent decline between 1986 and 1987. The record after these 
prognostications is even more positive, with food production growing 
significantly faster than population in the 1990s. While it is easy to find 
observers in the 1970s, 1980s, and today warning that the success of the 
green revolution cannot last forever, the data indicate remarkable and 
sustained success in food production for more than four decades, with 
no evidence that future food production will not keep pace with popula-
tion growth, especially given the declining rate of growth.   
While the experience of the world as a whole is one important 
summary statistic, it is also interesting to look at the experience of in-
dividual countries. India was singled out by Ehrlich for particular at-
tention in The Population Bomb. Ehrlich quoted one expert on Indian 
agriculture who predicted that India had reached its maximum level 
of food production in 1967–1968. At that time, India’s population was 
growing at more than 3 percent a year (implying a doubling time of less 
than 25 years), and it was one of the places where Ehrlich and many 
others predicted mass starvation. Figure 5.5 shows food production in 
India from 1961 to 2003 based on the same FAO data used for Figure 
5.4, once again using 1961=100 as the baseline. India’s food production 
over the period actually grew faster than food production for the world 
as a whole, and 2003 production was 2.9 times greater than the level in 
1961. Even so, the line for per capita food production in Figure 5.5 in-
dicates that India’s food production did not grow fast enough to keep up 
with its population during some periods in the 1960s and 1970s—per 
capita food production fell by about 10 percent between 1961 and 1966. 
These were temporary shortfalls, however, and per capita food produc-
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tion returned to its 1961 level by 1970. It fell again slightly in the mid-
1970s, returned to its 1961 level in 1980, and then remained above its 
1961 level in the 1980s and 1990s. 
As with the world data, India’s impressive increases in food output 
in the late 1960s and the 1970s were followed by numerous predictions 
that the success could not be sustained. Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1990) ac-
knowledged India’s “dramatic increases in wheat production between 
1965 and 1983” but noted that “since 1983, India’s rising grain produc-
tion has lost momentum” and warned that “the country appears to be 
facing a catastrophic problem in the 1990s, if not earlier” (pp. 70–72). 
The FAO data indicate that food production in India actually grew by 
2.3 percent a year between 1990 and 2003, 0.5 percent faster than the 
growth rate of the population. By 2003 India’s per capita food produc-
tion was 23 percent above its 1961 level (and 43 percent above the low 
observed in 1966), even though the Indian population in 2003 was 2.4 
times larger than in 1961. 
While India has done much better at producing food than almost any 
observer could have predicted in the 1960s, as has the world as a whole, 
not all regions of the world have done so well. Sub-Saharan Africa has 
been much less successful at feeding itself over this period. Figure 5.6 
shows total food production, per capita food production, and population 
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for sub-Saharan Africa from 1961 to 2003. Total food production for 
sub-Saharan Africa in 2003 was 2.7 times the level of 1961. This is in 
many respects an impressive increase, but it was not sufficient to keep 
pace with Africa’s rapid population growth: per capita food production 
in sub-Saharan Africa in 2003 was 14 percent below the level of 1961. 
Most economists looking at the disappointing performance of agricul-
ture in Africa agree that the problems are not fundamentally related to 
resource constraints or rapid population growth. 
“In the case of sub-Saharan Africa,” writes Gale Johnson (1999), 
“the failure to achieve a significant increase in per capita food supplies 
has been due, not primarily to limitations of natural resources, but to 
wholly inappropriate national policies that exploited agriculture in the 
name of promoting economic development as well as by ethnic and 
civil strife in several countries” (p. 5915). As an example of the policies 
that have discouraged food production in Africa, Johnson mentions the 
World Bank study of agricultural pricing policy, which estimated that 
effective returns to African farmers declined by 51.6 percent between 
1960 and 1984 as a result of governmental interventions in agricultural 
markets (Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes 1988). 
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While the decline in per capita food production in Africa shown in 
Figure 5.6 is a very serious problem, it does not negate the relatively 
optimistic picture of global food capacity provided by the evidence 
from other regions. The disappointing African experience also points 
to some of the reasons for the positive experience of the past 40 years 
in the rest of the world. The rapid increases in global food production 
are not simply the result of technological innovation in agriculture. As 
frequently pointed out by agricultural economists, getting economic in-
centives right in agricultural sectors within countries and liberalizing 
agricultural trade across countries are key factors in generating world 
agricultural output. It is also important to recognize the role played by 
increased human capital. As Johnson (2000) posed the question in his 
presidential address to the 2000 meeting of the American Economic As-
sociation (AEA), “What made it possible for the world to escape from 
what could be called the Malthusian trap? The answer is simple: the 
creation of knowledge” (p. 2).  
Leaving aside regional imbalances in food production in recent de-
cades, we must recognize that even increased per capita food produc-
tion within a particular country does not necessarily translate into re-
ductions in hunger in that country. Distribution of food, like distribution 
of income, is very unequal both within and across countries. Examining 
the distribution of resources within countries requires household level 
data. Below I will look at estimates of trends in poverty for the world as 
a whole and for specific regions and countries. Since these estimates are 
usually based on measures of consumption at the household level, they 
are the best evidence regarding trends in hunger in the world. 
Trends in Commodity Prices
The impressive story of how world food production kept pace with 
world population during the population explosion might be considered 
a story of remarkably good luck, in that green revolution innovations 
came along at just the right time to keep up with the population explo-
sion. Concerns about the impact of the population explosion were not 
limited to food, however. Rapid population growth was also predicted 
to cause scarcity with many other types of commodities. In order to 
investigate these issues we can look at data on a wide range of other 
commodities, both renewable (like food) and nonrenewable. This was 
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one of the points made by Julian Simon in his book The Ultimate Re-
source (1981). Simon upheld the standard notion of economists that 
one of the best indicators of whether the world is running out of a re-
source is whether the price of that resource is increasing. While various 
nonmarket forces, such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) cartel, might create distortions between price and 
resource supply, it would be difficult to have a situation in which a 
commodity is nearing depletion at the same time that the price of the 
resource is declining. 
Simon’s emphasis on the tendency of most commodity prices to 
decrease over time led to a famous bet between himself and Paul Ehr-
lich (Tierney 1990). Simon challenged any taker to pick any natural 
resource and any future date, and he would bet that the real price of the 
resource would decline. Ehrlich and a group of colleagues selected five 
metals—chrome, copper, nickel, tin, and tungsten—for the period from 
October 1980 to October 1990. The outcome was that the real price of 
each of these five commodities declined between 1980 and 1990, and 
the bundle of five metals that cost $1000 in 1980 (in quantities that cost 
$200 each) could be bought for $618 in 1990 (adjusted for inflation). To 
settle the bet, Ehrlich sent Simon a check for $576.07, the decline in the 
total cost of the five metals using 1990 prices. 
Data on commodity prices are relatively easy to come by, since 
commodities are the focus of very active and highly competitive in-
ternational markets. The data presented here are taken from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (2001). Figure 5.7 shows real 
commodity price indices from 1960 to 2000, using 1960=100 as the 
baseline. All prices are adjusted for inflation. Four broad indices are 
shown—food, agricultural products, metals and minerals, and all non-
energy commodities. Although each index has periods of price increases 
over the four decades, the clear trend is downward for all four indices. 
The price decline between 1960 and 2000 is 40 percent for metals and 
minerals, 54 percent for food, 60 percent for agricultural commodities 
overall, and 54 percent for the combined index of all nonenergy com-
modities. For this last category, the combined index of all nonenergy 
commodities, the price is lower in every period between 1960 and 2000 
than it was in 1960. 
Petroleum prices, which are not shown in Figure 5.7, are the one 
major exception to the trend of falling commodity prices. Movements 
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in petroleum prices are driven predominantly by actions of the OPEC 
cartel; the highest real prices were observed in the late 1970s. Accord-
ing to World Bank data, the price of petroleum in 1980 was 6.7 times 
higher than the price in 1960. The petroleum price in 2000 was 3.6 
times the 1960 price. While these higher petroleum prices have an im-
pact on all economies in the world, they would seem to have little to do 
with actual resource scarcity. 
The results shown in Figure 5.7 provide a powerful piece of data 
in support of sustainable development. During a period in which world 
population doubled, real commodity prices, excluding petroleum, fell 
by more than 50 percent. Many economic forces help explain this fairly 
remarkable outcome. Technological innovations have increased effi-
ciency in the use of resources and have often produced substitutes for 
resources when price increases have appeared. As Johnson emphasized 
to the AEA in the case of agricultural production, human knowledge 
has been instrumental. Trade liberalization and increased efficiency in 
global transport and communication have also played an important role. 
While a separate story could be told about the price trends in every 
major commodity, the common theme is one of falling prices and de-
Figure 5.7  Indices of World Commodity Prices, 1960–2000 (1960=100)
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creasing resource pressure, in spite of the enormous increase in world 
population. 
Trends in Poverty 
It is frequently, and appropriately, pointed out that increased food 
production or rising per capita incomes do not improve the lives of 
all people equally. Some segments of the population may be excluded 
from economic progress completely, or may even suffer declining liv-
ing standards at the same time that aggregate measures indicate im-
provement. The increase in food production shown above would be less 
reassuring if we discovered that all of the increase in consumption went 
to high-income consumers. One of the concerns about rapid population 
growth has been that it would lead to increased poverty, both because 
poor countries were those with the highest growth rates and because 
higher population growth rates might have negative distributional con-
sequences within countries (Birdsall, Kelley, and Sinding 2001; Cassen 
1994; Lam 1987, 1997). 
Data on poverty rates are much more difficult to come by than data 
on agricultural output or commodity prices, since poverty estimates re-
quire data at the level of individual households. Measuring poverty in 
developing countries is a complex and challenging task that has been 
the focus of extensive research. The absence of reliable and consistent 
data to estimate poverty was one of the main motivations for the World 
Bank’s effort to collect comparable household surveys on income 
and consumption in a large number of countries (Grosh and Glewwe 
2000). 
The issue has produced extensive debate over matters of measure-
ment, analysis, and interpretation, much of which has played out in the 
context of larger debates about the impact of globalization, interna-
tional trade, and the actions of international agencies. The ideal way to 
measure trends in poverty in any country would be to have a consistent 
series of large, nationally representative household surveys with de-
tailed information on income and consumption for a number of years. 
Very few developing countries met this ideal before the mid-1980s, and 
even after the launching of the World Bank’s ambitious Living Stan-
dards Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys in the 1980s, many issues of 
incomplete coverage and data comparability remained. As is discussed 
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by Ravallion (2003) and Deaton (2001, 2002, 2003), most estimates of 
poverty use a combination of household survey data and national ac-
counts data.3 The survey data are used to provide detailed information 
on the distribution of income or consumption across households, but 
are often only available for one or two points in time. National accounts 
statistics can be used to estimate changes in mean income for every 
year, with the combination of the survey data and national accounts 
being used to estimate the percentage below a given poverty line in 
years when complete survey data are not available. An additional key 
methodological issue is the comparison of incomes across countries. 
It is standard to use Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) indices, which are 
based on the cost of purchasing a comparable basket of goods in each 
country to compare income and consumption across countries. 
The most comprehensive attempts to estimate poverty in this way 
have been done by researchers at the World Bank. Estimates covering 
the period 1981–2001 are presented in Figure 5.8, based on data taken 
from the World Bank’s PovertyNet Web site (World Bank 2004). Meth-
odological details and additional estimates are provided in Chen and 
Ravallion (2001). Figure 5.8 reports estimates of poverty based on one 
of the simple benchmark poverty lines that is often used—$1 a day in 
per capita household consumption. Note that the estimates are typically 
based on direct measures of consumption and therefore speak to the 
issue of changing trends in hunger as well. The top panel of Figure 5.8 
shows the percentage in poverty (the population headcount ratio); the 
bottom panel shows the absolute number in poverty, using 1981=100 
as a baseline for each region. For the total developing country popu-
lation, the “World” line in Figure 5.8 indicates that the percentage of 
the population in poverty in all developing countries by the $1 a day 
measure declined from 40.3 percent in 1981 to 21.3 percent in 2001. 
Impressive declines in poverty in China play a large role in the overall 
trend, although the poverty rate still declines from 31.6 percent to 22.8 
percent when China is excluded (not shown). This world decline was 
large enough to more than offset the substantial population growth in 
developing countries during this period, leading to a decline in the ab-
solute number in poverty in all developing countries of about 25 percent 
(from 1.48 billion to 1.10 billion).  
Figure 5.8 also shows poverty trends for major regions of the devel-
oping world and for the specific case of India.4 Looking at the regional 
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Figure 5.8  Percentage and Absolute Number in Poverty by Region, 
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breakdowns in Figure 5.8, we see that the largest decline in poverty 
over this period took place in East Asia and the Pacific, where the $1 
a day poverty rate plummeted from 58 percent to 16 percent between 
1981 and 2001. Estimates for India indicate that the poverty headcount 
ratio fell from 55 percent in 1981 to 35 percent in 2001. The absolute 
number of poor people in India is estimated to have stayed almost con-
stant over this 20-year period, showing small declines in the late 1990s. 
The declining poverty rates in India shown in Figure 5.8 are consistent 
with estimates of Deaton and Drèze (2002). 
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa had more disappointing per-
formances over this period. The percentage of the population in poverty 
in Latin America remained roughly constant at around 10 percent, im-
plying about a 50 percent increase in the absolute number in poverty. 
Africa had by far the worst experience of any region, with the percent-
age in poverty rising from 42 percent to 47 percent. Combined with 
rapid population growth, this resulted in almost a doubling of the num-
ber of people in poverty in 20 years, an increase of 150 million.  
In addition to the large regional differences in both levels and trends 
in poverty shown in Figure 5.8, there are often large differences within 
a given country. A detailed examination of poverty in India by Deaton 
and Drèze (2002) shows significant declines in poverty in the 1990s but 
also shows regional differences in poverty increasing over the period, 
including no reduction in poverty in some of the states that already had 
the highest levels of poverty. A number of studies also indicate that in-
come inequality has increased in India and China even though poverty 
has declined. Higher income growth occurred in the highest income 
deciles (Chen and Wang 2001; Deaton and Drèze 2002). 
Although data on poverty rates before the 1980s are much more 
limited, most evidence indicates that the declines in poverty shown in 
Figure 5.8 for the period after 1980 were a continuation of declines in 
poverty over several decades. Sala-i-Martin (2002) combines national 
accounts data from 1970 to 1998 with the available data on individual 
country income distributions to estimate changes in the distribution of 
income in each country and for the world as a whole. Applying the $1 
per day poverty line to these distributions, he estimates that there have 
been substantial declines in poverty rates for the developing world as a 
whole over the entire period. His estimates of the levels of poverty are 
considerably lower than those estimated by Chen and Ravallion, but 
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the trends show a similar pattern: poverty fell rapidly in Asia, fell more 
slowly in Latin America, and increased substantially in Africa.  
In summarizing the data on world poverty trends in recent decades, 
we find that the overall picture is quite positive. The evidence since 
1980 indicates that the percentage of the world in extreme poverty (fall-
ing under the $1 a day measure) has been cut almost in half. The ab-
solute number of people in poverty has declined by about 25 percent. 
This good news must be balanced by a couple of sources of concern. 
First, these estimates imply that one in five people in the world continue 
to live in extreme poverty. Second, the trends have varied enormously 
across regions, with poverty increasing rather than decreasing in Africa. 
The percentage of the African population in poverty has risen to almost 
50 percent, and the absolute number of Africans in poverty roughly 
doubled between 1981 and 2001. 
THE RAPID DECLINE IN FERTILITY
The impressive ability of the world economy to absorb the popula-
tion growth of the last four decades is matched by equally remarkable 
declines in fertility rates. It is instructive to look at these declines in some 
detail and to consider their causes from an economic perspective. This 
section will pay particular attention to the case of Brazil, where fertility 
fell rapidly in the absence of significant family planning programs. 
Figure 5.9 shows the total fertility rate (TFR) for major world re-
gions from 1950 to 1999, based on United Nations Population Division 
(2003) estimates. The total fertility rate is the sum of the age-specific 
fertility rates in a given year and can be interpreted as the number of 
births a woman would have in her lifetime if she was exposed to the 
age-specific birth rates for that year. The total fertility rate for the world 
was around 5 births per woman for the five-year periods beginning in 
1950–1954 and ending in 1965–1969, then began to fall rapidly in the 
1970s. By the 1995–1999 period the world TFR had fallen to 2.8. De-
mographers use a TFR of 2.1 as a benchmark for replacement fertility, a 
rate that would have each couple replacing itself on average, with some 
additional births to compensate for those that didn’t survive to child-
bearing age.5 Freedman and Blanc (1992) found it useful to measure the 
percentage decline in fertility toward replacement level as a measure of 
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fertility decline. The difference between the TFR and replacement fer-
tility for the world fell from 2.9 to 0.7 between 1965 and 1999, meaning 
that fertility fell by 75 percent of the amount required to reach replace-
ment fertility. 
As shown in Figure 5.9, declines in fertility have been observed 
in all regions of the world. Asia and Latin America have had the fast-
est declines, following very similar patterns over the 50 years shown. 
In both regions the TFR fell from around 6.0 in 1950 to about 2.7 in 
1999. This decline is 82 percent of the decline necessary to reach re-
placement fertility. The pace of fertility decline has been significantly 
slower in Africa. While the TFR has clearly been declining in Africa, 
especially after 1980, the TFR for the region as a whole was still 5.3 
in 1995–1999, almost twice as high as for Asia and Latin America, the 
next-highest regions. The decline from the 1960 peak of 6.8 represents 
32 percent of the decline necessary to reach replacement fertility. 
Figure 5.10 shows the TFR for four specific countries for the period 
1950–1999—Kenya, India, Brazil, and Thailand—based on United Na-
tions estimates. Thailand is an example of a country experiencing rapid 
fertility decline, having dropped from a TFR of well over 6 in 1960–
1964 to near replacement level fertility by 1990–1994. Brazil’s fertil-
Figure 5.9  Total Fertility Rate for World Regions, 1950–1999













































ity decline is slightly slower, but Brazil had fallen to near replacement 
level fertility by 1995–1999. India began its fertility decline somewhat 
later than Brazil and Thailand and has had slower rates of decline. The 
TFR in India in 1995–1999 was about 3.3. Kenya, like most sub-Saha-
ran African countries, continued to have high fertility into the 1980s, 
with a TFR of over 7.0 in the 1980–1984 period. Fertility began to 
fall at a rapid rate later that decade, however, reaching about 4.5 in 
1995–1999. 
Fertility Decline, Investments in Human Capital, and Quantity-
Quality Tradeoffs
The patterns of fertility decline over the last 50 years are much 
clearer than are the determinants of the decline. While it is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to survey the vast literature that has analyzed the 
determinants of fertility decline in developing countries, I will address 
a few issues that I believe are fundamental to understanding the eco-
nomics of fertility. As in the case of rising agricultural output and fall-
ing commodity prices, optimizing responses to changing incentives and 
Figure 5.10  Total Fertility Rate for Selected Countries, 1950–1999
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tradeoffs has played an essential role in the fertility declines of the last 
40 years. 
Declines in fertility across the developing world have coincided 
with substantial increases in the health and schooling of children. The 
negative relationship between fertility and children’s schooling is a 
strong empirical regularity, whether observed across populations, across 
time in a given population, or across families at a given point of time 
in a population. Not only are couples in developing countries having 
significantly fewer children than they were four decades ago, they are 
investing a great deal more in the human capital of those children. The 
tradeoff between the quantity and quality of children is one of the cen-
tral features of economic theories of fertility (Becker and Lewis 1973; 
Willis 1973; Lam 2003). Since his early writings on the economics of 
fertility, Becker has pointed out that rising incomes lead to substitu-
tions away from quantity of children and into quality of children, where 
quality is indicated by expenditures on children, including investments 
in schooling and health. Lam and Duryea (1999) applied the models of 
Becker and Lewis (1973) and Willis (1973) to the case of rising parental 
schooling, noting that falling infant mortality and increased parental 
schooling could easily lead to a similar substitution of quality in place 
of quantity of children. This mechanism helps explain why the fertility 
decline has been so universal and why it has been combined with rapid 
increases in schooling.  
THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE
Brazil’s fertility decline makes for a particularly interesting case 
study. It is probably the best example of a developing country experi-
encing rapid fertility decline in the absence of a major family planning 
effort. Brazil is also a country for which we have excellent census and 
survey data going back to 1960, making it possible to analyze the fertil-
ity decline in great detail. As indicated in Figure 5.10, Brazil’s fertility 
decline was well underway by the late 1960s, and fertility fell rapidly in 
the 1970s and 1980s. This was a period in which the country was ruled 
by a military government that gave little support to family planning 
programs (Merrick and Berquó 1983; Martine 1996; Potter, Schmert-
mann, and Cavenaghi 2002). It is also noteworthy that the fertility de-
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cline began during the rapid economic growth of the 1960s and 1970s 
but continued at a similar pace during the recessionary 1980s. Research 
suggests that increases in schooling, especially for women, played a 
major role in this decline (Merrick and Berquó 1983; Lam and Duryea 
1999). 
Lam and Duryea use the cross-sectional relationship between wom-
en’s schooling and fertility to estimate the decline in fertility that would 
have resulted from increasing women’s schooling prior to 1984. They 
estimate that increases in women’s schooling could account for roughly 
70 percent of the large decrease in fertility that occurred in the 1960s 
and 1970s in Brazil. Figure 5.11 shows the relationship between wom-
en’s schooling and fertility in 1984 and in 2002. The 1984 relationship 
is taken from Lam and Duryea (1999); the pattern for 2002 is estimated 
using the 2002 PNAD survey, which includes roughly 10,000 women 
aged 45–59.6 
The mean number of children that had been born to women aged 
45–49 fell from 5.0 in 1984 to 3.5 in 2002 (not shown).7 This is a con-
siderably larger gap than the varying distance between the two lines for 
Figure 5.11  Number of Births by Years of Schooling, Women Ages 45–49, 
Brazil, 1984 and 2002
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children ever born in 1984 and in 2002 in Figure 5.11. This indicates 
that the increased schooling of women, which shifts the distribution of 
women to the right along the horizontal axis in Figure 5.11, plays an 
important role in explaining the fertility decline. Mean years of school-
ing for women aged 45–49 rose from 3.5 in 1984 to 6.4 in 2002. Impor-
tantly, this involves a shift away from the lowest levels of schooling, the 
levels associated with the highest fertility. 
The percentage of women aged 45–49 with zero years of schooling 
fell from 30 percent in 1984 to 14 percent in 2002, while the percent-
age going beyond the fourth grade rose from 24 percent to 53 percent. 
Given the strong relationship between schooling and fertility in Figure 
5.11, especially at the lowest schooling levels, these shifts in the school-
ing distribution imply large declines in fertility. 
Figure 5.11 also shows the number of surviving children by years of 
mother’s schooling. Several features should be noted about the relation-
ship between the number of surviving children, the number of children 
ever born, and years of schooling. First, there is the large gap between 
the number of children ever born and the number of children still alive 
Figure 5.12  Mean Schooling of 14-Year-Olds by Years of Schooling of 
Mother, Brazil, 1984 and 2002
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at the time of the 1984 survey for women with low schooling. Women 
with zero schooling, a large part of the sample, had lost 1.2 children 
on average, a mortality rate of 18.5 percent. Part of the high fertility of 
women with low schooling levels appears to have been a response to 
high infant mortality. Figure 5.11 also shows the large improvement in 
child survival as schooling increases: women with schooling of eight 
years or more had very few children die. These relationships suggest 
that as increased schooling leads to higher infant survival, women re-
spond by having fewer births. 
As noted above, it has been an empirical regularity around the 
world that falling fertility has been associated with increased invest-
ments in children’s human capital. Parental schooling can play an im-
portant role in this relationship, as suggested by economic theories of 
quantity-quality tradeoffs. Figure 5.12 shows the relationship between 
mother’s schooling and the schooling of 14-year-olds in Brazil in 1984 
and 2002, using the same household survey data as was used in Figure 
5.11. Figure 5.12 shows a strong positive relationship between mother’s 
schooling and children’s schooling, with an especially strong relation-
ship at low levels of schooling. In the 1984 data, 14-year-old children 
whose mothers had 15 or more years of schooling (university comple-
tion) were more than three grades ahead of 14-year-olds whose mothers 
had zero schooling. The 2002 relationship shows a slightly flatter slope 
to this curve, although there is still a gap of well over two grades be-
tween the highest and lowest schooling levels. 
Although Figure 5.12 gives the impression that there has been rela-
tively little improvement in schooling between 1984 and 2002, there 
was in fact a large increase in mean schooling over this period. The 
mean years of schooling of 14-year-olds grew from 3.5 years to 5.4 
years, a 54 percent increase. As can be seen in Figure 5.12, the in-
crease in schooling of 14-year-olds, holding mother’s schooling con-
stant, is significantly smaller than this 1.9 year overall improvement. 
As with the fertility relationship discussed above, this indicates that 
the increased schooling of women is an important factor in explaining 
increased schooling of their children over this period. The improve-
ments at the bottom of the schooling distribution are once again im-
portant, since moving women from zero to four years of schooling has 
a big impact on the schooling of their children. Lam and Duryea show 
that the strong relationship between parental schooling and children’s 
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schooling continues to be observed when regressions are estimated with 
additional controls for variables such as region and urban or rural loca-
tion, with the effect of father’s schooling almost as large as the effect of 
mother’s schooling.
While many factors, including the increased provision of family 
planning services, play a role in explaining the rapid declines in fertility 
in the last 40 years, improvements in child survival and in the schooling 
of parents clearly are key parts of the story. Brazil’s case is particularly 
strong evidence of this, since there was very little increase in family 
planning. The fact that investments in children’s schooling and health 
increased at the same time fertility declined is one of the most important 
signs of the changing behavior of parents, since it means that today’s 
generation of young people is the best educated in human history. Given 
the importance that increases in human knowledge have had in helping 
the world survive the population explosion, it is reassuring to know that 
the next generation of adults will be even better educated than the gen-
erations that dealt with the challenges of the last 40 years. 
CONCLUSION
The years from 1950 to 2000 form one of the most interesting peri-
ods of demographic change in history. The 1950s saw the annual growth 
rate of world population begin a dramatic increase that peaked at over 
2 percent a year in the mid-1960s, followed by a return to the 1950 
level of 1.4 at the end of the 1990s. The doubling of world population 
between 1960 and 2000 was by far the shortest doubling time in human 
history, a phenomenon that will almost surely never be seen again. This 
population explosion essentially played itself out within a half-century, 
and as it did so it presented an unprecedented challenge to the world’s 
ability to feed itself and provide resources necessary for modern human 
existence. 
This chapter has argued that the world has already survived the 
population explosion. While the demographic impact of the rapid popu-
lation growth of recent decades will continue for several more decades, 
the population growth rate of the world will continue to fall rapidly, re-
turning the world to the kind of growth rates seen in the early twentieth 
century and even earlier. During this population explosion the world 
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managed to increase per capita food production, decrease poverty, and 
reduce the prices of most commodities, both renewable and nonrenew-
able. This is an amazing accomplishment that we should not lose sight 
of as we move beyond the late twentieth century. 
Understanding how the world survived the population explosion 
requires an understanding of both the demography and the economics 
at work during these decades of rapid population growth. Demographi-
cally, it is important to recognize that it was rapidly falling mortality 
that began the population explosion and that it was unexpectedly rapid 
falls in fertility that brought it to an end. The economics of markets, 
individual responses to incentives, and returns to human capital are im-
portant aspects of the story. The fact that per capita food production was 
31 percent higher in 2003 than it was in 1961 reflects both innovations 
in agricultural technology and responses by farmers to economic incen-
tives. The fact that an index of nonenergy commodity prices fell 54 
percent between 1960 and 2000 reflects technological advances and the 
impact of international trade. And the fact that the world’s total fertil-
ity rate fell from 5.0 to 2.8 between 1965 and 2000 reflects the rational 
responses of couples to increased child survival and increased parental 
schooling. Parents not only chose to have fewer children but also chose 
to invest more in the health and schooling of those children, making this 
current cohort of young people the best educated in history.  
In considering issues of sustainable development and the world’s 
ability to meet increasing resource pressures, the history of the past 
50 years must be a source of optimism. At the same time, challenges 
remain. While world poverty rates fell impressively in recent decades, 
with the percentage of people living on less than $1 a day being cut in 
half between 1980 and 2001, poverty increased substantially over this 
period in Africa. Nor has Africa been able to increase food production 
fast enough to keep pace with population. Beyond that, this chapter has 
not dealt with the many environmental concerns that are often raised 
by those who are less optimistic about the world’s future. These issues 
are critical, especially when markets may do a poor job of creating ap-
propriate incentives, as in the case of ocean fishing or global warming. 
In considering whether the world will be able to meet these challenges 
of the twenty-first century, however, we should not forget how bleak 
prospects looked in the 1960s. The world’s ability to survive the popu-
lation explosion may be one of the most important lessons about human 
adaptability that we will ever receive.  
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Notes
This research was supported by grants from the National Institute of Child Health and 
Human Development, part of the U.S. National Institutes of Health.
 1.  Estimates before 1950 are taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s “Summary Es-
timates,” which are based on a number of historical sources (2003). Estimates 
and projections from 1950 to 2050 are taken from United Nations Population 
Division (2003). See Bongaarts and Bulatao (2000) for discussion of projections 
to 2050.
 2.  The growth rates in Figure 5.2 are based on estimates of the total population for 
each single year up to 2000. The figure shows three-year moving averages of 
these growth rates, which serve to remove some of the short-run year-to-year 
volatility. The growth rates for the period after 2000 are based on United Nations 
population projections for every fifth year (2000, 2005, etc.). For example, the 
growth rate centered on 2002.5 for the medium variant is the average annual 
growth rate implied by the U.N. medium variant estimates for the population in 
2000 and 2005. 
 3. National accounts data are the aggregate data on measures such as GNP and 
industrial output that are produced by national statistical agencies.
 4.  Note that India is included in the “South Asia” series, in addition to being repre-
sented separately.
 5. The actual value of replacement fertility depends on mortality rates between 
birth and childbearing, and thus is different for every population. The figure of 
2.1 is a rough benchmark.
 6. PNAD stands for Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios, or National 
Household Survey.
 7.  Note that most of these births would have taken place when these women were 
20 to 35 years old, so this decline roughly describes the decline in fertility be-
tween the 1960s and the 1980s.
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Property Rights and the 




I seek here to connect two prominent contemporary concerns—
property rights and environmental sustainability. While the relation 
between these two ideas may not be apparent at first thought, they are 
most certainly linked in the realm of public policy. The linkage oc-
curs because many actions taken by private landowners hold serious 
implications for parts of the natural world that are the subject of much 
concern for sustainability. And to the extent that public policies con-
cerning sustainability seek to influence individual and group action so 
that detrimental impacts are avoided, individual landowners may find 
themselves in an unwelcome situation. The dominant myth in America 
is that the owner of land may do as she wishes with the land that she 
owns. When this belief is acted upon, and when such acts are detrimen-
tal to sustainability outcomes, perceptions of property rights come into 
direct conflict with the imperatives of sustainability. 
In this chapter I will offer a brief overview of the concept of rights 
(and that of duties), I will explore the concept of property, and I will 
then spell out the idea and practice of property rights in the American 
political and legal system. I will next turn to a brief discussion of the 
issues that must be faced if we are to understand the essence of sustain-
ability. The problem to be highlighted here is that sustainability cannot 
be discussed in the absence of serious thought about the evolving pur-
poses of nature. That is, we learn about what is worth sustaining when 
we learn about how different people come to see what “nature is for.” 
Since the purposes of nature are continually evolving, we can only un-
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derstand concerns for sustainability if we understand the nature of this 
evolutionary process. Finally, I will offer some insights into the prob-
lems that arise when scientific experts (or courts of law) offer up advice 
(or legal findings) about sustainability or about property rights. The 
philosophy of pragmatism helps us to understand that, in a democracy, 
assertions from scientists—or decrees from courts—must be justified to 
those who will be affected by those assertions and decrees. I explore the 
important implications of having public policy flow from this fact.
PROPERTY RIGHTS
If we are to understand the role of property rights in relation to 
concerns for environmental sustainability, we must start with the idea 
of a right. Rights are the collective (legal) permission to be able to 
compel the government to come to your assistance in particular situ-
ations (Becker 1977; Bromley 1989, 1991; Christman 1994). Rights 
do not offer mere passive support by the state. Rather, to have rights 
is to have assurance of active assistance from the coercive power of 
the state. That is, the state stands ready to be enlisted in the cause of 
those to whom it has granted rights. Rights expand the capacities of the 
individual by indicating what one can do with the aid of the collective 
power. This process works because of the correlated duties on others 
who might wish to interfere with the individual to whom rights have 
been granted. Rights are not something embedded in natural law. In-
stead, rights emerge through the collective recognition of the legitimacy 
of particular interests in the eyes of the state. 
With the meaning of rights in hand, we can now consider the mean-
ing of property. Despite how we talk—“I just bought a nice piece of 
property on a lake”—what the idea and practice of property convey 
is not an object (such as land). Property is, instead, a stream of values 
into the future (Macpherson 1973, 1978). When one buys a piece of 
land one acquires not merely a physical object but rather control over 
a benefit stream arising from the setting and circumstances associated 
with that object. That is why we spend money (one benefit stream) in 
order to acquire property (“ownership” of a new benefit stream arising 
from the fact of ownership). The price paid to acquire that new benefit 
stream is simply the discounted present value of all future net income 
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flowing from ownership of the thing and its stream of values. Owner-
ship concerns futurity—value running into the future that the owner 
controls (for the most part) and may now receive. 
The idea of property rights brings these two ideas together. Prop-
erty rights define the limits of the law pertaining to the income aris-
ing from the control of income-producing settings and circumstances. 
Trademarks, copyrights, and patents are property rights. All are forms 
of rights in property (the future value) and correlated duties falling on 
nonowners. In practical terms, the empirical content of property rights 
is determined when conflicting rights claims are brought before that 
legal body created to resolve conflicting claims in a democracy—the 
courts. As property rights disputes work their way through the court 
system, some of them may end up in the Supreme Court. The legal 
struggle, and the appeals process that keeps it moving up through ever 
higher layers in the judicial system, is precisely concerned with figuring 
out which disputant has the more compelling rights claim. We see that 
property rights are not some a priori concept by intuition (“this is a ta-
ble”). Rather, property rights are the result of a process whose essential 
purpose is to determine which of the conflicting rights claims before the 
court seems better, at the moment, to sanctify. In other words, settings 
and circumstances are not protected because they are, a priori, instan-
tiations of property rights. Rather, those settings and circumstances that 
gain protection from the courts acquire, by virtue of the decisions in the 
courts, the status of a property right.
John Locke plays a central role in the American idea of property 
rights. Locke worked out a theory of the acquisition of property, such 
acquisition then giving rise to several desirable outcomes, from which 
flow the main justifications for the holding of property. Locke’s neces-
sary starting point is a creation story in which a Calvinist God gives 
the earth to humans in common and admonishes them to take dominion 
over that commons by, among other things, mixing their labor with it 
(Kreuckeberg 1999). Locke is then able to argue that by having mixed 
their labor with the land they deserve to become its owner. This Lock-
ean creation story occurs in a state of nature (a pre-civil society) and 
hence it is necessary to have some means of protecting that which has 
been acquired. It is here that the state enters the picture. To Locke, the 
purpose of the state is to protect those who have labored as God com-
manded, and thereby to bestow on all the beneficial effects that arise 
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from this class of hard-working citizens. The state, having formed to 
protect those who have, out of nothing but hard work, created so much, 
is thus obligated to stand as a shield for those who now hold property. 
That protection works in two important directions. It works against oth-
ers who may wish to prey on the industry of those who labor on their 
land, and it works, reflexively, against that very state. That is, the state 
itself is restrained, by the collective realization of the great benefit aris-
ing from the existence of an owning and laboring class, from interfering 
with those activities it finds so beneficial and compelling.
It is here that we come to the Lockean idea of holding land. If one 
acquires land in the Lockean way then it has been justly acquired, and 
its continued holding is justified on moral grounds. Equally important, 
this holding is justified on prudential grounds since the effect of indi-
viduals holding land is the production of benefits for the community at 
large. The key justification for the continued holding of land finds its 
expression in the idea that this grant is the essential assurance of liberty 
for those who hold land. They are assured of liberty because the state 
agrees to protect them from the predations of others, and they are as-
sured of liberty because the state itself agrees to refrain from its own 
form of predation on the private property of its citizens (unless compen-
sation is offered in return). 
Locke recognized that as the earth filled up, and as less and less of 
God’s Commons (to use Kreuckeberg’s phrase) was available for ap-
propriation, it was inevitable that conflicts would arise (Kreuckeberg 
1999). As Locke put the matter, his theory of justified acquisition and 
subsequent justified holding worked only so long as there was “enough 
and as good” for others. This Lockean proviso brings us to Immanuel 
Kant. The views of Kant are important in discussions of sustainability 
because it was Kant who first offered a way out of the trap set by the 
static nature of Locke’s concept of property rights. 
Kant’s innovation was to recognize that rights (and therefore prop-
erty rights) are not tangible empirical realities but are, instead, mental 
constructs. The word he used is noumena. Those things that cannot be 
apprehended by the senses but are knowable only by reason constitute 
noumena. Kant motivates his inquiry on rights by asking what condi-
tions are necessary for an individual to make internal something that 
is, by its very nature, external? Something external to an individual is 
made internal by understanding the idea of belonging to. And how is 
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it decided that something external belongs to an individual? The indi-
vidual may declare that some particular object or situation belongs to 
her. Notice that this is a claim against all others to whom the object or 
situation might otherwise belong. Such claims are asserted by those 
who wish to make the point that the speaker is the rightful (justified) 
possessor and controller (“owner”) of the thing under discussion. The 
speaker is making something internal that is, quite clearly, external.
Kant recognized that such claims represent negations of the inter-
ests of others within the same community. And he suggested that while 
one individual may indeed announce and display physical possession 
of something external, this was not the same as having a socially sanc-
tioned authority to make that declaration binding on others who might 
wish to make internal that very same thing. That is, unilateral declara-
tions of “belonging to” are inherently unstable and therefore cannot 
be expected to settle the matter once and for all. Kant noticed that it is 
only from the consent of others that one can make internal that which is 
clearly external. For if that external thing can belong to anyone within 
the community, what justification can be mounted to assert that it be-
longs to any particular member of that community? Why should others 
willingly accept binding duties on nothing more compelling than the 
self-serving assertions of those already in possession of something of 
potential value to others? 
Kant said that such assertions are nothing but the affirmation of 
empirical possession. And by being based on mere possession they con-
fuse physical control with something much more profound. That more 
profound circumstance is one that Kant called intelligible possession. 
Intelligible possession comes into play when a community of sentient 
beings reaches agreement that indeed it is both right (moral) and good 
(prudential) that someone among them should be able to make internal 
something that has hitherto been external. The essence of empirical pos-
session is a dog with a bone. There is not, nor can there be, recognition 
among the community of dogs—all of whom covet the bone—that it 
“belongs to” the one currently in possession of the bone. The most one 
can say is that they acknowledge possession. It takes Kantian reason to 
transcend empirical possession. In human society, what is mine depends 
not on what I say about it being mine. Rather, what is mine becomes 
mine by virtue of the assertions of all others who, by their declaration, 
acquiesce in their own disenfranchisement from the benefits associated 
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with that object or circumstance. Others grant me possessio noumenon, 
or socially justified possession—I cannot take it for myself.
 We see that Locke gave us a basis for justified acquisition and hold-
ing of land (property) as long as there is “enough and as good” for 
others. But Locke stopped short of a complete theory of what is to be 
done when there is not enough and as good for others. That is, Locke 
developed a theory of acquisition and holding that works best when 
it is needed least. Kant helped us to see that the continued holding of 
land in the face of scarcity requires something very special. For scar-
city raises the specter of deprivation and exclusion if Lockean acquisi-
tion and holding works against the interests of others in the community 
who—by virtue of coming late—find that all of God’s Commons has 
already been justly acquired. How are we to justify the continued hold-
ing of land once there is no more of it to be justly acquired? Or what are 
we do about those who hold (own) land yet insist on using it in ways 
inimical to environmental sustainability?
Contemporary Lockeans have a ready answer to this question: let 
the latecomers buy it from those who have justly acquired it (who have 
previously purchased it). Or, if the current owner is to be restrained 
from using land in destructive ways the government must offer com-
pensation in order to induce the owner to stop such practices. Notice 
that once the initial acquisition has been transferred to another for a 
particular price, the logic seems compelling and without end—all fu-
ture acquisitions must be mediated by due consideration to the extant 
holder of land (property). And what is transferred in this way is—and 
must be—precisely what earlier acquirers obtained. By this logic, the 
“just acquisition and holding” continues into perpetuity.
Such logic threatens the prospects for sustainability of certain com-
ponents of nature adversely affected by traditional land-use practices. 
That is, the current holding of land and other natural resources often 
results in actions that are now found to be neither moral nor prudential. 
What if ownership results in wetlands—important breeding and nest-
ing habitat for wildlife—being destroyed? What if ownership results 
in too much old growth timber being cut down? What if ownership 
means excessive soil erosion that fouls streams and lakes? Given these 
possibilities, on what grounds can payment then be justified in order to 
induce the current holder to stop using his land in an antisocial manner? 
In other words, what is to preclude one or more holders of land from en-
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gaging in social extortion? We see that land justly acquired may evolve 
into land unjustly held, its current use no longer being moral or pruden-
tial. Kant recognized that the community itself must determine whether 
land justly acquired continues to be justly held. And Kant located this 
determination in acts of reason undertaken by a civil society (Williams 
1977). It is the community itself that must set the standards by which 
holding of justly acquired land remains justified.
Kant forced us to work out a new theory of holding land in the face 
of emerging collective disapproval of the actions of the current owner. 
Such a theory must offer an explanation (justification) for difficult deci-
sions about what to do with just and prudential holdings into the future. 
In more practical terms, this theory must address the issue of what is 
to be done when current land holdings—or particular uses of land—are 
no longer socially acceptable. Must payment to the offensive owner 
always be forthcoming? This is the essential “takings” question in land-
use regulations (Bromley 1993, 1997). 
One school of thought holds that there are no circumstances in which 
actions on land that has been justly acquired can be circumscribed or 
precluded—say through regulations—without those restrictions being 
accompanied by compensation (Epstein 1985). In reality, however, 
there are many land-use conflicts in the American experience in which 
particular uses of land have been prohibited and no compensation has 
been forthcoming. One classic case is Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. City of New York, in which the Penn Central wanted to construct an 
enormous skyscraper on stilts above New York’s Grand Central Termi-
nal, which it owns. The New York City Landmarks Commission had 
declared it a historic site, preventing this plan. Penn Central sued the 
City of New York for compensation under the takings clause and was 
denied. Other cases involve wetland drainage and timber harvests under 
the Endangered Species Act. The courts have sometimes found in the 
interests of a restrained land owner, and they have sometimes found in 
favor of governments seeking to protect natural habitats in the interest 
of sustainability. Why have the courts varied?
An answer to this apparent contradiction is found in the work of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, said to be one of the most creative and profound 
philosophers America has ever produced. Peirce would have us imagine 
the idea of property rights in the American experience as the benedic-
tion applied to those settings and circumstances that, when the dust of 
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consideration by various levels of jurisprudence has finally settled, are 
found worthy of indemnification by the state (Peirce 1934). Notice that 
the term property rights is not something known axiomatically—some-
thing whose essence is clear to us by intuition or introspection before a 
particular legal struggle is joined and its specifics emerge. Rather, the 
idea of property rights is worked out—created—in the process of re-
solving mutually exclusive rights claims before the courts. This means 
that the American judicial system does not seek to discover where the 
a priori property right lies. Instead, the courts offer a necessary forum 
to which, from time to time, conflicting rights claims will be brought. 
When the more compelling rights claim has been determined, the court 
will issue a decree to that effect. We see that property rights are made, 
not discovered.
This idea that the courts create, not discover, property rights as they 
dig into conflicting rights claims can be attributed to the celebrated Su-
preme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Louis Menand says that 
“it was Holmes’s genius as a philosopher to see that the law has no 
essential aspect” (Menand 2001). Indeed, Holmes had written in 1870 
that the merit of common law is that it leads judges to decisions on the 
merits of the cases before them and it then allows them to determine the 
guiding principle secondarily. Menand describes the process thus: 
A case comes to court as a unique fact situation. It immediately 
enters a kind of vortex of discursive imperatives. There is the im-
perative to find the just result in this particular case. There is the 
imperative to find the result that will be consistent with the results 
reached in analogous cases in the past. There is the imperative to 
find the result that, generalized across many similar cases, will be 
most beneficial to society as a whole—the result that will send the 
most useful behavioral message. There are also, though less explic-
itly acknowledged, the desire to secure the outcome most conge-
nial to the judge’s own politics; the desire to use the case to bend 
legal doctrine so that it will conform better with changes in social 
standards and conditions; and the desire to punish the wicked and 
excuse the good, and to redistribute costs from parties who can’t 
afford them (like accident victims) to parties who can (like manu-
facturers and insurance companies).
 Hovering over this whole unpredictable weather pattern—all of 
which is already in motion, as it were, before the particular case 
at hand ever arises—is a single meta-imperative. This is the im-
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perative not to let it appear as though any one of these lesser im-
peratives has decided the case at the blatant expense of the others. 
A result that seems just intuitively but is admittedly incompatible 
with legal precedent is taboo; so is a result that is formally consis-
tent with precedent but appears unjust on its face (Menand 2001, p. 
339). 
It would seem that pragmatism is a central reality of American juris-
prudence. This pragmatism is particularly suited to property rights cas-
es, which are concerned with figuring out where the most compelling 
property interests lie. The problem here is to blend moral and prudential 
arguments in search of the best thing to do. That best thing will com-
prise the “truth” in that particular setting. In fact, one way to paraphrase 
the courts’ approach is to say that truth is merely that which it is better, 
at the moment, to believe. Truth is the special benediction we bestow on 
our settled deliberations (Rorty 1982, 1999).
It would also seem that conventional efforts to divine the idea—
the a priori essence—of property rights are flawed and prevent clear 
thought about environmental policy and sustainability. When property 
disputes arrive in the courts, justices are forced to consider and imagine 
possible futures and then figure out which of the claimants has the more 
compelling claim in light of those imagined futures. Their legal find-
ings, or decrees, reflect this new recognition.
SUSTAINABILITY
With this necessary background on the legal side of land-use is-
sues, let us turn directly to the matter of sustainability. The central issue 
concerning environmental sustainability is to recognize that individual 
and collective ideas concerning the purposes of nature are undergo-
ing constant change. Thus the problem of sustainability concerns the 
need to understand and to come to grips with the continual evolution 
in human conceptions about what nature is for. And the present-day 
challenge of sustainability involves the ongoing evolutionary process 
whereby a particular type of land cover—a particular plant and animal 
community—has come to be seen as much more complex, interesting, 
and dependent on other distant ecotypes (as well as much more impor-
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tant to the well-being of other ecotypes and to us as humans) than had 
been previously thought.
At one level, not much about the forest has changed in a fundamen-
tal way over the past several decades. Despite dwindling in the area 
they cover worldwide, forests are still an evolving complex of chemical 
and physical properties and attributes. However, while the forest has 
not changed very much, the precise social meaning of the forest has 
changed profoundly. It is not the forest on the ground that we address 
and fuss over when we undertake management activities. It is the forest 
in our minds that we are working on and seeking to manage. Indeed it is 
the forest in our minds that we use when we are in it, and it is the forest 
in our minds that we covet and recall when we are away from it. 
Modernism, grounded on Cartesian radical doubt, brought us the 
odd idea that the mind is—to use Richard Rorty’s phrase—simply a 
“mirror of nature.” That is, we are led to believe that there is a unique, 
tangible, and knowable reality out there (in the world) that would be-
come available to us if we would but first, as good Cartesians, purge 
our minds of all existing ideas and thoughts about that reality. With 
this newly emptied receptacle, we could then immediately grasp and 
comprehend that extant reality, and then we would—at last—have an 
accurate and irrefutable description of it (Rorty 1979). Our knowledge 
of it, and about it, would be complete and irrefutable. With that durable 
knowledge in hand, we would then be getting very close indeed to the 
“truth” about that particular reality—the “thing in itself,” as Kant and 
his followers might put it. Some refer to this as the representational 
model of knowing. Those whose essential burden in life is to produce 
true descriptions of and stories about that reality are called scientists. 
And, as modernism drills into us at every opportunity, scientists pursue 
the truth.
Pragmatists are not so sure about this search-for-truth claim. Prag-
matism suggests that when the collective determination of what is out 
there converges into a consensus and comes to be adopted by the epis-
temic community (the scientific discipline) whose task it is to investi-
gate some particular aspect of the world, then this consensus becomes 
the accepted story—the “truth”—about that observed and apprehended 
“reality.” Scientific debates are not about some knowable reality. They 
are debates about stories about that reality. In other words, there is no 
plausible, reliable, complete, irrefutable, comprehensive, true, and ac-
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curate account of a “forest” or an “ecotype” or an “ecosystem.” Indeed, 
that Holy Grail of environmental policy, species, is itself an artificial 
construct. To be sure, the creations of the early classifiers and categoriz-
ers have some plausible attributes. But the only thing that recommends 
them to us now is that these categories and their members serve to or-
der our world—they are useful for the purposes that motivated their 
creation. 
I hope it is now easier to comprehend my earlier assertion that what 
matters about forests, ecotypes, and ecosystems is nothing more than the 
categories, meanings, and purposes that humans attach to them. Each of 
these environmental assets and the species in them become for us what 
we have made of them. We will see, understand, use, manage, and re-
vere them in ways that evolve as we figure out new ways to think about 
them. To put the finishing touches on this line of thought, the forest is 
for us the sum of its effects on us. Human interaction with forests and 
ecosystems can only be understood in terms of the effects those forests 
and ecosystems have on us. We do not manage forests and ecosystems. 
We manage and redefine the effects that forests and ecosystems have on 
us, and we manage and redefine the effects we have on them.
We know and understand a stunning sunset, a high mountain mead-
ow, or the boreal forest, not by anything inherent in those physical set-
tings, but rather by the effects those settings and circumstances have on 
us. Our conception of the effects of a sunset, a forest, or an ecosystem is 
the whole of our conception of a sunset, a forest, or an ecosystem. That 
is all there is (Peirce 1934). The mind is not a mirror of nature. Rather, 
the mind creates our conception of nature in the light of our current 
embeddedness in particular social, economic, and cultural settings and 
circumstances. An adult from an urban area sees a very different forest 
than does an adult from a small town surrounded by forest. She sees 
the forest differently because she learned about it differently, and she 
most certainly uses it differently. When those settings and circumstanc-
es change for us, then the construction project in our mind recreates 
nature in keeping with the emergent futures we think we see before us. 
This recreation of nature is always undertaken in light of our imagined 
purposes for the future.
 The way in which we see nature cannot be distinguished from the 
way in which we imagine the purposes of nature—what nature is for. 
Indeed it is our vision of what nature is for that prefigures how we see 
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and regard nature. Debates about sustainability will, inevitably, bring 
into the discussion the testimony of scientific experts. And the use of 
scientific knowledge for improved decision making necessarily starts 
with the requirement that the scientific knowledge offered up must be 
pertinent to the disparate purposes for nature held by the many indi-
viduals and groups who claim to speak on behalf of nature. There is no 
single decision maker, and this multitude of audiences reminds us that 
there cannot possibly be a single bundle of scientific knowledge that 
will, upon presentation by the experts, be found to be decisive with re-
spect to what shall be done about particular environmental challenges.
In the face of this multitude of audiences for scientific knowledge, 
we must recognize that there are two general categories of knowledge 
that are pertinent. The first concerns scientific knowledge that presumes 
to be informative, while the second concerns information that pertains 
to what we call agency. Consider the problem of global climate change. 
When we think of scientific knowledge that presumes to inform, we 
usually think of the natural sciences—paleobiology, oceanography, cli-
matology, forestry, atmospheric chemistry, and the like. The point here 
is that distinct epistemic communities undertake research to gather data 
that, with sufficient interpretation and elaboration, will provide perti-
nent information about processes of interest to the rest of us. Notice that 
data are not information. Rather, information is purposefully reconfig-
ured data. We will be shown long-run trends in global mean tempera-
tures, we will be shown fossil records and maps of vegetation change. 
We will see photographs and maps and charts. We are being informed. 
Or are we? Some individuals, with different perspectives on the issue, 
and with different interests at stake, may well be suspicious. In other 
words, we must never presume that all individuals are equally open to 
what the rest of us might consider to be useful information. 
Consider now the second category of scientific knowledge—what 
I above referred to as the problem of agency. Regardless of what one 
happens to believe about global climate change, the interesting issue 
is whether or not human activity—say the burning of fossil fuels—is 
plausibly related to this matter. That is, one can accept the natural sci-
entific evidence that, yes, it would seem that the earth is indeed getting 
warmer. But admitting a warming trend and accepting human culpabil-
ity in that trend are two distinct mental processes. Perhaps the trend is 
caused by increased activity on the surface of the sun. Or perhaps Planet 
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Earth is going a bit wobbly on its axis. We see that many individu-
als—again for a purpose that may be subconscious—draw a distinction 
between fate (so-called acts of God) and outcomes in which the hand 
of humans is seen as decisive. For many individuals, corrective action 
to address acts of fate is pointless; they are of the belief that only if hu-
mans can be found culpable must we confront and seek to change those 
implicated behaviors.
Suddenly global climate change, a matter of such overwhelming 
simplicity and certitude in the minds of some individuals, is seen to be 
multilayered and deeply confusing. In addition to this complexity, we 
have multiple audiences, each of which brings its own created imagin-
ing about necessity and purpose and its own particular receptivity to 
what the rest of us regard as informative evidence. 
WHAT TO BELIEVE?
I now turn to the process whereby individuals come to hold particu-
lar beliefs, and how they might be induced to alter firmly held convic-
tions. I shall approach these questions from the perspective of what I 
call volitional pragmatism—the human will in action, looking to the 
future, trying to figure out how that future ought to unfold for us (Brom-
ley 2004, 2005).
The central challenge in public policy for environmental sustainabil-
ity is to understand the process whereby information from a community 
of scientists is regarded as definitive and pertinent to the problem under 
consideration. There are two issues here. The first is the authority with 
which scientists speak on a particular matter. This problem has to do 
with the veracity and coherence of pronouncements emanating from a 
particular community of scientists. The second problem involves the 
receptivity of the larger public to scientific pronouncements and dec-
larations. The first problem concerns what I call warranted assertions; 
the second, what I call valuable assertions. 
Warranted assertions are those that can be justified to most members 
of the discipline out of which the assertions emerge. Most economists 
who advise on environmental policy feel quite comfortable telling us 
how environmental choices ought to be considered—and that is usually 
in terms of benefit-cost analysis. The issue here is the extent to which 
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a subset of the discipline of economics has a conceptual and empirical 
sanction to issue prescriptive assertions, and to have those claims stand 
as the truth as seen through the eyes of the entire profession. 
Pragmatism accords the status of warranted belief (or warranted 
assertion) only to the settled deliberations of an entire community of 
scholars (a discipline or a particular epistemic community). When an 
entire discipline speaks with clear consensus on a particular scientific 
matter, then the rest of us can safely regard these truth claims as con-
stituting warranted assertions. On the other hand, when that disciplin-
ary consensus is absent, or when it begins to dissipate over time, then 
the associated truth claims cannot be justified within the discipline and 
they thereby lose their warrantability and their legitimacy to the larg-
er community to which they are addressed. The various audiences for 
these assertions from “science”—whether executive-branch agencies of 
government, legislative bodies, courts, or citizen’s groups—find them-
selves barraged by a wide array of conceptual and empirical claims. 
Often, the processing of those assertions takes place in a manner that 
might be thought irrational by those who produce scientific assertions. 
Such dismissive judgments are quite unjustified, and this brings us to 
the demand side of information. 
Consider now the idea of valuable assertions. Pragmatists insist 
that the adjective “valuable” can only be applied by those who are the 
intended consumers of particular assertions (truth claims). In other 
words, the consumers of those assertions stand as the definitive judges 
of whether or not they happen to find them valuable, useful, pertinent, 
informative, and dispositive. For instance, when environmental econ-
omists offer specific consequentialist prescriptions about collective 
choice—indicating which decisions are efficient, correct, rational, best, 
and socially preferred—we see truth claims from a particular subdisci-
pline of economics projected onto disparate considerations about what 
is best for the future. The pragmatist would wish to know whether or 
not those specific truth claims can be justified to all members of the par-
ticular community to whom they are directed. If that justification is pos-
sible then the truth claims are valuable. They are valuable because the 
community into which they are projected finds such assertions helpful, 
useful, edifying, and instrumental to improving the working out of what 
seems best to do in the current setting and circumstances. If those truth 
claims cannot be justified to the members of the pertinent community 
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then such claims are unjustified. They are unjustified precisely because 
the community to whom they are directed finds them to be impertinent 
to the task they currently face.  
We see that the prescriptive assertions from a community of dis-
ciplinary adherents are hardly a sufficient condition for the immediate 
acquiescence of the rest of us. The public may well respond, “Do not 
expect the rest of us to stop what we are doing and fall into line with 
the pronouncements from scientists just because they happen to be sci-
entists.” Indeed, the public’s acquiescence in the alleged truth claims 
of science must rest on a separate set of arguments and reasons from 
those to which the members of a discipline alone are privileged. With 
the public lacking this information, disciplinary practitioners are not 
entitled to expect the general population to accept their particular truth 
claims on faith. 
Notice that the issue here is not truth but justified claims or justi-
fied belief. The pragmatist would ask whether economistic truth claims 
are capable of being justified to an audience of individuals who are the 
objects of our interest as we seek to improve their lot with our socially 
preferred, or optimal, policies. The question worth asking is, “Why, ex-
actly, are the truth claims of environmental economics more pertinent to 
this particular choice setting than, say, the truth claims of psychology?” 
We have here a debate about the true and the quest to justify claims 
about the true. Recall that truth is not a property of perfect correspon-
dence between propositions (words) and particular events and objects to 
which those propositions refer—between language and things. Truth is 
not denotative. Truth is, instead, a property of the relationship between 
different statements about specific events and objects—that is, between 
contending linguistic claims. Truth is connotative (Bromley 2005). 
We now have a way to view the prescriptive assertions emanat-
ing from any number of scientific disciplines. Warranted assertions are 
those that can be justified to the larger disciplinary community—here 
the keys are that warranted assertions be coherent in their concept and 
plausible in their empirical claims to the larger epistemic community 
out of which such assertions arise. Valuable assertions are those that 
a community of sapient agents (that is, the rest of us) find useful and 
reasonable to the decision now before them. The essential idea here is 
that human choice and action are properly characterized as prospec-
tive volition—the human will in action, looking to the future, trying 
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to determine how that future ought to unfold. As this process evolves, 
individuals and groups bring contending expressions and imaginings to 
the task of choice and action (Shackle 1961). Individuals and groups 
do not know precisely what they want until they work out what they 
can have. Group action is more complicated than individual action be-
cause it requires reconciliation of disparate and contending individual 
expressions and imaginings until a consensus emerges—the properties 
of which are that this consensus is regarded as 1) feasible, and 2) the 
best thing to do at this particular time. 
The two properties of that consensus—“feasible” and “best at this 
time”—represent judgments reached by those individuals who are re-
sponsible for collective action. In the realm of environmental policy, 
the first step in this process of working out an emergent consensus is 
necessarily confined to legislators, administrators, and judges. As we 
know, this process may be aided by input from economists and other 
scientific “experts.” It is here that the first test of valuable assertion is 
encountered. In a democracy, going beyond this level entails the critical 
step of justifying particular decisions or decrees to the larger politi-
cal community. In some cases that would include polluters, victims of 
pollution, and others who care about nature. In other cases, it could be 
those who see the purpose of the forest being the production of timber 
versus those who see the purpose of the forest being the provision of 
places of solace and emotional regeneration. In either case, these are 
the individuals whose separate actions will be liberated, restrained, or 
expanded by policies that favor one purpose over another. If policies 
are not justified to such disparate audiences, those policies will lack 
legitimacy. This justification to the larger political community neces-
sarily entails the giving of reasons for the decision reached, and those 
reasons must match as closely as possible the asking for reasons that is 
expected from the political community to whom the collective action is 
directed (Brandom 1994, 2000). This activity is properly thought of as 
justification in the service of emergent consent. 
We see that even if particular truth claims are deemed coherent by 
the discipline—or the court chamber or parliament—from which they 
spring, the projection of those truth claims to a larger audience is im-
pertinent unless there is widespread acceptance on the part of those to 
whom the truth claims are directed. Individuals in contemporary life re-
tain the authority to reject, for their own reasons, truth claims from any 
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source (scientist or mystic). Recall that the status of valuable belief is a 
property bestowed upon prescriptive assertions (truth claims) by those 
to whom such claims are directed—not by those who produce the asser-
tions. All that the producers of prescriptive assertions can justifiably af-
firm is that their assertions share wide agreement within the interpretive 
community out of which they arise—that they are warranted. 
We see that the fundamental problem in much public policy is that 
pronouncements from scientists tend to be seen as presumptively legiti-
mate, while the pronouncements from nonscientists are often dismissed 
as mere opinion, as based on emotion, as idealistic, or as predicated on 
sentiment. Such judgments are simply one more residue of modernist 
conceit. 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABILITY—AGAIN
My purpose here has been to find a way to help us escape the trap 
in which environmental policy (and discussions of sustainability) is 
usually framed. That usual framing forces us to make a choice at two 
levels. At the first level, we must decide if we are to invoke consequen-
tialist choice rules or ethical choice rules. Notice that much debate gets 
stalled here and never moves on to the second, more profound level, 
where substantive issues are addressed. Even assuming that we manage 
to reach agreement on which path to the “correct” choice is to be fol-
lowed, this second-level challenge remains fatally flawed. It is flawed 
because it presumes that there is some a priori right way to address 
either the ethical issues or the consequentialist issues.
This suggests that discussions about sustainability cannot be un-
derstood as prescriptive assertions about what must be—what ought to 
be—saved for the future. Nor can we make much headway by advanc-
ing prescriptive assertions concerning the optimal level of something 
that must be preserved. Rather, coherence in such conversations will 
only flow from a continual conversation—a political process—in which 
we work out what seems worth saving as we struggle with figuring out 
what we revere now and what we hope our descendants will revere as 
well. This conversation addresses fundamental issues about the sustain-
ability side of our story. 
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While such considerations are going on, it is to be expected that 
owners of private land may well experience the unwelcome scrutiny of 
the larger community, which happens to be affected by particular land-
use decisions. In response to this scrutiny landowners may well appeal 
to the community’s understanding of what it means to have a property 
right. They would, it seems, be well advised not to play this card too 
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Too Poor to Be Stewards?




Sustaining natural resource stocks, especially those underpinning 
the capacity to produce food, is key to most definitions of sustainable 
development. Yet troubling evidence has surfaced of instances where 
the rural poor were forced to sacrifice long-term sustainability for the 
sake of near-term survival (Mink 1993; Figueroa 1998). Are such cases 
special ones, or is rural poverty a driving factor in causing soil erosion, 
overgrazing, deforestation, and degradation of other natural resources? 
This chapter argues that natural resource sustainability in develop-
ing countries is not the result of a direct cause-effect relationship, but 
rather is engendered by a web of causal factors. Untangling that web 
entails separating out strands for poverty from those for location-spe-
cific natural resources, human institutions, technology, and population. 
This chapter will review the history of the poverty-environment debate, 
examine three case studies that shed light on key relationships, and, 
finally, propose policy interventions to promote the sustainability of the 
natural resources that underpin agricultural productivity.
POPULATION AND FOOD PRODUCTION: IDEAS AND
TRENDS 
The poverty-environment debate has grown from a seed planted by 
the English clergyman Thomas Malthus 200 years ago. Having studied 
the historical growth rates of population and food production, Malthus 
154 Swinton
(1798) wrote an essay, published anonymously by Joseph Johnson, a 
radical publisher at St. Paul’s Churchyard in London, in which he laid 
out his famous scenario for disaster: “The power of population is in-
definitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence 
for man. Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. 
Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio.” Throughout hu-
man history, war and pestilence have reined in population before the 
food supply became a constraint. But by the mid-nineteenth century, 
when a potato blight spread famine among the Irish population, killing 
one million inhabitants, current events seemed to support Malthus’ grim 
observation that food production lacked the potential to keep up with 
population.
As population growth rates took off during the period of relative 
peace after World War II, Malthusian fears again reared up. Could the 
world possibly provide for a rapidly growing population? Two affirma-
tive answers emerged during the 1960s. Based on her sweeping review 
of agricultural development worldwide, Esther Boserup (1965) found 
that rising population tended to trigger an intensification of agriculture, 
leading to higher food production from the same land. She argued that 
this was so because rising population increased demand for food, rais-
ing food prices and creating incentives for farmers to invest in boosting 
the productivity of the land by adding productive inputs, such as fertil-
izers and irrigation.
At the same time, the Rockefeller and Ford foundations were in-
vesting in new agricultural research centers in Mexico and the Philip-
pines. By the end of the 1960s, Norman Borlaug and fellow agricultural 
researchers at these locations had bred new, high-yielding varieties of 
wheat and rice, whose advent became known as the green revolution. 
Developed by traditional methods of crossing plant varieties that had 
different desired characteristics, these new varieties possessed resis-
tance to debilitating diseases like wheat rust, as well as reengineered 
plant architectures that shifted more biomass from stems and leaves 
into grain formation. In regions like the Punjab, where irrigation and 
fertilization were available, these varieties delivered spectacular yields. 
The success of the early varieties triggered a generation of investment 
in a network of publicly funded international agricultural research cen-
ters. The goal of the network was to bring productivity gains compa-
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rable to those in the Punjab to crop and livestock farmers working under 
diverse conditions around the globe.
By the 1980s the euphoria of the boom-boom days of the green 
revolution had begun to wear off. Replicating the yield gains achieved 
in developing countries in wheat, rice, and hybrid maize had proven 
more difficult to do for other crops and livestock. Moreover, even those 
more successful crops had turned out to yield significantly less when 
fertilizer and water inputs were lacking. Despite major investments 
in agronomic and socioeconomic research to understand and improve 
farm management practices, yield gains were not keeping up. To make 
matters worse, by the 1990s many developing country governments had 
cut back sharply on their agricultural research and extension services 
in response to fiscal discipline imposed by the International Monetary 
Fund. 
Today, a stark contrast has emerged between food production trends 
worldwide and food production trends in the poorest regions. Viewed 
globally, Malthus’ fears now look groundless: Food production out-
stripped population growth by 50 percent during the period 1960–2000. 
As shown in Figure 7.1, food available per capita has grown signifi-
cantly (Wiebe 2003). Indeed, the percentage of the world population 
that is food-insecure has fallen steadily. Viewed regionally, however, 
food production in the poorest parts of the developing world has not 
kept up. A Malthusian trend apparent in several disadvantaged regions 
has been most noted in sub-Saharan Africa. There, food production per 
capita eroded by 15–20 percent during the last 40 years of the century 
(Figure 7.2). Indeed, despite a shrinking percentage of food-insecure 
population globally, the absolute number of people who are at risk of 
hunger worldwide has remained troublingly stable (Figure 7.1).
How are we to reconcile persistent localized hunger with growing 
global bounty? In a world increasingly integrated by trade and com-
munication, the crux of the problem is no longer the quantity of food 
produced, but rather access to it (Runge et al. 2003). Almost a billion 
people are still too poor to acquire the food they need. Worse, they may 
feel the need to sacrifice future natural resource productivity for current 
consumption. The task of this chapter is to examine why poverty en-
dures in many rural regions of the tropics, and particularly how poverty 
is linked to natural resource degradation.
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DESPITE TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, WHY DOES 
MALTHUS STILL LOOK PARTLY CORRECT?
The persistence of pockets of extreme poverty raises questions about 
the population–food production relationship. Why was Malthus wrong 
at a global level yet seemingly right in some regions of the globe? And, 
are the trends we observe inevitable?
The place to begin is the fundamental ratio of food productivity: 
the rate of change in food production divided by the rate of change in 
population. Malthus clearly failed to anticipate the sensitivity of the 
numerator (rate of change in food production) to technological change. 
Figure 7.1  Rise in World Food Production Compared to Population 
Growth, 1960–2000
NOTE: Food insecurity is indicated here by chronic undernourishment.
SOURCE: Wiebe (2003), based on data from the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO). 
Two hundred years ago, citing limits on the extent and
quality of agricultural land and concerns about popula-
tion dating back to Plato and Aristotle, Thomas Malthus
argued that population growth would inevitably outpace
food production—unless checked by “moral restraint,
vice, [or] misery” (Malthus, 1982 ed.). By 1960, his con-
cerns appeared well founded. Growing at an unprece-
dented rate, the world’s population reached 3 billion, of
which about a third were chronically undernourished.
Four decades later, the world’s population has doubled to
6 billion, and demand for food has grown with it. But
food production has grown even faster, and the number
of people who are chronically undernourished has fallen
(fig. 1.1). Growth in food demand has generated incen-
tives to increase resource use and improve technology
and efficiency much more rapidly than Malthus antici-
pated, particularly during the second half of the 20th
century.
Despite these achievements, enormous challenges
remain. More than 800 million people remain chronical-
ly undernourished, most of whom live in Asia or Africa.
For many of these people, food security depends on
income from agriculture, and thus on the quality and
productivity of agricultural inputs, such as land and
labor. Meanwhile, concerns persist about the effects of
increased agricultural production on the quality of land,
water, and other environmental resources.
Addressing these challenges requires improved under-
standing of the links between land quality, land degrada-
tion, agricultural productivity, and food security (see box
on key concepts)—incorporating biophysical processes
as well as choices that farmers make in the context of
diverse and changing economic circumstances. Though
studied for many years, these links remain shrouded by
conceptual difficulties, disciplinary boundaries, and
incomplete data. Recent developments in each of these
areas have improved our understanding of how land
quality and land degradation affect agricultural produc-
tivity, how agricultural productivity affects food security
through its impacts on both food supplies and farmers’
incomes, and how food security, in turn, influences farm-
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Figure 1.1—World food production and population, 
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Not only has technological change proven able to augment food produc-
tion dramatically, it has also proven highly responsive to relative prices. 
The powerful dynamic that Ruttan and Hayami dubbed induced innova-
tion describes how technological change is driven by shifts in relative 
prices of inputs and outputs (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). In particular, 
this dynamic has meant that when land becomes relatively scarce (e.g., 
because of rising population), technological change tends to increase 
its productivity disproportionately. Indeed, the green revolution was all 
about technological changes in plant genetics, irrigation, and fertiliza-
tion; these three areas had the combined effect of sharply increasing 
crop yield per unit of land.
But technological change is by no means automatic. First, agricul-
tural research is not automatically triggered by relative factor prices. 
This mechanism can work effectively where markets permit the intel-
lectual property from research to produce marketable products. For ex-
ample, Hayami and Ruttan (1985) document the spread of tractors in 
North America in response to the high cost of labor relative to land 
and the spread of fertilizer in Japan in response to the high cost of land 
relative to labor. But certain types of agricultural research do not gen-
erate marketable products. Private seed companies have done much to 
Figure 7.2 Food Production Per Capita in sub-Saharan Africa, 



























































advance the genetics of hybrid corn, for which newly hybridized seed 
must be purchased for planting each year, thus ensuring that the re-
search will be profitable. But the same companies have shown little 
interest in improving open-pollinated cereal crops, like rice and wheat, 
because the seed can be multiplied on-farm, so that seed is only sold 
once. Hence, public sector investment in agricultural research was cru-
cial to the original green revolution breakthroughs in rice and wheat. 
Second, overcoming the scientific hurdles is only the first step to-
ward technological change. Breakthroughs at the level of basic research 
typically then require adaptive research that will tailor them to the con-
ditions of farmers who might take up the new practices. Adult education 
and extension efforts are needed to inform farmers about the existence 
of new technologies. Then, once aware of the new possibilities, farmers 
must be willing and able to adopt them (Nowak 1992). Technological 
change ultimately occurs because farmers decide to do things differ-
ently.
From Macro to Micro: What Drives Farmer Behavior?
Given the pivotal role of individual farmers in determining how 
much food is produced, it helps to look at the world from a farmer’s 
point of view. Farmers face many choices: whether to farm at all or to 
engage in nonfarm employment; whether to grow food or a cash crop, 
like cotton or tobacco; how much land, labor, and other inputs to devote 
to each crop or animal enterprise; and what practices (technologies) to 
follow.
The choices that farmers make are shaped by their objectives and 
the resources at their command. Objectives might include being able to 
feed, clothe, and house the family, or avoiding the risk of failing to meet 
subsistence needs in case weather or pests should be bad. Defined nar-
rowly, productive resources typically include the labor and knowledge of 
family members and employees (human resources); land, water, climate, 
and biodiversity (natural resources); and equipment, buildings, and the 
means to buy or produce feed, fertilizers, pesticides, and other inputs 
(financial and manufactured resources). Some would add to this list the 
networks of social relationships and cultural-legal institutions that en-
able farmers to obtain access to needed resources (social capital). 
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Two important environmental factors affect the quality of these pro-
ductive resources. Access to economic infrastructure—notably roads, 
communications, banks, and markets that supply inputs and buy prod-
ucts—strongly affects the costs of inputs and the earnings possible from 
selling products. The biogeophysical environment—notably climate, 
soil quality, access to water, and topography—strongly affects the need 
for agricultural inputs, the potential productivity of the land, and the 
ease of selling the crops produced. 
So if technological change was responsible for increasing per capita 
food production for the world on average, why have certain regions 
been left out? Several answers fit the question. The first is that while 
technological change may be driven by relative prices (which reflect the 
relative scarcity of specific production inputs), it is equally driven by 
scientific feasibility. Raising land productivity is most feasible where 
the land is fertile, well watered, and well drained. A few fortunate places 
in the world meet these criteria naturally. In many others, they require 
investment in mineral fertilizers, irrigation, and drainage.
The regions of the world that have lagged farthest behind in food 
production are those where the economic infrastructure and the bio-
geophysical environment are least favorable. The semiarid tropics and 
highland areas, like South America’s altiplano, Africa’s Sahel and high-
land regions, and parts of Asia, face formidable geophysical constraints. 
Steep slopes in highland areas exacerbate soil erosion; they may also 
aggravate seasonal drought if sudden tropical deluges run off before 
soaking into the earth. Semiarid zones, by definition, have scant rain-
fall, less surface water, and higher risk of drought. 
The underdeveloped economic infrastructure in these same re-
gions adds up to sparser, lower quality roads that make transportation 
more expensive. Poor communication networks render communication 
slower and more expensive as well. Less developed financial institu-
tions mean that credit for purchasing inputs tends to be costlier. Distant, 
poorly equipped markets mean that more farmers have farther to go to 
buy inputs and sell products. Expensive transportation, communication, 
and credit make production inputs on the farm costlier (e.g., fertilizers, 
improved seed, irrigation, drainage); they also reduce the farm-level 
value of food produced. Farm income is reduced both by transportation 
costs and by the risk of weak market prices inherent when poor com-
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munications deprive the farmer of information on where and when to 
market the crop.
Due in large part to these biogeophysical and infrastructural disad-
vantages, not only has food productivity lagged in the semiarid tropics 
and highland regions of the world, but these regions also account for 
large numbers of impoverished people. Global malnutrition is highest 
in regions where public infrastructure is most deficient and where the 
natural endowment of biogeophysical resources is least generous. In 
these zones, farmers face severe capacity constraints to the natural and 
infrastructural resources at their command.1
TOO POOR TO BE STEWARDS?
More troubling than the failure to expand food production faster 
than population in these poor regions is evidence of diminishing in-
comes, when one considers that incomes are critical to maintaining or 
raising per-capita food consumption. Worse yet, projections 25 and 50 
years into the future using the International Model for Policy Analysis 
of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) suggest that regions 
like sub-Saharan Africa are likely to see significant percentage increas-
es in the number of hungry people (Runge et al. 2003, p. 31). 
For large numbers of the rural poor, agriculture offers the principal 
means to put food on the table, whether it be food that was produced 
on the farm or food bought with earnings from the farm. Farmers can 
respond to the imperative to increase food production to meet rising 
household needs with two alternative strategies: extensification or in-
tensification. Extensification refers to expansion onto new lands. Usu-
ally uncultivated lands are less suited for agricultural production than 
those lands that farmers chose to cultivate earlier. They may be less 
fertile, steeper, more susceptible to drought, or more prone to waterlog-
ging than other lands. Hence, crop yields on such marginal lands tend to 
be lower than average. Examples of extensification include felling the 
forest to open new lands or expanding from fertile valleys up onto less 
productive hillsides. While extending farming onto marginal lands may 
reduce average yield per unit of land and may also increase the riski-
ness of output, it does not undermine the productivity of lands already 
in production.
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Intensification of agricultural production can also raise food pro-
duction per capita, as documented by Boserup. Subsequent authors 
have chronicled the virtuous cycle by which initial acceleration of soil 
erosion in Machakos, Kenya, was reversed over a period of three gen-
erations, as rising food and coffee prices led farmers to invest in land 
terracing and other soil conservation measures, enabling environmen-
tal recovery and increasing food production per hectare (Tiffen, Morti-
more, and Gichuki 1994). 
Unfortunately, the “more people, less erosion” story from Macha-
kos is countered by others where productivity has continued to decline. 
If access to increased income or other sources of investment capital 
is unavailable, farmers may have no alternative but to work harder to 
scrounge more food from the same land. In their study of agricultural 
intensification in highland Rwanda, Clay, Reardon, and Kangasniemi 
(1998) distinguish between labor-led and capital-led intensification. 
Labor-led intensification occurs when farmers work the land harder to 
extract more food. In Rwanda, farmers would cease to leave fields fal-
low, cropping them continuously but without fertilization. The process 
does intensify output per hectare of land in the short term, but at the cost 
of undermining the land’s long-term productive potential by mining the 
nutrient supply in the soil. Similar patterns of shortening fallow periods 
linked to declining crop yields have been observed in other parts of the 
semiarid and highland tropics (Swinton and Quiroz 2003b).
The distinction between labor-led and capital-led intensification of-
fers one explanation for how decline and increase of agricultural land 
productivity can coexist in the world. Basing their work on a broad 
review of literature on agricultural land productivity in hilly regions, 
Templeton and Scherr offer a unified theory for how these effects are 
linked to population, as shown in Figure 7.3 (Templeton and Scherr 
1999). They contend that at first, population increases are linked to 
declining productivity. For example, bush fallow cultivation systems, 
where the land goes unplanted by the farmer except for once every five 
or more years, tend to shift to long-cycle crop rotations of three to five 
years and then to shorter rotations, but all relying on fallow to restore 
soil fertility. As the annual output gains from such labor-led intensifi-
cation diminish, rising populations in largely autarkic regions trigger 
increases in the cost of food and of the land that can produce it. These 
changes, in turn, spur capital investment in the land, which gradually 
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increases land productivity from a low point. The U-shape of this popu-
lation–land productivity relationship can thus encompass both the la-
bor-led (Malthus effect) and capital-led (Boserup effect) intensification 
explanations with a common population driver (Templeton and Scherr 
1999).
In a world with migration and trade, opportunities exist for people 
and goods to move about. Many poorly endowed areas with rising pop-
ulations can receive goods produced elsewhere, often at lower costs of 
production than local costs. There also exist opportunities for inhabit-
ants to migrate elsewhere for work. Migration offers an alternative to 
intensification as a means for rising populations to meet their subsis-
tence needs. But how migration affects land productivity depends on 
the specific situation: migration reduces the labor available for farming, 
which can cause low-productivity systems to stagnate at the bottom 
of the population-productivity U-curve. On the other hand, if migrant 
remittances are reinvested in the land, then capital-led intensification 
may cause land productivity to rise. The upshot of migration patterns 
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is that certain regions can find themselves trapped at the bottom of the 
U-curve when migrants move out but households choose not to invest 
in agricultural productivity (García-Barrios and García-Barrios 1990; 
Zimmerer 1993; Wiegers et al. 1999).
Where the means for investment are not available, impoverished 
farmers face a stark choice between meeting current subsistence needs 
and preserving the future productive potential of the natural resource 
base (Mink 1993). Adolfo Figueroa (1998) succinctly summed up their 
dilemma: “Given the options of producing less today . . . in exchange for 
producing more in the future, or less in the future and more in the pres-
ent, the small farmer will choose the second option.” Such a Faustian 
bargain between survival and land stewardship directly contravenes the 
goal of sustainable development, defined by the Brundtland Commis-
sion as “development that meets the needs of the present without com-
promising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). 
If the poor are undermining their own future survival, not to men-
tion the natural resource base shared by the rest of humanity, what does 
this mean for development policy? Should we revive Sir Arthur Lewis’s 
dictum of the 1950s that the key to economic development is to transfer 
surplus labor from unproductive agricultural employment to the pro-
ductive industrial sector (Lewis 1955; Fei and Ranis 1964)? Should 
agricultural development efforts be targeted only at less poor regions 
or poor areas endowed with abundant biogeophysical resources? Such 
policy remedies would represent an abrupt change in direction. Is there 
conclusive evidence of circumstances where there is a causal link be-
tween poverty and natural resource degradation?
THE EVIDENCE
A number of recent studies have examined the evidence of links be-
tween poverty and natural resource degradation (Wunder 2001; Barrett, 
Place, and Aboud 2002; Swinton, Escobar, and Reardon 2003). The 
great academic challenge to these studies is to control for the natural 
resource setting and the level of political-economic infrastructure. Put 
differently, does poverty affect natural resource outcomes differently in 
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the rain forest than, say, in the savanna? Does the same level of poverty 
cause different environmental outcomes in a setting with good roads 
and communications, as opposed to a more remote location? The pleth-
ora of different agricultural natural resources complicates comparisons 
even more. The quantity and quality of soils, natural forages for live-
stock, surface and ground water, and forests are just the most evident of 
the natural resource characteristics that interact closely with farming. In 
order to parse the poverty-environment puzzle more carefully, we ex-
amine illustrative cases for three agriculturally related natural resource 
degradation processes: soil erosion, overgrazing of natural rangeland, 
and soil nutrient depletion.
Soil Conservation with Terraces
Of the many natural resource management technologies that farm-
ers in developing countries have considered, terracing to conserve soil 
and runoff water offers researchers the advantage of paired cases un-
der similar geophysical and socioeconomic environments. Recent case 
studies from Peru and Ethiopia present nuanced complexity. In Peru, 
terraces have existed for over 600 years, since before the time of the In-
can empire. Many of these terraces are maintained to this day, yet others 
have been allowed to decay, despite the fact that terrace maintenance 
requires far less work than new construction. Remarkably, elsewhere in 
Peru, farmers are constructing new terraces. How can we explain this 
conundrum that in similar topographic conditions in the same country, 
farmers would display such different attitudes toward soil conserva-
tion? Efraín Gonzales de Olarte and Carolina Trivelli (1999) point out 
that the returns to investment in terracing differ markedly from one 
part of Peru to another. In more remote parts of the country like the 
south-central Andes, where low-value crops like potato and forage are 
raised, the payoff to investments in terrace construction—or even ter-
race maintenance—are unattractive. But in the Pacific valleys, where 
cash crops can be raised for export or sale in coastal cities like Lima, 
farmers have been actively building new terraces because they see an 
appealing payoff and can obtain the resources to do it (Wiegers et al. 
1999). What is the effect of poverty? The poorest farmers are the ones 
in the remote areas who have been allowing terraces to decay. Many of 
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them have been opting to invest in migration to the cities rather than 
invest in agricultural land productivity.
A continent away, Ethiopia offers a similar internal contrast. Terrac-
es that were built by local workers under food-for-work projects have 
been destroyed by some landowners, allegedly because the value of 
their soil and water conservation services could not justify the forgone 
productivity of the amount of land they took up (Shiferaw and Holden 
1999). Yet at the same time, other terraces were being built voluntarily 
in similar parts of the country. In the areas where terraces were being 
torn down, it seems that on the steepest slopes, farmers felt that the 
benefits of terraces were too modest, whereas on the most gently sloped 
land, soil bunds offered comparable benefits at lower cost of construc-
tion and lower opportunity cost of land unproductively occupied. But 
perhaps the biggest reason for destroying terraces had to do with land 
tenure security. Where farmers felt confident of passing fields on to 
their children, they were much more prone to build or preserve terraces 
than when they expected to control the fields for five years or less (Ge-
bremedhin and Swinton 2003). The effect of poverty is not apparent 
here, although households with more members are more likely to build 
terraces.
Native Forage Protection from Overgrazing
Conservation of native range forage species offers another case in 
contrasts. In Chile’s arid Region IV—the north-central part of the coun-
try—impoverished farmers grazed goats on native scrub in a common 
pool grazing area, all the while watching the digestible native vegeta-
tion slowly disappear. Because of the growth of off-farm jobs in the 
grape industry during the 1990s and a government policy of subsidizing 
small-scale irrigation, many families earned enough income to invest in 
irrigation to raise alfalfa for cattle feed. As a result, the livestock popu-
lation of these communities increased, and there also was a resurgence 
in the native forage species (Bahamondes 2003). Farmers were able 
to capitalize on attractive cattle prices because of the off-farm income 
available for investment and the government cost-sharing policy, which 
proved to be critical contributors to this success story. Although the pro-
tagonists began the decade of the 1990s as poor people and ended it the 
same, the Chilean economy had created considerable wealth at many 
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levels in the meantime. Some of that wealth allowed investments that 
relieved the population pressure on the rangeland resource base.
In contrast, both the total biomass and the biodiversity of native 
forage species in the Peruvian altiplano have declined precipitously in 
the upland villages that relied upon communal grazing. Increasingly, 
the only species available are ones that are indigestible to the sheep, 
alpacas, and llamas grazed there. Yet the livestock owners most at fault 
turn out not to be the poorest in the area, who own few animals, but the 
relatively well off, who own many (Swinton and Quiroz 2003a). Yet 
indirectly, this story still traces its causes back to a poverty root. Over 
three-quarters of the people in the altiplano lack what the Peruvian gov-
ernment defines as basic human needs. Even the relatively less poor in 
the altiplano are still poorer than the peasant farmers of Chile’s Region 
IV, whose off-farm earnings have allowed investment in irrigated for-
ages. While livestock farmers in both areas have communal grazing 
lands at hand, the herders in Peru’s altiplano are far more distant from 
major urban markets than their Chilean counterparts.
Maintenance of Soil Nutrient Levels
One additional case study of maintaining soil quality provides a nu-
anced perspective on the role of property rights. In a set of eight villages 
in the Peruvian altiplano, farmers reported declining crop yields and 
soil fertility, compared with their recollection of 20 years earlier. Very 
few used mineral fertilizers or manure amendments to restore fertil-
ity, because of a shortage of cash and the need to use dried manure for 
cooking fuel. Regression analysis highlighted the primary importance 
of fallow cycles in their crop rotation. A second stage analysis pointed 
to the importance of a cultural institution known as aynoca for influenc-
ing farmers to include fallow in crop rotations. Aynoca is the Aymara 
word for a community-level cropping pattern, whereby fields in a cer-
tain part of the village are all sown to the same crop. While the aynoca 
system originated to make it easier for villagers to take turns protect-
ing maturing crops from predators and thieves, the system has had the 
side effect of enforcing a community-level crop rotation (even though 
the individual fields are privately owned). Farmers in communities that 
had abandoned the aynoca system conceded that the system had helped 
them to maintain soil fertility, although they reported having given up 
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the aynoca system in order to have more land to plant, thus boosting 
short-term production to meet household needs (Swinton and Quiroz 
2003a).
WHY DO THE POOR SOMETIMES SUCCEED AS 
STEWARDS?
The evidence can be interpreted at two levels. Certainly the clear-
est environmental success story presented here comes from Chile, 
where capital-led intensification was made possible by off-farm earn-
ings. Likewise, terrace construction in Peru responded to capital-led 
intensification stimulated by agricultural income-earning opportunities. 
When income is available to poor farmers, whether by cross-subsidy 
from other sources or by increased income from farm sales, capital-led 
intensification is possible and may have dramatic results.
But successful natural resource stewardship also occurred among 
poor farmers without capital-led intensification. Land tenure security 
made it worthwhile for poor Ethiopian farmers to achieve largely labor-
led intensification for stone terrace construction, even though benefits 
from soil conservation would only accrue slowly over time. Likewise, 
there was evidence that the poorest do not necessarily cause the great-
est natural resource degradation, as shown by the overgrazing in the 
Peruvian altiplano by livestock owners who are relatively less poor than 
their neighbors. And the success of the aynoca system at checking soil 
fertility loss by maintaining crop rotations with fallow illustrates how a 
common property management institution is able to support sustainable 
stewardship, at least at a basic level. These examples signal possibilities 
for sustaining natural resource management at modest cost.
POLICY GUIDELINES
So if the poor are not necessarily bad stewards of natural resources, 
what factors can public policy manipulate to improve their steward-
ship—and ultimately to promote sustainable development? The an-
swers will clearly vary from place to place, based on the politico-eco-
nomic infrastructure and the natural resource setting. But the recurring 
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themes consistently relate to understanding farmers’ incentives and the 
constrained resources that limit their feasible alternatives. Policy guide-
lines are listed below, beginning with ones related to farmer incentives 
and going from least costly to most. Many are familiar recommenda-
tions for strengthening small-farm incomes, because better incomes are 
key to meeting the incentive and capacity needs for increased invest-
ment in sustainable natural resource management.
Incentive No. 1: Clear, Durable Property Rights
Clear, durable property rights are a sine qua non for longterm in-
vestments in conserving natural resources (Feder et al. 1988; Baland 
and Platteau 1996). Uncertainty about whether future benefits will ac-
crue to the person who made the investment can sharply undermine the 
expected value of returns even in a riskless world, as noted in the Ethio-
pian stone terrace investment case above. For a risk averse, impover-
ished farmer, uncertainty about poverty rights undermines even further 
the expected utility of future benefits that will accrue in exchange for 
a known, up-front cost. Although, in principle, clear property rights 
would not seem difficult to establish, in practice the great challenge is 
to ensure their diffusion and consistent enforcement. Indeed, abundant 
evidence shows that formal land titling is not equivalent to land tenure 
security, particularly in countries where changes of regime have made 
enforcement of land titling unpredictable (Gebremedhin and Swinton 
2003).2 
Incentive No. 2: Local Institutions That Support Natural Resource 
Stewardship
Farmers’ objectives are not limited to the consumption of goods by 
household members; they also include intangibles like respect earned 
from others. Local institutions for community-based natural resource 
management can be effective by using peer pressure for the common 
good. The Peruvian aynoca system of collective decision making over 
adjacent private parcels of land illustrates a mechanism by which peer 
pressure helps to enforce a community-level crop rotation that can 
maintain soil fertility at modest levels.
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Incentive No. 3: Efficient Infrastructure
An efficient system of transportation, communication, and markets 
for agricultural inputs and products can dramatically improve the ex-
pected net benefits from investments in natural resources that support 
agricultural productivity. To the extent that agricultural growth allevi-
ates poverty, which in turn alleviates natural resource degradation (e.g., 
soil erosion and soil nutrient depletion), this can advance the sustain-
ability of some resources. Ready access to a transportation network can 
sharply reduce farm-gate input costs and increase expected prices at 
the farm gate for food products.3 The same kind of effect comes from a 
reasonably dense network of markets, though market density and road 
transportation quality are substitutes. Access to roads and markets were 
key stimuli prompting construction of new terraces for soil conserva-
tion in Peru (Gonzales de Olarte and Trivelli 1999). Effective rural 
communications, not only broadcast media but also telephone systems, 
can markedly improve the timing of market transactions.4 All three of 
these infrastructural elements contribute to the net returns of agricul-
tural production, thereby augmenting the value of conserving the natu-
ral resources that make agricultural production possible.5 Indeed, the 
continued viability of capital-led intensification methods like mineral 
fertilizer and improved seed requires access to markets that offer these 
inputs (Howard et al. 1998).
One important caveat to the call for improved infrastructure is 
that while better infrastructure tends to make farming more profitable 
(hence more likely to result in available capital to invest in resource 
sustainability), better infrastructure also facilitates the spread of agri-
culture. Where agriculture competes directly with valued natural land 
uses such as forests or prairies, better infrastructure may undermine 
the sustainability of those nonagricultural natural resources (Reardon 
 and Vosti 1995; Angelsen and Kaimowitz 2001; Lee and Barrett 2001; 
Vosti et al. 2003).
Capacity No. 1: Access to Education
Human resources are the most abundant assets in poor households. 
Level of education is often associated with adoption of natural resource 
management practices, for several reasons. First, better educated farm-
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ers tend to manage their resources more efficiently, obtaining better net 
returns (Kelly et al. 2002). Better net returns imply higher shadow pric-
es for the natural resources that make production possible, and higher 
shadow prices favor conservation of those resources. Second, house-
hold members who are literate and numerate appreciate more fully the 
economic benefits and costs of natural resource management. For ex-
ample, research into cotton growers’ pesticide management in Zimba-
bwe showed that farmers who could read and understand pesticide la-
bels were less likely to suffer pesticide poisoning from overapplication 
(Maumbe and Swinton 2003). 
By contributing to skills for off-farm work, primary and second-
ary education can help with natural resource management indirectly as 
well. Migration to find work is common in much of the developing 
world. Remittances from such activities can have the same salutary ef-
fects on sustainable natural resource management as the off-farm earn-
ings of the Chilean goat owners described earlier (Bahamondes 2003).
Agricultural extension education, when effective, can rapidly affect 
farm management. Thirty years of research has highlighted the impor-
tance of participatory approaches to extension and applied agricultural 
research. One promising approach, called farmer fields schools, leads 
groups of farmers in conducting their own on-farm research. Farmers 
find such participatory research engaging, while their farming neigh-
bors learn from the demonstration effect (van de Fliert 1993).
Capacity No. 2: Access to Knowledge about Natural Resource 
Conservation
Over the past 15 years, many countries have eliminated or sharp-
ly reduced their capacity for research and outreach in agriculture and 
natural resources. None of the case studies evaluated here involves a 
significant research element because most of the countries cited have 
sharply curtailed their research and extension activities. Yet adapting 
agricultural and natural resource management research results to local 
farmers’ needs is a precondition for adoption of new methods, mak-
ing participatory research approaches especially apt (Kelly et al. 2002). 
Research and education need not be carried out by the state: nongov-
ernmental organizations in many parts of the globe are finding ways to 
meet these needs. But clearly, awareness of the benefit flows that natu-
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ral resources offer and of the alternative management practices needed 
to maintain those benefit flows is a necessary condition for adoption of 
such practices.
Capacity No. 3: Access to External Sources of Income or Credit
Capital-led intensification may not represent the only means to in-
tensify sustainably, but it has certainly proven effective again and again. 
The Chilean case illustrates how economic growth in other areas can 
create off-farm earnings by members of farm households, whose in-
come then cross-subsidizes natural resource conservation. Research 
among the cotton farmers of the Office du Niger in Mali has shown that 
cotton farmers are more likely than nearby farmers of cereal grains to 
apply fertilizer and productivity-enhancing inputs to their fields. The 
cotton crop serves both to guarantee credit for inputs and to grant ac-
cess to input markets that exist to support cotton production (Kelly et 
al. 2002). Research in Ethiopia to learn farmers’ willingness to pay for 
the benefit flows from soil conservation found that the poorest farmers 
were willing to pay the least (Holden and Shiferaw 2002). While this 
is not surprising, it reemphasizes the importance of financial capital for 
natural resource conservation investments. Even terrace construction, 
which is largely labor-led, requires the means to nourish the labor force, 
if not to pay wages on top of that.
Capacity No. 4: Emigration to Relieve Population Pressure
Frequently unmentioned is the option of relieving population pres-
sure on natural resources through migration. Large regions of the Appa-
lachian Mountains in the Eastern United States were once hardscrabble 
farms. Putting the hillsides to the plow caused severe soil erosion while 
failing to generate adequate income to meet basic needs. Migration to 
urban jobs (sometimes paired with government buyout of farms) has 
returned that region largely to forest. A similar option exists for devel-
oping countries, but the policy challenge is how to generate sufficient 
economic growth in other areas to absorb the population of marginal 
farms. The risk is that migration merely serves to create irreversible 
natural resource degradation, as when poor farmers from populous re-
gions that are suffering declining productivity move to the rain forest 
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frontier. There, they convert the forest cover into fertilizer for short-
lived gains before having to move on.
CONCLUSION
Poor farmers in the developing world are not necessarily bad stew-
ards—but nor are they typically very good ones. Like the rich, the poor 
respond to incentives. But the poor face inherent capacity constraints: 
even when they earn enough to survive, they may not earn enough to 
invest in land productivity (Reardon and Vosti 1995). Malthus failed 
to foresee the potential of technological change to keep food produc-
tion ahead of population growth. But for that potential to be realized, 
technological change typically requires investment through capital-led 
intensification. The most promising way to slow or reverse agricul-
tural natural resource deterioration is to contribute to rural incomes, 
which enables investments in sustainable intensification. Several pol-
icy approaches with this general effect are proposed, such as incen-
tive schemes to broaden the marketing margin (making farming inputs 
cheaper and products more valuable) and attempts to strengthen the 
capacity of farmers to earn income on or off the farm. Good steward-
ship can also be encouraged without capital-led intensification through 
suitably designed property rights and local institutions. But the low cost 
of these strategies is offset by their limited potential to improve natural 
resource sustainability.
The natural resource perspective that shapes much of this chapter 
focuses on resources that support agricultural productivity, notably 
soil and rangeland. Overexploitation of these resources can often be 
relieved when suitable incentives exist and when increased incomes al-
leviate constraints on the capacity to invest in future resource sustain-
ability. For natural resources that are best sustained by limiting human 
access—as in the case of native primary forests and prairies—either 
carefully designed property rights must create incentives for sustain-
able management or else there must exist income earning opportunities 
from sources unrelated to the resource to be protected, such as urban 
employment (Escobal and Aldana 2003).
The common element among all the policy alternatives presented 
here is the importance of tailoring policy to the specific socioeconomic, 
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infrastructural, and biogeophysical setting in which agricultural natu-
ral resources are managed. Ways exist to ameliorate sustainable natural 
resource management practices, from the nearly costless to those that 
make heavy demands on the public treasury. But successful policies 
require a tailored understanding of the human and natural environments 
as well as clear targeting of the natural resource objective to be met.
Notes
The author thanks Steve Vosti for helpful comments.
 1.  For a world map showing these regions, go to http://www.povertymap.net/maps 
graphics/index.cfm?data_id=23355&theme=food%20security. 
 2.  A thoughtful literature exists on various common property management struc-
tures apt for sustaining certain types of natural resources, especially biological 
resources such as native forage species and forest-dwelling species (Baland and 
Platteau 1996; Otsuka and Place 2001).
 3. “Farm gate” refers to costs and revenues as perceived from the farm. The farm-
gate cost of an input is the cost to buy it at market plus the cost of transporting it 
to the farm. Conversely, the farm-gate unit value of a product is its market price 
minus the unit cost of transport to market.
 4.  In fact, with the rapid expansion of private contracting in the developing world, 
better communications and transportation can make possible access to high-mar-
gin global markets that are totally inaccessible to impoverished farmers other-
wise. 
 5.  Improved infrastructure will certainly benefit the household. The net effect on 
natural resources is indeterminate. As noted in the case studies above, invest-
ments in natural resource conservation depend in part on the profitability of agri-
cultural products that may be produced from them (e.g., the case of stone terrace 
construction in Peru). But better infrastructure also improves access by house-
hold members to off-farm jobs, raising the opportunity cost of family labor. This 
is why research in Tigray, Ethiopia, found that farm households in less remote 
villages were less prone to construct stone terraces.
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